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3ABSTRACT
This study is a critical examination of the views about the voluntary aspect of
religious faith in contemporary analytic theistic philosophy of religion. The
background  of  the  question  is  the  variety  of  opinions  regarding  the
voluntariness or involuntariness of religious faith. The study examines
different propositional attitudes, such as belief, hope, and acceptance, which
are  taken  to  be  involved  in  the  cognitive-epistemic  aspect  of  religious  faith.
Another important theme concerns the practical dimension of religious faith
and the attitudes it involves. Questions having to do with the emotional and
evaluative features of religious faith are also touched upon. In addition, certain
traditional theological topics pertaining to voluntariness of faith are
addressed. Apart from the critical evaluation, this study develops one view of
faith, that is, faith as propositional hope. The method used is philosophical
conception and argumentation analysis.
In  the  first  chapter  I  analyse  the  general  views  of  analytic  theists  on  the
nature of faith and propositional belief. In the second chapter the central topic
is how beliefs relevant to faith are acquired and the implications this issue has
for  questions  about  voluntariness  of  faith.  Richard  Swinburne’s  and  Alvin
Plantinga’s  accounts  of  faith  are  the  main  focus  of  this  chapter.  The  third
chapter is chiefly concerned with the possibility of believing without sufficient
evidence; the permissibility of such believing is also addressed. Views
elaborated by John Bishop and Jeff Jordan are central in this chapter. In the
fourth chapter I analyse views which claim that faith need not entail belief and
the impact of these views on issues concerning the voluntariness of faith. The
chapter consists of views put forward by Robert Audi, William Alston, Louis
Pojman, and J. L. Schellenberg. This chapter also includes the view of faith I
defend, that is, faith as propositional hope.
The  voluntary  aspect  of  religious  faith  has  been  understood  in  different
ways. The overall conclusion of this study is that the cognitive aspect of faith
is in the main involuntary, though volitional acts can have some effect on it.
The same goes for the emotional and evaluative aspects of religious faith. On
the other hand, the practical dimension of faith seems to be largely a matter of
voluntary  choice  and  behaviour.  These  insights  imply  that  from  a
philosophical  viewpoint whether people perceive a given religious faith as a
worthwhile and meaningful worldview is due to other factors than their direct
voluntary choice, but it is their decision whether they commit themselves to
the faith in question.
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9INTRODUCTION
THE AIM OF THIS STUDY
This study is a critical examination of the views about the voluntary aspect of
religious faith in contemporary analytic theistic philosophy of religion. The
background  of  the  question  is  the  variety  of  opinions  regarding  the
voluntariness  or  involuntariness  of  religious  faith.  Apart  from  the  critical
discussion and evaluation of various positions, the study seeks to advance one
conception of faith without convinced belief, that is, faith as propositional
hope, which is offered as a viable alternative for some religious doubters.
Analytic theistic philosophy of religion has dominated the modern Anglo-
American philosophical discussion on religion ever since the 1970s, when the
previous decades’ questions concerning the cognitive meaning and purpose of
religious  language  receded  into  the  background  and  epistemological  and
metaphysical topics began to gain increasing attention again.1 A noticeable
feature of Analytic Theism has been a strong interest in these more traditional
issues which are taken to be intertwined in religious worldviews.2 The analytic
theistic approaches to religion, in most cases to Christianity, are diverse, but
the tradition nonetheless has certain general characteristics that distinguish it
from other movements in contemporary philosophy of religion.
The theistic conception of God is typically seen to be at the core of Analytic
Theism. According to the renowned theist Richard Swinburne, theism is the
claim that God exists, which he takes to be equivalent to the claim that a person
without a body exists, who is eternal, perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient,
perfectly  good,  and  the  creator  of  all  things.3 For  the  present  purposes  any
elaborated  notion  of  theism  is  not  required  (the  subject  is  anyway
controversial). We may regard theism simply as the claim that God exists, and
a  theist  can  be  understood  as  a  person  who  in  some  way  embraces  theism
rather than rejects it in the way irreligious persons do.
Perhaps the most discussed topic in analytic theistic philosophy has been
the  relationship  between  faith  and  reason.  The  central  question  of  this
problem is  whether faith is  a  rationally  acceptable position and under what
conditions it can be considered such. The topic is generally discussed from an
apologetic point of view. In this respect the most notable theistic positions are
Evidentialism in its different forms4 and Reformed Epistemology5. In brief,
evidentialists strive to offer epistemic justification for religious belief by way
of  arguments  for  the  truth  of  theism  and  Christianity,  whereas  Reformed
epistemologists argue that holding religious belief can be reasonable without
1 On the language-focused discussion, see e.g. Stiver 1996, ch. 3-4.
2 For an overview on the subjects debated, see e.g. Peterson et al. 1991.
3 Swinburne 1979,  8-9.  For a  succinct  elaboration of  the theistic  conception of  God,  see e.g.  van
Inwagen 2006, 18-36.
4 See e.g. Helm 2000; Moser 2010; Swinburne 2005.
5 See e.g. Alston 1991; Plantinga 2000; Plantinga and Wolterstorff 1983.
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the  support  of  such  arguments.  Besides  these  positions  the  analytic  theistic
tradition  includes  viewpoints  of  another  kind,  for  example,  ones  that  take
advantage  of  the  ideas  of  pragmatism,  which  is  concerned  with  prudential
justification of religious belief.6
Given the prominence of the problem of the relationship between faith and
reason, it is surprising that analytic theists have not discussed very extensively
the exact nature of faith. As J. L. Schellenberg points out, most philosophers
are not concerned about the details of religious faith, but they simply hold that
faith can either be equated with religious belief, that is, with believing that so-
and-so,  or  that  it  entails  such  belief,  and  they  subsequently  focus  on  the
justification of that belief.7 There is doubtless a truth in Schellenberg’s claim.
However, the discussion on the nature of faith that has taken place in analytic
theistic philosophy has actually been quite diverse. For example, while the
notion of belief has played a key role in the discussion, both of the suppositions
Schellenberg mentioned—that faith is equal to or entails belief—has been
called into question by analytic theists.8 In  addition,  the  views  of  faith  they
have offered are divergent.
In this study I shall analyse the views of faith the theists have presented.
The views will be considered especially from the perspective of the
voluntariness  of  faith.  My  interest  in  this  theme  was  aroused  by  the  claim
frequently made in analytic philosophy, namely that believing does not seem
to be a matter of voluntary choice; we do not seem to choose our beliefs at will.
This claim has a fairly straightforward impact on issues concerning faith and
voluntariness,  assuming  that  faith  and  belief  are  connected  to  each  other.
Consider the following questions, for example. If faith entails belief, how could
faith be voluntary if belief is not voluntary? Might faith in this case have some
other aspects that are voluntary? Then again, if the beliefs allegedly entailed
by faith are not chosen at will, how are they acquired? What about the views
of faith which supposedly do not entail belief—can choosing this kind of faith
be a voluntary matter?
Besides such philosophical themes as mentioned above, issues concerning
the voluntariness of faith have to do with certain traditional theological
questions. They concern the supposed merit of faith on the one hand, and the
role of God’s grace in the acquisition of faith on the other. As to the former,
especially the Roman Catholic Church has emphasised that faith is a virtue and
as such meritorious.9 But this seems to presume that faith is voluntary, for
presumably only voluntary acts can be praised. On the other hand, traditional
Christianity asserts that faith is due to the supernatural grace of God and the
promptings  of  the  Holy  Spirit.10 But  if  so,  how  could  having  faith  be
meritorious and how could it thus be a matter of a voluntary act?
6 See e.g. Jordan 2006.
7 Schellenberg 2005, 106.
8 See e.g. Bishop 2007; Pojman 2003.
9 See e.g. Swinburne 2005, 140.
10 See e.g. Swinburne 2005, 118-120.
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The  theological  problems  concerning  the  voluntariness  of  faith  will  be
discussed  to  some  extent  in  this  study.  They  are  related  to  philosophical
themes, which are the main focus of this study. It should be noted, however,
that in analytic theists’ considerations philosophical and theological topics are
quite  often  entangled  with  each  other.  Such  entanglement  is  visible  in  this
study,  too,  although it  may be an undesirable feature:  one could reasonably
call for a sharp distinction between philosophical and theological reflections
on faith (cf. section 4.5.2.).
While this study revolves around the notion of will and its derivatives, any
metaphysical theory about the nature of will or free will is not presumed.11 The
same goes for the problem concerning the relationship between human will
and God’s foreknowledge or providence.12 Though  these  issues  are  by  no
means irrelevant, they do not belong to the subjects of this study: in this study
the focus is not on the metaphysical but, as one might say, on the psychological
aspects  of  volitional  activity.  I  shall  operate  with  a  fairly  unproblematic
distinction between voluntary and involuntary acts and states. For example,
for a typical human being running, studying, and whistling belong to the group
of voluntary acts, whereas sneezing, blushing, and falling ill have their place in
the group of involuntary things. And these distinctions hold regardless of
whether,  say,  the  metaphysical  view of  theological  determinism is  true  (the
view claims that each and every event has been preordained by God).
In contemporary discussion there is no overview on the different accounts
of faith that analytic theists have offered. The study at hand seeks to address
this issue, which calls for conceptual clarification. In this respect the closest
relative to this study is, as far as I know, John Bishop’s useful but short and
partly  cursory  article  “Faith”  (2010).  An  otherwise  noteworthy  book  about
faith, in general, written within analytic philosophy of religion, is William Lad
Session’s The Concept of Faith: A Philosophical Investigation (1994).  The
models of faith Lad Sessions develops bear a resemblance to and partly overlap
analytic theists’ conceptions. However, unlike in this study, Lad Sessions’s
focus is not primarily on the accounts of faith that analytic theists have
elaborated.
With respect to the question of the voluntariness of faith a predecessor to
this study is Louis Pojman’s book Religious Belief and the Will (1986).
Pojman,  however,  considers  at  quite  some  length  historical  views  on  the
relationship  between  religious  belief  and  the  will,  whereas  this  study
concentrates on contemporary discussion. Pojman also mostly deliberates the
voluntariness of religious belief, or belief in general, but this study discusses
more broadly the voluntariness of faith—this already indicates that faith is not
to be reduced to mere belief. In addition, though Pojman’s book still includes
considerations which are relevant to the contemporary discussion, much has
been said on the voluntariness of faith after its publication, and it is this later
discussion that the study at hand focuses on.
11 On the metaphysics of free will, see e.g. van Inwagen 1983.
12 On these topics, see e.g. Flint 1998; Zagzebski 1991.
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My study proceeds as follows. In this introductory chapter I present some
remarks on the philosophical assumptions and backgrounds of the study. They
have to do with certain views largely shared by the analytic  theists.  William
James’s article “The Will to Believe” will also be briefly discussed, as his view
is  relevant  for  contemporary  debate.  In  the  first  chapter,  I  will  offer  an
overview on the analytic theists’ views on the nature of faith and belief. The
chapter  will  also  clarify  the  research  question  of  this  study.  In  the  second
chapter, the key topic is how religious beliefs are acquired and the implications
this issue has for questions concerning the voluntariness of faith. The views of
Richard Swinburne and Alvin Plantinga are the main focus of this chapter. The
third  chapter  shares  the  questions  of  the  second  chapter  but  primarily
discusses the possibility of believing without sufficient evidence. The
permissibility of such believing will also be addressed as part of the topic of
the  ethics  of  belief.  Views  elaborated  by  John  Bishop  and  Jeff  Jordan  are
central in this chapter. In the fourth chapter, I shall evaluate different views of
faith without belief and their impact on issues concerning the voluntariness of
faith. The chapter consist of views put forward by Robert Audi, William Alston,
Louis Pojman, and J. L. Schellenberg. In this chapter I also present the view
of faith I defend. The relevance of these themes to the main topic of this study
should become clear in due course. In this connection it might also be noted
that the later chapters of this study widely presuppose the conclusions of the
earlier chapters.
ANALYTIC THEISM AND THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THIS STUDY
Some  presuppositions  shared  by  analytic  theists  are  of  significance  to  my
study.  I  shall  present  the  relevant  suppositions  briefly.  To  begin  with,  the
philosophers whose views on faith are analysed in this study are mostly
Christian theists, though there are also some exceptions. Some theists’ views
on faith are highly influenced by Christian thought and notions,  but for the
most  part  the  discussion  on  the  nature  of  faith  has  been  fairly  formal  and
depends only loosely, if at all, on Christian insights. This formality is echoed
in this study, though one might ask whether it is a deficiency when the subject
is specifically Christian faith.13 It may be that utilising Christian insights will
increase  its  popularity  in  the  future  discussion.  There  are  already  some
tendencies towards this direction.14
13 William Abraham has criticised philosophical discussion on the rationality of religious belief for
similar reasons: “[…] the beliefs that really shape and determine Christian intellectual identity and
existence are much more precise and specific than belief in God. They are constituted by profound
convictions about the person of Christ, about the mysterious reality of the Holy Trinity, about the
presence  of  the  Holy  Spirit  in  one’s  life,  about  the  possibility  and  reality  of  forgiveness,  about  the
existence of one, holy, catholic, and apostolic church, and the like. It is these rather than some minimalist
theism which really matters to the vast majority of religious believers. Yet until very recently these have
received next to no attention on the part of philosophers interested in the rationality of religious belief.
Somehow they are taken as secondary and peripheral.” Abraham 1990, 434-435.
14 See e.g. Moser 2010; Plantinga 2000.
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While the use of Christian ideas comes in different degrees, the thesis we
may  label  as  theological  realism is  widely  presumed by  the  analytic  theists.
Following  William Alston’s  general  point  of  view on  the  issue,  I  propose  to
define  theological  realism  as  an  interpretation  of  the  function  of  religious
language.15 Thus, theological realism is the view that at least some statements
of religious language are factual statements. As such, the statements are either
true  or  false  depending  on  whether  facts  (reality,  mind-independent  world)
are  as  the  statements  say  they  are.  As  for  the  facts,  they  obtain  or  exist
independently of human conceptions of them and have not been created by
human activity.16 Theological  realism  presumably  entails  some  kind  of
correspondence theory of truth: the factual statement “God exists” is true if
and only if God’s existence is a fact.17
There may be an inclination to conceive theological realism not merely as
an  interpretation  of  religious  language,  but  as  the  view  that  the  factual
statements of religion are, in fact, true.18 When understood in this  stronger
way,  theological  realism  looks  like  a  metaphysical  view  about  what  exists
independently of human thought and conceptions. In this case, a theological
realist would typically be a person who holds that mind-independent reality
includes,  among  other  things,  a  God  of  a  certain  nature.  However,  it  is  of
crucial  importance to realise here that  advocating theological  realism in the
first linguistic sense does not as such entail adopting any specific stance on the
truth value of the factual statements of a given religious language. So, being a
linguistic theological realist does not imply being a metaphysical theological
realist.  Typical  agnostics  and  atheists  are  also  theological  realists  in  the
linguistic sense: they hold that religious language involves factual statements,
albeit ones whose truth is doubtful, as agnostics hold, or false or probably so,
as atheists argue.19
The noted distinction between linguistic and metaphysical theological
realism is significant for our purposes. Analytic theists have not unanimously
embraced  the  metaphysical  version  of  theological  realism,  though  they
approve of it in the linguistic sense. In other words, though the theists hold
fast to the view that religious language involves factual statements, they have
not universally claimed that the statements are true beyond doubt. In this
respect, the views of faith the theists have elaborated go together with
agnosticism  and,  strikingly,  some  even  begin  to  approximate  atheistic
15 See Alston 1995; 1996b. See also Koistinen 2000, 28-29.
16 I suppose one could argue that central theological facts are in some sense mind-independent but
have been created by human activity. This, however, is not theological realism but sounds more like a
kind of theological constructivism or non-realism, which will be discussed soon.
17 In addition, theological realism about religious language naturally goes together with, though does
not perhaps entail, the view that religious language about God can be understood fairly literally. That is,
the way we speak about God does not in any significant manner differ from the straightforward way we
talk about mundane things. See e.g. Alston 1989, ch. 1; Swinburne 1993, ch. 4-6. This univocal reading
goes against the prominent analogical or negative theology’s interpretations of religious language about
God, which in some way problematise the direct applicability of our concepts to divine reality. On these
themes, see e.g. Stiver 1996.
18 Cf. Poidevin 1996, 111.
19 See e.g. Mackie 1982.
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positions.20 Just how these views, perhaps especially the latter prima facie
inconsistent view, can be possible, requires a further conceptual apparatus and
will be addressed later in this study.
The competing view to theological realism is theological non-realism (or
anti-realism or irrealism).21 This view comes up in various forms, but one of
its distinctive features is to interpret religious language as having primarily
some  other  function  than  expressing  factual  statements  in  the  way  a
theological realist assumes. For example, a theological non-realist may argue
that, just like the point of fictional edifying stories, the point of religious
language is not so much to describe supernatural reality as to arouse certain
favourable emotions or moral conduct.22 While  some  religious  fables  can
perhaps be suitably interpreted in non-realistic terms, for analytic theists, at
any rate, comprehensive non-realism about religious language is not a serious
alternative to the realistic interpretation of such language. Realism is typically
taken for granted (as, for example, this study will illustrate), and it does seem
to convey the traditional and commonsensical description of certain parts of
religious language.
In this connection one might also note that with reference to religion some
philosophers might deem inadequate the dichotomy and debate between
realism and different non-realistic positions. The insight behind this view
could be, say, that the distinction does not do justice to the sui generis nature
of  religious  discourse.  Something  like  this  appears  to  be  the  claim  of  the
Wittgensteinian philosopher of religion D. Z. Phillips. While he seems to hold
that God is real in religious life, by this he does not mean that some factual
statement like “God exists” is true in the way a theological realist may argue.
But  neither  does  Phillips  seem to  suggest  any  non-realist  view according  to
which God’s being real means that God-talk can be significant without having
to  suppose  that  it  refers  to  some real  object.  Apparently,  Phillips  has  some
third option in his mind as regards religious language and God’s reality. Then
again, Dan Stiver, for example, appears to imply that Phillips ultimately
belongs to the non-realists’ group.23
A further noteworthy presupposition of analytic theists relates to
theological  realism  and  explains  their  interest  in  the  problem  of  the
relationship between faith and reason. This is the supposition that faith has a
20 See e.g. Audi 2011; Pojman 2003. Cf. Schellenberg 2005.
21 For our purposes it is not relevant to consider how different non-realistic positions differ from
each other. All of them are anyway in contrast to theological realism. For some discussion on this theme,
see e.g. Herrmann 2004.
22 For views akin to theological non-realism, see e.g. Braithwaite 1955; Cupitt 1980; Herrmann
2004; Le Poidevin 1996. I suppose a theological non-realist can understand religious language in two
different ways. First, the non-realist may hold that religious language does not involve factual statements
at  all,  though it  may at  first  glance look like it  does.  This  could be termed as some kind of  linguistic
theological non-realism. Second, the non-realist can argue that religious language does involve factual
statements, but what one thinks about those statements as factual statements is wholly irrelevant, for
the proper purpose of religious language should be conceived as something else than describing mind-
independent reality. Unlike in the first case, in the second case the non-realist does not altogether deny
linguistic theological realism but is rather indifferent to it.
23 See Phillips 1993; Stiver 1996, 69-72.
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close connection with epistemic attitudes, that is, attitudes whose
truthfulness,  plausibility,  or  justifiability  can  be  evaluated  in  more  or  less
general terms. This may mean that faith or some aspect of it is conceived of as
comprising  epistemic  attitudes,  such  as  epistemic  beliefs  about  the  factual
statements of religion.24 Then again, the supposition may also mean that even
if the most central attitudes in faith are not conceived as epistemic attitudes,
they are nonetheless taken to be held in a framework of epistemic attitudes,
which have an effect on the reasonability of the attitudes held in faith.25
The supposition that faith has a close link with epistemic attitudes plays an
integral role in analytic theists’ discussion on faith, and, as we will see, it also
has  relevance  to  the  topic  of  the  voluntariness  of  faith.  However,  this
“epistemic  link”  supposition  has  been  questioned  by  some  philosophers  of
religion. First of all, a theological non-realist may see epistemic considerations
as  not  very  significant  for  the  discussion  on  the  nature  of  faith:  if  religious
statements are not primarily meant to function as factual statements, it is
perhaps  not  imperative  to  ask,  like  a  theological  realist  might  naturally  do,
whether the statements are true or justified or correspond with reality.
Instead,  for  a  theological  non-realist,  questions about the moral,  emotional,
and expressive value of the statements may be more important.
On  the  other  hand,  a  metaphysical  theological  realist  can  also  deny  the
importance of epistemic considerations for faith. Some fideists might advocate
a view of  this  kind (Barthians,  for  example).  Fideism, as Terence Penelhum
puts it, is “the view that faith does not need the support of reason and should
not seek it.”26 Accordingly, a fideist who embraces metaphysical theological
realism may claim that the factual statements of religion are affirmed solely
“by faith” or “on faith” and whether the statements seem more likely true than
false from the epistemic point of view is wholly irrelevant and beside the point.
This  type  of  fideism,  according  to  which  faith  is  entirely  isolated  from
epistemic  considerations  and  entails  an  autonomous  form  of  life,  is  widely
rejected by analytic  theists,  though some restricted versions of  fideism may
find some support among them.27
In summary, the questions analytic theists see as significant vis-à-vis faith
presume  certain  characteristic  views.  As  regards  this  study  the  crucial
assumptions  are  linguistic  theological  realism  and  the  view  that  faith  is  in
some way connected with epistemic attitudes. Though these suppositions have
been  questioned  by  some  philosophers,  in  this  study  they  are  taken  for
granted.  After  all,  the  questions  of  the  study  at  hand  arise  from  premises
representative  of  analytic  theists.  It  is  not  clear  whether  their  problems  are
significant to philosophers of another background.
24 See e.g. Plantinga 2000.
25 See e.g. Pojman 2003.
26 Penelhum 1995, 14.
27 See e.g. Bishop 2007. On fideism, in general, see e.g. Amesbury 2012.
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WILLIAM JAMES’S WILL TO BELIEVE
A  well-known  classic  about  the  relationship  between  faith  and  will  is  the
pragmatist  William  James’s  article  “The  Will  to  Believe”,  first  published  in
1896.  James  discusses  this  topic  from  the  viewpoint  of  epistemic
responsibilities, and hence the background of his discussion is the question of
the  relationship  between  faith  and  reason.  As  such  James’s  view  does  not
belong to the subjects of this study. But given the status of his article and that
there  has  been  interest  in  Jamesian  themes  among  analytic  theists,  it  is
appropriate to offer a brief outline of James’s claims here. The issues raised by
his view may serve as a preface and stimulus for the later parts of this study.28
James tries to argue that  at  times it  is  within persons’  rights to “adopt a
believing attitude in religious matters” even if their epistemic reasons for the
attitude in question are inconclusive.29 Here  James  is  deliberately  going
against W. K. Clifford’s famous evidentialist principle according to which “it is
wrong  always,  everywhere,  and  for  anyone,  to  believe  anything  upon
insufficient evidence”.30 Though James at first admits that Clifford’s principle
and views  akin  to  it  sound quite  reasonable,  he  nonetheless  maintains  that
they can be dismissed when certain specific conditions are fulfilled.31 In short,
James’s  claim  is  that  when  a  hypothesis  presents  itself  to  a  person  in  “a
genuine  option”,  the  person  may,  if  she  so  wants,  rightfully  adopt  the
hypothesis despite its evidential inconclusiveness.
What is a genuine option? James labels a choice between two competing
hypotheses as an option. According to him, an option is genuine if it is living,
forced, and momentous. A living option, as opposed to a dead option, is one in
which both hypotheses are live ones; both of them have some credibility or are
in some way appealing. A forced option is one which is unavoidable: there is
no possibility of not choosing some alternative. For example, accepting some
truth  or  not  accepting  it  is  in  James’s  view  a  forced  option  (withholding
judgement appears to be equal to not accepting the truth). Lastly, an option is
momentous,  rather  than  trivial,  if  it  is  unique  and  irreversible  and  there  is
something  significant  at  stake.  James  undoubtedly  sees  taking  a  stand  on
religious hypotheses momentous to some people, whereas a choice between
scientific hypotheses seems for him to be trivial.32
Suppose  then  that  a  choice  between  a  religious  hypothesis  and,  say,
agnosticism is for me a genuine option. Which hypothesis should I in this case
adopt?  James  argues  that  if  the  choice  cannot  be  decided  on  intellectual
grounds, my “passional” or “willing nature” not only legitimately may but must
28 A remark about interpreting James is in order. According to Richard Gale, offering a coherent
description of James’s “will to believe” thesis is challenging after all he has said about the subject. (Gale
1999, 93. See also Bishop 2007, 112.) I am inclined to agree with Gale. Thus, the outline presented here
will  be  just  one  superficial  interpretation  of  James’s  view,  and  I  do  not  seek  to  go  very  deeply  into
problematic details. My aim is here not so much to offer an all-inclusive description of James’s view as
to give a preamble to later discussion.
29 James 1897, 1-2.
30 Clifford 1879, 186.
31 James 1897, 8.
32 James 1897, 2-4.
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decide  which  hypothesis  to  choose.  By  passional  or  willing  nature  James
means humans’ non-intellectual nature, which includes, as James’s terms
suggest, passional and volitional tendencies and predilections, among other
things.33 Consider a simple example: if from the desiderative viewpoint I find
the religious hypothesis  more attractive than the agnostic  one,  James holds
that I should go with the religious hypothesis even if that is not intellectually
warranted for me.
But if my intellectual grounds for the religious hypothesis are wanting, why
should I allow my passional tendencies to choose it? Would it not be rational
for me to withhold choice and thereby choose agnosticism? James does not
think so. One of his reasons for this denial seems to be that by choosing the
religious  hypothesis  I  may,  in  fact,  be  putting  myself  in  a  better  epistemic
situation to assess the hypothesis’s truth (I have to “test” its truth). So, I must
go with the hypothesis, for otherwise, James says, relevant evidence might be
forever withheld from me, and I might cut myself off forever from my “only
opportunity of making the god’s acquaintance”.34 James argues that if I do not
choose  the  religious  hypothesis,  I  am  following  a  sceptical  or  agnostic  rule
according to which it is “better risk loss of truth than chance of error”.35 James
holds, however, that “a rule of thinking which would absolutely prevent me
from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really
there, would be an irrational rule”.36 Thus, since in James’s view adopting the
religious hypothesis can, in fact, lead me to discern the truth better, I should
choose it. It is better to have a chance of error than to risk a loss of truth.
Suppose  we  grant  to  James  all  of  his  points.  One  might  next  ask  what
exactly does it mean to adopt a religious hypothesis, when it presents itself in
a genuine option. It is here that the question of the relationship between faith
(“adopting a religious hypothesis”) and will comes up. According to one prima
facie interpretation, by adopting the religious hypothesis James is
encouraging, as the title of the article and some of James’s wordings suggest,
believing  the  religious  hypothesis  by  the  choice  of  the  will.37 That  is,  if  my
passional likings favour the religious hypothesis, I can simply decide to believe
it at will.
In  reality,  it  may  be  questioned  whether  the  above  is  what  James  really
means  by  adopting  a  religious  hypothesis—he  later  felt  that  “The  Right  to
Believe” would have been a better name for his article.38 Still, James notices
and discusses a problem that the general idea of believing at will involves: it
seems that in many cases our will is incapable of producing beliefs. In its place,
James holds, we are forced to believe what the intellect perceives as truth. To
utilise James’s own example, we cannot choose to believe at will that the sum
of the two one-dollar bills in our pocket is equal to a hundred dollars, but our
33 James 1897, 9, 11.
34 James 1897, 28.
35 James 1897, 26. James’s italics.
36 James 1897, 28. James’s italics.
37 See e.g. James 1897, 1, 6, 7, 29.
38 See e.g. Miller 1942, 542.
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intellect shows that the sum is two dollars, and this is what we consequently
believe.39
However, James argues that “our willing nature is unable to bring to life
again” only already dead hypotheses, such as the sum of two one-dollar bills is
equal to hundred dollars.40 Things  seem  to  be  otherwise  as  regards  live
hypotheses or the hypotheses involved in genuine options in general. In this
case our passional (willing, non-intellectual) nature can apparently do
something that overrides the view that the will cannot cause belief and we only
believe what the intellect dictates.41 It would be tempting to explicate James
as saying that a person’s passional nature can in some way change the person’s
non-believing state into a believing state as regards the relevant hypothesis.
But this is a vague description, and in this respect James is actually opaque
and ambiguous. It is not at all clear what he means by allowing our passional
nature to choose a hypothesis in the situation of a genuine option. But it seems
that some kind of choice is nonetheless made.
This  much  may  suffice  for  an  introduction  to  James’s  view—and  to  the
topics of  this  study,  too.  Though one further question could be what James
means by belief, the central thing to recognise here is that preliminary
considerations  suggest  that  the  idea  of  believing  at  will  is  strange,  and  this
peculiarity  has  relevance  to  issues  concerning  the  voluntariness  of  faith.  As
illustrated by James, the view that adopting a religious hypothesis is a matter
of simply believing it at will is not without its problems. Later in this study we
will review some theistic interpretations or, rather, reconstructions of James’s
view.  All  of  them  take  into  account  the  peculiarity  involved  in  the  idea  of
believing at  will  and seek to address it  in different ways.  This is  one way to
approach the question of the relationship between faith and will: how should
James’s view be understood?
39 James 1897, 4-5, 7.
40 James 1897, 8.
41 See James 1897, 9-11.
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1 FAITH AND BELIEF IN ANALYTIC THEISM
In  this  chapter  I  shall  firstly  analyse  analytic  theists’  general  views  on  the
nature of faith. The aim is primarily to offer a conceptual clarification and a
framework  for  later  parts  of  this  study.  Secondly,  I  will  examine  theistic
philosophers’ views on the nature of belief, since it has an important role in
the discussion on faith and voluntariness thereof. One thing should be noted
about the notion of belief from the outset. As William Alston says, the term
“belief” is ambiguous: it may refer either to the psychological state of believing
something, “believing that so-and-so”, or to what is believed, the propositional
content of the psychological state.42 In this study “belief” stands for the former:
it is belief as one propositional attitude among others, that is, propositional
belief. The latter use of belief is covered by the notion of proposition (for some
further discussion see section 1.2.1.).
1.1 THE NATURE OF FAITH
1.1.1 VARIANTS OF THE NOTION OF FAITH
The  concept  of  faith  is  extensive,  and  it  is  used  in  both  religious  and  non-
religious contexts. According to John Bishop, at its most general “faith” means
much the same as “trust”.43  On the other hand, J. L. Schellenberg holds that
“faith”  is  a  rich,  suggestive,  and  elusive  term—it  is,  as  he  puts  it,  “multiply
ambiguous”.44 Even if we focus merely on religious faith, it is tempting to agree
with Alston’s claim that because “faith” is a highly loaded positively evaluative
term in religion, there is a tendency to attach it to whatever one thinks most
central in a religious response to the divine.45 But this just further obscures the
concept. So, in order to avoid vagueness, I will in this section explicate some
relevant meanings of the notion of faith.
Robert Audi has distinguished seven different faith-locutions which he
thinks the discourse of everyday life contains. The locutions are:
(1)propositional faith, indicated where someone is said to have faith that
something is so;
(2)attitudinal faith, designated where a person is said to have faith in some
being (or other entity, such as an institution);
(3) creedal faith, that is, a set of tenets designated by ‘a religious faith’, the
kind of faith one belongs to by virtue of commitment to at least its
central tenets;
42 Alston 1996a, 3. Cf. Lad Sessions 1994, 50; Schellenberg 2005, 40.
43 See Bishop 2010.
44 Schellenberg 2005, 107.
45 Alston 1996a, 14-15.
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(4)global faith, the kind whose possession makes one a person of faith and
can  qualify  one  as  religious  provided  that  the  content  of  the  faith  is
appropriate;
(5)doxastic faith, illustrated by believing something “on faith” (or, perhaps
not quite equivalently, “in faith”), so we may conceive doxastic faith as
one kind of propositional faith;
(6)acceptant faith, referred to when someone is said to accept another
person, or a claimed proposition or proposed action, ‘in good faith’ or,
sometimes, ‘on faith’; and
(7)allegiant faith (or loyalty faith),  which  is  roughly  fidelity,  as
exemplified by keeping faith with someone.46
Locutions  (1)-(4)  are  relevant  here  and  so  worth  commenting  on  to  some
extent. Views similar to (5) and (6) will be discussed in sections 3.1. and 4.2.
respectively. Locution (7), as Audi notes, is important for understanding
religious commitment, which is a widely discussed topic in this study.47
In  locution  (1)  “faith”  functions  as  a  cognitive  attitude  akin  to
propositional belief. The intentional object of such faith is thus a proposition.
In  locution  (2),  on  the  other  hand,  the  object  of  faith  is  characteristically  a
person,  though there are other possibilities,  too—an artefact  or  a  group,  for
example.48 The object of this kind of faith is actually imprecise: it can be either
a  thought  of  the  object  or  the  object  itself.  Audi  seems  to  acknowledge  this
vagueness, as he contrasts the psychological use of “faith in” with its relational
use.49 Both propositional and attitudinal faith seems to involve some kind of
favouring (rather than opposing) attitude towards their object.50 In
philosophical treatments “faith that” and “faith in” have been defined
variously. Note that these attitudes need to be distinguished from their
doxastic counterparts, namely, “belief that” and “belief in”.
Audi’s locution (3), creedal faith, is in its meaning close to that of doctrine.
Audi holds, for example, that to speak of the Roman Catholic creedal faith is
to  speak  of  a  body  of  doctrine,  a  set  of  propositions,  which  is  supposedly
distinctive of Roman Catholicism. Audi says that his creedal faith is what Keith
Yandell labels a religion.51 According to Yandell,
a religion is a conceptual system that provides an interpretation of the world and
the place of human beings in it, that rests on that interpretation an account of how
life should be lived in that world, and that expresses this interpretation and lifestyle
in a set of rituals, institutions and practices.52
Given the comparison, Audi apparently refers by “creedal faith” to a broader
set  of  propositions than those of  a  specific  creed,  such as the Nicene or the
46 Audi 2011, 53-54.
47 Audi 2011, 62. For Audi’s elucidation of the locutions, see Audi 2011, 54-62.
48 Alston holds that “when one is said to have faith in a group, a social institution, or a movement,
either these are being personified or we are thinking of a person or persons as being involved in them in
some crucial way”. Alston 1996a, 12-13.
49 Audi 2011, 56.
50 Cf. Alston 1996a, 12-14. For example, Alston says that “if S were strongly opposed to universal
democracy, it would be somewhere between inapt and false to represent S as having faith that democracy
will triumph”. Alston 1996a, 12.
51 Audi 2011, 57, 57 n. 9.
52 Yandell 1990, 451. Yandell’s italics.
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Athanasian Creed. Possibly the creedal faith of a given religion can be seen as
that religion’s worldview.53
The  scope  of  the  Christian  creedal  faith  would  probably  be  broad  and
possibly indefinite for Audi. Traditionally, however, the propositional content
of  Christian  faith  has  been  conceived  rather  narrowly.  For  example,  in  the
Thomist tradition, as Anthony Kenny describes it, the content of faith is certain
propositions specially revealed by God through different mediums, say, Christ,
the Bible, or the Church. The propositions concern God’s nature and the acts
he has done, and they are not ascertainable by mere use of natural reason.54
According to this view, “the theistic proposition” that there is an omnipotent,
omniscient, and morally perfect God is not, strictly speaking, part of the
content of faith, since it was argued that God’s existence can be known without
special revelation by rational enquiry.55
Alvin Plantinga also holds that the propositional content of Christian faith
is  not  primarily  that  there  is  a  God.  Instead,  in  his  view  the  content  is  the
scheme of salvation God has arranged: “The content of faith is just the central
teachings of the gospel; it is contained in the intersection of the great Christian
creeds.”56 In this study we do not, in general, need to take any specific stance
on the question of what is the propositional content of faith. It perhaps suffices
to note that in theistic discussion the proposition that there is a God figures as
a typical example of the content of faith. When referring to the content of faith
we  may  speak  variously  of  propositions  of  faith,  faith-propositions,  creedal
propositions, doctrinal propositions, and the like.
In  Audi’s  locution  (4),  that  is,  in  global  faith,  Audi  holds  that  the  basic
notion is that of being a person of faith or of having religious faith. He opposes
this both to lacking any such faith and to having a particular religious faith,
which implies adherence to specific doctrines or standards (cf. creedal faith).
Audi argues that people with their own views of God can be persons of faith,
though they do not belong to any faith in particular. Being a person of faith is
in  Audi’s  view  a  global  notion,  because  it  “represents  an  overall  stance  in
matters that govern important aspects of human life.”57
I am not sure why having religious faith, in general, would in Audi’s way
have to be contrasted with having a particular religious faith. Does not having
religious faith always amount to having some particular religious faith, though
53 Compare Audi’s notion to that of Swinburne: “I understand by a creed a theological system in a
wide and vague sense, in which there are some central claims agreed by followers of the religion and
other disputed less central claims. I am not using the term creed in the narrower sense of a collection of
propositions to which a church member is required in some sense to assent.” Swinburne 2005, 198.
54 “The truths which it was alleged had been thus revealed were of various kinds: that Israel was
God’s chosen people, that there were three persons in one God, that the Eucharist was Christ’s body and
blood, that the Holy Spirit does not desert the elect, that the wicked would suffer forever in Hell.” Kenny
1983, 69.
55 Kenny 1983, 69-70, 74-75. Cf. Swinburne 2005, 138.
56 Plantinga 2000, 248.
57 Audi 2011, 57-58. It may be common to use ”having faith in God”, which Audi called attitudinal
faith, as a synonym for “having Christian faith” or “being a person of Christian faith”. See e.g. Moser
2010, 104-105; Swinburne 2005, 137. However, here “faith in” should be conceived more narrowly as
one relevant attitude among others a person of faith may exemplify.
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not necessarily an accredited one? For example, people with their unique
views on religious matters seem to subscribe to the particular religious faith
they  have  come  up  with.  But  be  that  as  it  may,  here  it  is  vital  just  to
acknowledge that there is such a notion of faith that is instantiated by being a
person of faith or by having religious faith. This is the concept of faith we are
above all interested in in this study. In the next section I will elaborate theists’
views on faith of this type.
1.1.2 ASPECTS OF FAITH
What does it take to be a person of faith? Or, equivalently, what does having
faith  presume?  I  suggest  that  this  question  can  be  answered  by  posing  the
requirements  or  traits  a  person  must  fulfil  in  order  to  count  as  a  person  of
faith. We may refer to these requirements as aspects of faith.58 An allegedly
complete index of these aspects could then be characterised as a model, a view,
or an account of faith (I will use these synonymously). Audi mentions that to
have,  or  be  of,  a  given  creedal  faith  is  mainly  to  hold  specific  tenets  and
attitudes.59 This,  however,  is  only a perfunctory description,  and the theists
have actually offered different accounts of faith. In this section I shall focus on
analytic theists’ general views on different aspects of faith.
Richard  Swinburne  holds  that  the  most  widespread  and  natural  view  of
faith  is  the  one  according  to  which  to  have  faith  is,  with  a  few  correctives,
simply to believe that God exists. “The person of religious faith,” he says, “is
the person who has the theoretical conviction that there is a God.” Swinburne
maintains that  this  view is  found in Aquinas and in many Christians before
him,  and  it  has  been  espoused  by  many  Protestants  and  many  outside
Christianity.60 Generally  speaking,  Swinburne  appears  to  be  right  on  this
point. The view that faith has to do with believing something to be the case,
that is, that faith is doxastic, seems to be a widespread assumption. But it is
not the only possibility, as will be shortly illustrated.
The  doxastic  nature  of  faith  seems  to  be  a  widely  shared  supposition  in
analytic theistic philosophy, too. The following evaluations by writers from
this tradition bear this point out.61 In Louis Pojman’s view, most theologians
and philosophers hold that Christian faith requires propositional belief,62 and
Schellenberg  similarly  contends  that  most  philosophers  maintain  that
religious faith is either propositional belief or entails such belief.63 What is
more, as Audi notes, in philosophical discussion on the relationship between
faith and reason there is a tendency to think that faith is belief-entailing.64
58 I suppose that one could also speak about, say, elements, constituents or components of faith. In
my view aspects of faith is just a suitably neutral term to use.
59 Audi 2011, 57.
60 Swinburne 2005, 138.
61 See also Koistinen 2000, 20-21.
62 Pojman 2003, 536.
63 Schellenberg 2005, 106.
64 Audi 2011, 52.
23
Plantinga even argues that beliefs about God amount to knowledge according
to his latest epistemological theory.65
Since there seems to be a connection between faith and belief, one could
argue that at least one aspect of faith amounts to believing certain
propositions, namely, the propositions of the preferred creedal faith. However,
this is an assumption that has been questioned in analytic theistic philosophy
of religion. To be precise, it has been argued that belief is not the only viable
propositional  attitude  a  person  of  faith  may  take  towards  the  relevant
propositions. The attitudes that have been proposed as a substitute for belief
are manifold. Alston, for example, suggests that acceptance is suitable for
faith,66 whereas Joshua Golding and Swinburne basically argue that assuming
the truth of the relevant propositions is sufficient (Swinburne’s view is actually
more complex; see section 2.1.).67 Then  again,  Richard  Creel,  James
Muyskens, and Pojman argue that hope can take the place of belief,68 while
Audi, Daniel Howard-Snyder, and Schellenberg maintain that propositional
faith can do that.69 It  is  of  importance  to  note  that  even  though  some
philosophers utilise the same term for the attitude they deem suitable for faith,
their definitions of the term may differ from each other remarkably.
One of the leading motives behind the above mentioned views seems to be
the assessment that considering belief or, rather, convinced belief, “the
theoretical conviction” in Swinburne’s terms, as a necessary precondition for
having  faith  is  unrealistic  and  an  unduly  strong  requirement.  Instead,  it  is
maintained that faith is also feasible with epistemically weaker propositional
attitudes.70 Pojman is a good example of this view. He argues that those who
are religious doubters and find it hard to believe that there is a God may still
hope that God exists, and this purportedly suffices for exemplifying one kind
of view of faith.71
The above line of reasoning is not unique only to recent discussion among
analytic  theists.  According  to  Timo  Koistinen,  a  standard  idea  in  the  post-
Kantian theology has been that having faith is compatible with philosophical
agnosticism. As Koistinen notes, Kant himself held that faith does not require
the belief that God exists but merely the belief that it is possible that God exists.
This  is  one  of  Kant’s  postulates  of  practical  reason,  and  it  evidently  fits
together with agnosticism or with not having a convinced (firm, strong, flat-
out) belief that God exists.72
65 See Plantinga 2000. For a similar claim, see Moser 2008.
66 Alston 1996a. It should be stressed, as Audi notes, that the term “acceptance” can be used as an
equivalent of “belief”. Audi 2011, 61. However, in this study we will draw a sharp distinction between
belief and acceptance. For discussion, see sections 3.1.2. and 4.2..
67 Golding 1990; Swinburne 2005. Cf. Buckareff 2005.
68 Creel 1993; Muyskens 1979; Pojman 2003. Cf. Knuuttila 1986.
69 Audi 2011; Howard-Snyder 2013; Schellenberg 2005. In addition to the views mentioned here,
Schellenberg lists the following authors arguing for faith without belief: Byrne 1998, 67-68; Lad Sessions
1994; Price 1969, 484-485; Tennant 1943, 78. See Schellenberg 2005, 129 n.1.
70 See e.g. Alston 1996a, 16; Swinburne 2005, 228.
71 Pojman 2003, 543.
72 Koistinen 2000, 90-91, 91 n. 76. In Kant’s view the “assertoric faith” merely needs “the idea of
God”: “The minimum of  cognition  (it  is  possible  that  there  is  a  God)  must,  subjectively,  already  be
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We can infer from the ongoing discussion that according to the theists it is
not a narrowly strong belief but, more broadly, some affirmative propositional
attitude that is taken to be indispensable for faith. We may name this as the
cognitive aspect  of  faith,  which  then  amounts  to  having  some  pro-attitude
towards the truth of the propositional content of faith.73 In theistic discussion
there appears to be two diverging general approaches to the nature of this pro-
attitude that is taken to be distinct from strong belief. First, one may argue that
the  attitude  does  not  amount  to,  or  consist  of,  belief  of  any  type  but  is  an
attitude of a different kind. This means that the attitude in question is non-
doxastic. Second, one may hold that the pro-attitude does involve belief, albeit
one that is conviction-wise weaker than strong belief. In this case one may call
the attitude in question sub-doxastic.74 These are important distinctions to
which I shall return in later parts of this study. For convenience’s sake, I will
in this section mostly speak about belief when referring to the cognitive aspect
of  faith,  though  it  needs  to  be  recognised  that  it  is  not  the  only  offered
alternative.
It  may  be  worth  emphasising  that  while  some  theistic  philosophers  are
arguing  for  sub-  or  non-doxastic  faith,  none  of  them  is  suggesting  a  non-
propositional version of it. According to one construal of the latter, religious
language never expresses propositions but functions in a way that is, in Audi’s
words, “not semantically statemental in a sense of implying truth or falsity”.75
A non-propositionalist could argue, for example, that the sentence “God is
good”, which prima facie stands for a proposition, in fact expresses some sort
of  positive  exclamation  akin  to,  say,  “hooray  for  life!”.  This  type  of  non-
propositionalism is best seen as a variant of theological non-realism (see the
introduction). Contrary to this, philosophical theists universally endorse the
propositional view of faith; they only differ on the point of what is a suitable
attitude towards the relevant propositions.
So, analytic theists hold that faith includes some pro-attitude towards the
truth of the propositional content of faith. But besides this cognitive aspect, an
account of faith is typically taken to involve something more. Relating to this
point,  Plantinga  says  that  suppose  we  ask  whether  one  could  have  the
appropriate  religious  beliefs  and  yet  fail  to  have  faith.  In  his  view  the
traditional Christian answer is yes, since, as said in the book of James (2: 19),
“the demons believe and they shudder”,76 and  yet  they  do  not  have  faith.77
What, then, distinguishes a person of faith from a demon, if it is not beliefs?
sufficient […]”. Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, 154 n. 32. In addition, according to J. P.
Day, Kant held that hoping is relevant here. The postulates of the practical reason are something one
hopes for. See Day 1991, 39-42.
73 Cf. Alston 1996a, 15; Bishop 2007, 104. See also Audi 2011, 57.
74 I have borrowed the term “non-doxastic” from Audi and the term “sub-doxastic” from Bishop. See
e.g. Audi 2011, 53; Bishop 2007, 110.
75 Audi 1991, 225.
76 As a  whole James (2:  19)  goes as  follows:  ”You believe that  God is  one;  you do well.  Even the
demons believe—and shudder.”
77 Plantinga 2000, 291. Plantinga, however, offers a suggestion according to which the devils might
not, after all, have the relevant beliefs: “The content of faith is plausibly indexical: a person x has faith
only if x believes or knows that God is benevolent toward x herself. But perhaps the devils do not believe
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Plantinga holds that the difference between a believer and a demon lies, in
traditional categories, in the orientation of the will. He maintains that the
dissimilarity is not primarily in the executive function of the will (say, decision
making),  though it  is  involved,  but in the affective function of  the will  (say,
loving and hating). Plantinga argues that even though the demons believe, they
hate what they believe and they also hate God. The person of faith, on the other
hand, not only believes but finds what she believes attractive, is grateful to God
for  it,  and  loves  God.78 This sort of welcoming the propositional content of
faith and being thankful to its sender we may label as the evaluative-affective
aspect of faith.79 This aspect  can be seen as encompassing a wide variety of
relevant favourable value judgments, sentiments, and emotions.80
In some instances the evaluative-affective aspect of faith amounts to
cherishing or esteeming the propositional content of faith (“the welcoming the
content”). This type of attitude indicates, in general, the positive value of the
relevant propositions. Such an attitude must be clearly distinguished from the
pro-attitude involved in the cognitive aspect of faith, which is more concerned
with  affirming  the  truth  of  the  propositions  in  some  way,  rather  than  their
positive value. However, some propositional attitudes seem to cover both the
cognitive and the evaluative-affective aspects of faith. At least at first glance,
propositional faith and hope appear to be attitudes of this sort. Still, the
general distinction between the cognitive and evaluative-affective should be
clear enough.81
Moving to another point, it is not uncommon to claim that besides believing
that there is a God, persons of faith also believe in God. Quite often “belief in
x” is used merely as a synonym for “belief that x exists” in which case the first
mentioned claim does not make much sense. Sometimes, however, “belief in”
and “belief that” are taken to be substantially dissimilar attitudes. There may
be different ways to elaborate the former notion as a distinct attitude from the
latter,  but  H.  H.  Price’s  and  Schellenberg’s  definition  of  it  is  especially
applicable regarding the topic of the evaluative-affective aspect of faith.
that God is benevolent toward them. They know that God is all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly
good, and that he has arranged a way of salvation for human beings; but perhaps they reject the belief
that God is benevolent toward them.” Plantinga 2000, 291 n. 1.
78 Plantinga 2000, 244, 291-292.
79 See Bishop 2007, 105. Cf. Alston 1996a, 15.
80 Here is what Plantinga says in one connection: “Chief among these right affections is love of God—
desire for God, desire to know him, to have a personal relationship with him, desire to achieve a certain
kind of unity with him, as well as delight in him, relishing his beauty, greatness, holiness, and the like.
There is  also trust,  approval,  gratitude,  intending to please,  expecting good things,  and much more.”
Plantinga 2000, 292.
81 What may seem to obscure the distinction is that according to some theories value judgments and
emotions involve propositional belief, which is a cognitive attitude. But even so there is an evident
distinction between, say, believing that God has forgiven the sins of humankind and believing that this
forgiveness is or would be a good or delightful thing. What may also seem to blur the distinction between
the cognitive and the evaluative-affective aspect  is  that  it  is  not  rare to speak broadly of  emotions or
affections in connection with truth-related cognitive attitudes. For example, Creel interprets
propositional  faith  as  emotional  confidence  that  a  proposition  is  true.  Creel  1993,  331  n.  4.  See  also
section 1.2.. But while such attitudes as Creel’s propositional faith involve an emotional or affectional
state, they nonetheless belong to the cognitive aspect of faith, since they primarily concern the truth of
propositions, not their positive value.
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Price distinguishes the factual sense of “belief in”, in which case it reduces
to  “belief  that”,  from  its  evaluative  sense,  where  he  thinks  something  like
esteeming or trusting is essential.82 Schellenberg holds that “affective belief”
is a better name for this latter attitude, and in his view it is primarily a matter
of emotion. Thus, Schellenberg suggests that “S believes in x” is synonymous
with the following conjunction: (1) S believes that x has value or is in some way
a good thing,  and (2) S is  disposed,  when x comes to mind,  to experience a
feeling state that, when conjoined with the fact represented by (1), produces a
blended experience of approving, trusting, and loyal emotions towards x.83
Price’s and Schellenberg’s notion of “belief in” can be conveniently applied
to summarise Plantinga’s intended affectional difference between a person of
faith and the demons: the person of faith not merely believes that there is a
God,  like  the  demons  do,  but  she  also  believes  in  God,  and  this  attitude  is
something  the  demons  lack.84 (Plantinga has actually made a similar point,
but  his  usage  of  “belief  in”  is  more  imprecise  than  Price’s  and
Schellenberg’s.85) It may be interesting to note that Price interprets the
demons  of  the  James  Epistle  as  having  factual  belief  in  God  but  evaluative
disbelief in him. That is, the demons believe that there is a God but neither
esteem nor trust him.86
Is there more to having faith than the cognitive and the evaluative-affective
aspects? Plantinga mentions that besides these things, faith also involves the
executive  function  of  the  will  (see  above).  By  this  he  means  that  persons  of
faith “commit themselves to the Lord, to conforming their lives to his will, to
living lives of gratitude.”87 (This  is  one  thing  that  Plantinga  appears  to  see
involved in belief in God.88) What is more, Plantinga says that “faith is initially
and  fundamentally  practical;  it  is  knowledge  of  the  good  news  and  of  its
application to me, and of what I must do to receive the benefits it proclaims”.89
Even so, Plantinga immediately adds to this insight that “still, faith itself is a
matter of belief rather than action; it is believing something rather than doing
something”.90
Bishop holds that  in the view of  faith Plantinga elaborates,  putting one’s
faith  into  practice  by  trusting  one’s  life  to  God and  seeking  to  obey  his  will
counts as “acting out” one’s faith rather than as part of faith itself.91 Plantinga
82 Price 1969, 435-437.
83 Schellenberg 2005, 69. Schellenberg’s notion of “belief in” resembles certain theories of emotion.
Consider,  for  example,  Patricia  Greenspan’s  characterisation:  “Let  me propose,  then,  that  we look at
emotions as compounds of two elements: affective states of comfort or discomfort and evaluative
propositions spelling out their intentional content.” Greenspan 1988, 4.
84 In order for affective belief to count as a religious attitude, Schellenberg holds that one additional
proviso is required: “At least part of S’s reason for valuing x is that S values the existence of an ultimate
and salvific reality, or, more directly, the good obtainable in relation to such a reality, if it exists.”
Schellenberg 2005, 86.
85 See Plantinga 1983, 18; 2000, 293-294.
86 Price 1969, 436-437. Cf. Helm 2000, 109.
87 Plantinga 2000, 244.
88 Plantinga 1983, 18.
89 Plantinga 2000, 249.
90 Plantinga 2000, 249.
91 Bishop 2010, ch. 3.
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seems to have a tendency to conceive of faith in this way, but among theistic
philosophers this view is somewhat unusual. In its place, it is rather common
for analytic theists to argue that having faith involves some type of practical
response, pursuit, or commitment as one of its central aspects; faith without
works is taken to be dead, as James (2: 17) states.92
An emphasis on practical commitment is, among other things, implied in
Paul Helm’s distinction between having “thin” and “thick” beliefs about God.
Helm  claims  that  for  a  thin  believer  her  beliefs  about  God  are  merely
theoretical in nature. Such a person may think that the beliefs she holds have
cognitive importance—they may be, for example, worthy of continual enquiry.
But even with this recognition, Helm holds, for a thin believer the beliefs she
has carry no practical consequences, that is, they are practically indifferent.93
In  contrast,  to  a  thick  believer,  Helm  argues,  God  is  one  to  whom  it  is
comprehensible to make a “fiducial commitment”. In his view, thick believing
makes such responses as trust, obedience, and devotion intelligible. In short,
Helm holds that thick belief introduces practical concerns,94 and he obviously
sees such believing as the proper attitude for a person of faith.95
In reference to Helm’s distinction, Bishop succinctly states that to those
whom belief  that  God exists  is  “merely  assent  to  a  metaphysical  hypothesis
with no significance for how they live their lives, theistic belief is outside any
context of faith”.96 In  another  connection  Bishop  notes  that  theoretically  a
person could have Christian beliefs, welcome their truth, and yet do nothing
in consequence, because of some type of weakness of will, for example. Bishop
maintains,  however,  that  to  be  a  person  of  Christian  faith,  one  has  to  do
something in virtue of one’s faith beliefs, namely, “commit oneself to God—
and that involves entrusting oneself  to God and seeking to do God’s  will.”97
One  might  say  that  here,  unlike  in  Plantinga’s  view,  much  weight  is
unambiguously given to the executive function of the will as a significant part
of faith.
To take one further example, Paul Moser has reasoned in a way similar to
that of Bishop, though he appears to put even more robust emphasis on the
practical  commitment  faith  involves.  Moser  argues  that  faith  should  be
understood in terms of kardiatheology, which is “theology aimed primarily at
one’s motivational heart, including one’s will, rather than just at one’s mind or
one’s emotions”.98 In  Moser’s  view  kardiatheology  should  be  conceived  as
“obedient entrustment of oneself to God” that is “inherently action-oriented”.
This view is then contrasted both with “intellectual approaches” that see faith
92 See e.g. Bishop 2007; Golding 1990; Helm 2000; Moser 2010; Pojman 2003; Swinburne 2005.
93 Helm 2000, 107-108. See also Helm 2000, 105.
94 Helm 2000, 106, 108.
95 See e.g. Helm 2000, 110. Helm’s distinction between thin and thick beliefs about God is wide-
ranging. For further elucidation see Helm 2000, 103-111.
96 Bishop 2007, 48.
97 Bishop 2007, 105-106.
98 Moser 2010, 25-26.
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only as belief and with “subjectivist approaches” that fail to make faith action-
oriented.99
As a result, it is typical for analytic theists to hold that having faith entails
a  commitment  to  God or  to  the  creedal  faith  one  espouses  by  some sort  of
practical action—or perhaps it is more accurate to speak of a disposition to act.
We  may  label  this  as  the practical aspect of faith. There may be different
interpretations as to what exactly is involved in this aspect, but the subsequent
outline  giving  Swinburne’s  views  likely  serves  as  an  appropriate  guide.  To
begin with, Swinburne notes that commitment to God is possible with good or
evil purposes. A person may, as he says, “try to conquer the world, believing
that God will help him in this task”.100 But Swinburne holds that a saving faith
cannot  be  exhibited  by  complete  scoundrels,  such  as  the  would-be  world
conqueror. He thus claims that a person can have faith only if her purposes are
good ones, like feeding the starving, worshipping God, and seeking an after-
life for oneself or for others.101 Following these thoughts,  one might suggest
that seeking to do actions that are morally good in the light of the faith one
advocates fits in with the practical aspect of faith.102
Relating  to  the  aspect  of  faith  at  hand,  Yandell  has  made  a  distinction
between “practical faith” and “personal faith”. He holds that the former
amounts to practising religion, for example, by participating in rites and
rituals and by confessing sins to God and asking for forgiveness. On the other
hand,  personal  faith,  according  to  Yandell’s  definition,  means  to  trust  God:
“One takes that Person to will good to oneself and others […]. One worships
God, not only as powerful, but as good. One confesses one’s sins and commits
one’s life to God.”103 Yandell’s motivation for his distinction seems to be the
possibility  that  one  can  apparently  have  improper  “empty  faith”,  that  is,
practical faith without personal faith.104
I  am  not  sure  whether  Yandell’s  distinction  is  reasonable,  though  some
division in that neighbourhood may be (social versus personal, perhaps; see
also  below).  The  problem  is  that  given  Yandell’s  somewhat  perfunctory
definitions of practical and personal faith, I cannot see how they would differ
from each other in any crucial way. There is surely the possibility of having a
kind of empty faith, when one practises faith only outwardly, superficially, or
formally. But this can be described as not fully executing the practical aspect
of faith or, say, as instantiating the practical aspect but not the evaluative-
affective  aspect  of  faith.  Either  way,  I  do  not  see  any  reason  to  make  a
distinction between practical and personal faith. Both of them are covered by
the practical aspect of faith as defined here.
99 Moser 2010, 105.
100 Swinburne 2005, 145.
101 Swinburne 2005, 145-146.
102 Swinburne seems to argue that having good purposes is an additional requirement for faith, and
it is not entailed by what we named the practical aspect of faith. We may, however, think that the
entailment holds. Cf. Helm 2000, 157.
103 Yandell 1990, 460-461.
104 Yandell 1990, 461.
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As presented so far, exemplifying all of the introduced three aspects of faith
would basically amount to holding certain valued propositions true and acting
upon  them.  Someone  might  claim  that  this  still  omits  something  essential,
namely, the interpersonal character of faith. For example, Moser argues that
“the notion of ‘faith in God’ is not reducible to the idea of faith ‘that God
exists’”.105 By this he means that having faith actually relates one to God, not
just  to  a  judgment  or  a  proposition  about  God.  Moser  notes  that  writers
influenced by Kierkegaard would say that faith involves a distinctive “I-Thou”
relationship between a human and God.106 Consequently, one might hold that
faith involves having a personal relationship with God. We may label this the
interpersonal aspect  of  faith  (which  is  not  to  be  confused  with  Yandell’s
personal faith).
The central question with respect to the interpersonal aspect of faith is what
does having a personal relationship with God actually mean. Moser appears to
think  that  one  important  aspect  of  this  relationship  is  a  peculiar  type  of
ongoing experiential acquaintance with God.107 While  the  nature  of  such
acquaintance would obviously require closer analysis, one may nonetheless
ask  a  few  things  about  it  from  the  outset.  First,  why  would  any  sort  of
experience of God be a necessary aspect of faith? Is it not instead the goal of
faith (cf. visio beatifica)? Additionally, Alston, for example, thinks that the
experiential awareness of God is a rare phenomenon, and Plantinga holds that
perception  of  God  is  a  part  of  mature  Christian  life,  but  such  maturity  in
Christian life is not attained by most people.108
Secondly,  one  might  ask  whether  a  condition  for  an  assumed  personal
relationship with God is experiential acquaintance with God. Moser seems to
think  so,  but  Kevin  Kinghorn,  for  example,  appears  to  think  otherwise.
According to Kinghorn, a person enters into a relationship with God when she
has faith in God under the following description:
Person  S  has  faith  in  person  G  inasmuch  as  S,  in  response  to  G’s  invitational
statement(s) to S, accepts G’s authority in the areas to which this statement(s)
indicates that G’s authority extends.109
As examples of invitational statements Kinghorn mentions commands,
promises,  and  assertions,  and  he  notes  that  God can  issue  such  statements
both directly, that is, “in person”, and indirectly through different channels,
say, a preacher or Scripture.110
Suppose  then  that  a  person  receives  God’s  invitational  statements  by
indirect means and accepts God’s authority in the required way. In this case,
according to Kinghorn’s description, the person has a relationship with God,
and yet she is not necessarily experientially acquainted with God. Perhaps as
a rough analogy one could offer an athlete who is trained by her coach via email
105 Moser 2010, 92.
106 Moser 2010, 92-93, 104-105. With respect to this point, Moser refers to Buber 1923; Brunner
1964; Farmer 1942 ch. 2; Kierkegaard 1992; Moser 2008, ch. 3.
107 See e.g. Moser 2008, 65; 2010, 91.
108 Alston 1991, 36; Plantinga 2000, 289.
109 Kinghorn 2005, 51-52.
110 See Kinghorn 2005, 52-59.
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correspondence only. In this case it is natural to think that even if the athlete
and the coach have never met in person, they are in a personal relationship
with each other (“the athlete accepts her coach’s authority in the areas to which
his training plan indicates his authority extends”).
Thus, it may be that a vital feature of personal relationships is not so much
experiential acquaintance but, as Kinghorn puts it, “mutual recognition of, and
response to, the agency of the other person”.111 It  is  relevant  to  note  that
Kinghorn seems to hold that the response to the other person, the “accepting
G’s  authority”,  is  in  essence  a  sort  of  commitment  to  the  other  person  that
manifests itself in practical action. A similar point applies to Moser’s view, too
(see his notion of kardiatheology above).112 In this way Kinghorn’s and Moser’s
accounts  of  what  a  personal  relationship  amounts  to  resemble  the
commitment we have taken the practical aspect of faith to involve.
Given the stated similarity between the practical and the interpersonal
aspects, one might ask whether it is possible to have the former without the
latter. Kinghorn seems to think that something like this is possible. His idea,
to  put  it  simply,  appears  to  be  something  like  the  following:  there  is  a
difference between responding merely to the statements given by God, on the
one hand, and responding to the giver of these statements, namely, to God as
a personal agent, on the other.113 The former would in our terms amount to
executing merely the practical aspect of faith, while the latter would amount
to instantiating the interpersonal aspect of faith.
We may illustrate this  point with our previous mundane example.  There
seems to be a difference between the following scenarios: the athlete executes
her coach’s training plan only because the plan as such seems to be workable;
the athlete executes the plan because it was given to her by the coach whom
she recognises as an authority on this specific subject. Unlike in the latter case,
in the former it is not so important where or from whom the training plan is
received,  and  so  one  might  propose  that  the  former  does  not  constitute  a
personal relationship.114
To note one further thing about the interpersonal aspect of faith, in Helm’s
view some proponents of “the personalist view” argue that because faith is a
personal relationship, it is not propositional at all.115 A defender of such a view
may claim, for example, that the interpersonal character of faith would only be
distorted if it were expressed in propositional form.116 Helm is critical towards
such views. He maintains that even if the object of faith is a matter of direct
acquaintance, it does not follow that propositions could not represent different
aspects  of  this  experience.  Helm  claims  that  faith  is  “always  exercised  in
111 Kinghorn 2005, 52. In a similar fashion, William Lad Sessions argues that a personal relationship,
which faith in his view is, is “a relationship between two distinct existing persons qua persons; it requires
at least minimal mutual understanding by each person of his or her own and the other person’s character
and intentions and also an understanding of the nature of their relationship”. Lad Sessions 1993, 76.
112 See Kinghorn 2005, 59-62.
113 Kinghorn 2005, 57-59.
114 Cf. Kinghorn 2005, 57-58.
115 Helm 2000, 3-4, 6.
116 Cf. Helm 2000, 4.
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respect  of  some  belief  or  beliefs  about  the  one  in  whom  the  faith  is
exercised”.117 Helm’s  critique  illustrates  the  weight  theists  give  to  the
propositional nature of faith.118.
1.1.3 CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION
As a result, my suggestion is that four broad and interrelated aspects of faith
can be distinguished within theistic discussion on what is an adequate model
(view, account)  of  faith,  or,  in other words,  on what being a person of  faith
entails. The aspects could be summarised as follows:
(i) the cognitive aspect: having some affirmative propositional attitude
towards the truth of the propositional content of faith;
(ii) the evaluative-affective aspect: positively evaluating the content of faith
and having appropriate emotional and reverential attitudes towards
God;
(iii) the practical aspect:  commitment  to  God and  to  the  creedal  faith  one
embraces by appropriate practical action or, rather, action disposition;
(iv) the interpersonal aspect: having a personal relationship with God.
We should note that not all of these aspects have received equal attention
in theistic discussion. Neither have they always been distinguished from each
other in the way done here. As we shall see, there is also some controversy
about which aspects are indispensable for an adequate account of faith. Here
it perhaps suffices to say that in addition to some cognitive attitude, which has
been seen as a sine  qua  non for faith, some kind of commitment is often
accentuated, whereas the interpersonal aspect has deserved less, if any,
consideration  in  this  context  (as  this  study  demonstrates).  But  there  are
exceptions to this general tendency, and sometimes these issues may be just a
question of varying emphases or definitions. One might also note that it seems
that the analytic theists have not really paid attention to possible social,
communal or institutional aspects of faith. This may be a deficiency.119
We might here speculate whether each of the presented aspects of faith
could alone function as a realisable model of faith. With respect to (i), having
117 Helm 2000, 5-7.
118 Helm does not actually specify who argues for a personalist and non-propositional account of
faith  but  just  refers  to  Lad  Sessions’  work  concerning  the  personalist  view.  See  Helm  2000,  3;  Lad
Sessions 1994, 26-49. It is noteworthy, however, that Lad Sessions does not claim that the personalist
view implies a non-propositional view of faith. Instead, he is critical towards such views, and his critique
is  similar  to that  of  Helm: “Accounts of  faith as  lacking propositional  belief  must  either devise some
nonpropositional account of cognition or else give up cognitivity for faith altogether. Neither alternative
seems very attractive—at any rate neither is attractive on the personal relationship model. Concerning
the former, nonpropositional knowledge or cognition may be (essentially) involved in personal
relationship, but this cannot be all that is involved. Even the best of friends or lovers needs to hold some
view as to the truth of certain important propositions about the other’s character, beliefs, intentions, and
desires (“he is trustworthy,” “she loves me”). Concerning the latter, without the cognitivity entrained by
propositional  belief,  we  could  not  talk  about  good  or  bad  personal  relationships  in  ways  that  seem
essential, as, for example, delusive or defective […]. No doubt it is vital that personal relationships can
be good or bad in ways that do not involve (believing) propositions, but this is no reason to extirpate
propositional cognitivity from faith altogether.” Lad Sessions 1994, 35-36.
119 See, however, Audi 2011, 97-99.
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merely some affirmative propositional attitude towards the preferred creedal
faith seems to be a coherent view. But, as we have seen, as such it is at least in
analytic theistic philosophy taken to be an unsatisfactory account of faith. As
to (ii), having only evaluative-affective attitudes relevant to the preferred faith
also looks like a feasible stance, at least partially. It seems possible for a person
to think,  for  example,  that  God’s  existence would be a good thing while she
lacks  a  view on  the  truth  of  the  matter.  Then  again,  by  the  looks  of  it,  it  is
questionable whether one could, say, emotionally love God while not holding
any view on God’s existence. Presumably the evaluative-affective aspect is not
by itself a sufficient model of faith, but when understood more broadly, it is
not unprecedented to argue that having faith is primarily a matter of emotion
of some sort. For example, Friedrich Schleiermacher, who was influenced by
the Romantic Movement, in his most famous statement defined religion as a
feeling of absolute dependence.120
Regarding (iii), at least from the theistic perspective it seems that it cannot
function as a viable model of faith without (i): engaging in religious activities
without any suitable cognitive aspect would amount to a case of make-believe.
This can, however, illustrate a type of truth-indifferent account of faith, which
is actually not far from Robin Le Poidevin’s non-realist construal of faith.121 Le
Poidevin holds that “to engage in religious practice […] is to engage in a game
of  make-believe”,  and  the  point  of  such  engagement  is  to  arouse  certain
valuable  emotions  that  can  have  an  impact  on  one’s  life.122 Alternatively,
having  (iii)  without  (i)  can  be  understood  in  a  stricter  sense  as  performing
religious actions without any cognition. This, however, does not seem to be a
comprehensible idea.  Would not action without any cognitive aspect  be just
blind,  unstructured  motion?  But  this  is  not  to  say  that  the  aim  of  some
religious  actions,  say,  meditation,  could  not  be  emptying  one’s  mind  from
thoughts altogether.
Lastly, whether (iv) alone could function as an account of faith obviously
depends  on  what  is  meant  by  having  a  relationship  with  God.  I  will  here
consider only one possibility. Suppose that having a personal relationship with
God involves experiential acquaintance with God. In this case one might argue
that the encounter with the divine reality is a completely ineffable experience,
and thus it cannot be expressed in a propositional form. On the face of it, this
model of faith would then not involve any cognitive aspect. But this may not
be very convincing. Even if one’s putative acquaintance with the divine reality
is for the most part indescribable, one needs to have some assumptions about
the nature of the experience, say, that it is of a religious character and that it
is,  say,  probably  truthful.  And  this  just  means  that  some  sort  of  broadly
cognitive aspect is required. So, it is hard to see how (iv) could function as a
model of faith without (i) (see also Helm’s critique against non-propositional
personalist views above).
120 See e.g. Forster 2002, ch. 10.
121 See Le Poidevin 1996, ch. 8.
122 Le Poidevin 1996, 118-119.
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Bishop has proposed that there are three key aspects that may feature in
models of faith: the cognitive, the affective, and the volitional.123 My list is a bit
different. Additionally, in my view it is more appropriate to think of Bishop’s
volitional aspect not as an aspect of faith but as a feature that may in a certain
way attach to some or all of the four introduced aspects of faith. This will, in
fact, be my viewpoint on the topic of the voluntariness of faith in the present
study.  Some  of  the  introduced  aspects  may  already  look  like  suitable
candidates for voluntary control. For example, it seems natural to think that
practical actions are chosen at will, and thus it might be proposed that at least
exemplifying the practical aspect of faith is voluntary. But even this requires
further analysis.
1.2 THE NATURE OF BELIEF
As we saw in the previous section, it is a widely held view in analytic theistic
philosophy that having faith involves having beliefs or, more accurately, that
the cognitive aspect of faith consists of propositional belief. While we saw that
this view has been questioned by some theistic philosophers, the assumption
nonetheless  often  serves  as  a  starting  point  for  the  discussion  on  faith  and
voluntariness thereof. It is thus significant to analyse theistic philosophers’
understanding of the notion of belief. In what follows, I will start with briefly
explicating the customary view of the structure of belief or propositional
attitudes,  in  general.  Subsequently,  I  will  describe  theists’  views  on  what
Pojman  calls  “the  phenomenology  of  belief”,  which,  as  the  name  suggests,
concerns the phenomenal features of belief.124
1.2.1 THE STRUCTURE OF BELIEF
Propositional attitudes like “believe that”, “know that”, and “hope that” are
normally taken to express a relation between a person and the content or the
object of the attitude, a proposition.125 When I believe that it rains, the person
is me who has the relation of belief to the proposition that it rains. There are
varying  views  on  the  ontological  status  of  propositional  attitudes  and
especially propositions, but from the folk psychological viewpoint, at least,
propositional attitudes are mental entities whose existence depends on
individual  minds.  It  is  also  tempting  to  think,  as  Plantinga  says,  that
propositions  are  ontologically  dependent  on  mental  activity  in  the  way  that
“either they just are thoughts, or else at any rate couldn’t exist if not thought
of”.126 Then again, Frege, for example, appears to hold that propositions, while
being graspable by thinking, are some type of abstract entities with a mind-
123 See Bishop 2010.
124 Pojman 2001, 138-141.
125 See e.g. Swinburne 2001b, 32.
126 Plantinga 2007, 211.
Faith and Belief in Analytic Theism
34
independent mode of being.127 We do not need to settle this Platonist debate
but may consider propositions simply as something that can be the objects of
propositional attitudes. In addition, they are, as William Lad Sessions puts it,
“whatever can have a truth-value of true or false”.128
In formal notation “S believes that p” can be put as follows:
(a) Bsp.
Negation of belief can amount to two things. For what is denied can be either
the belief-attitude or the proposition in question. Thus “S does not believe that
p” and “S believes that not-p” respectively:
(b) ¬Bsp,
(c) Bs¬p.
We may call (b) non-belief that p and (c) disbelief that p. So, to disbelieve that
p is equal to believing that not-p. Both (b) and (c) are incompatible with (a).
(b) is weaker than (c) in the sense that from (c) follows (b), but not necessarily
the other way around. Indeed, (b) is compatible with the person being agnostic
towards p. Thus, “S does not believe that p and S does not believe that not-p”:
(d) ¬Bap ∧ ¬Ba¬p.
 (d)  is  incompatible  with  (a)  and  (c).  It  is  perhaps  appropriate  to  note  that
agnosticism towards  a  given  proposition  need  not  amount  to  ignorance  but
can be a reflected intellectual stance.129
One might here also mention the well-known de  dicto/de  re distinction
with respect to beliefs and belief-ascriptions (that is, reports of beliefs such as
(a)-(f’)).  Consider  Quine’s  famous  example  as  an  illustration.  He  notes  that
“Ralph believes that someone is a spy” is ambiguous between
(e) Ralph believes that there are spies,
(f) there is someone whom Ralph believes to be a spy.
In formal notation respectively:
(e’) BRalph ∃x Spy(x),
(f’) ∃x BRalph Spy(x).
In this case (e) would be construed as de dicto and (f) as de re.
What is the difference between (e) and (f)? While Quine was ultimately
critical towards the distinction, he notes that, on the face of it, the difference
is vast: if Ralph is like most of us, (e) is true and (f) false.130 Something along
these lines is likely true. For example, I do believe that there are spies, but it is
not the case that there is a certain person whom I believe to be a spy. What is
more, the formal notation expresses a syntactical difference between (e’) and
127 See  Frege  1892;  1956.  In  this  case  the  way  thinking  can  grasp  a  proposition  needs  further
elucidation. So, perhaps in thinking one actualises a mental token of the mind-independent proposition.
Then again, perhaps in thinking one grasps the mind-independent proposition per se.  This  would
presumably make it possible for persons to think about the numerically same proposition at the same
time. I surmise Frege opted for the latter view. See e.g. Frege 1956, 307-308.
128 Lad Sessions notes that a proposition is distinct from a statement, which “is the linguistic
expression of a proposition, inscribed (or uttered, or whatever) in some particular ‘sentence’”. Lad
Sessions 1994, 52. Cf. Swinburne 1994, 97-99. For our needs such further distinctions are not required,
though they are otherwise important. For discussion on propositional attitudes and propositions, see
e.g. McGrath 2012; McKay and Nelson 2010; Richard 1990.
129 A classic of epistemic logic is Hintikka 1962.
130 Cf. Quine 1956, 178.
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(f’). In (e’) the scope of the quantifier is narrower, within the scope of belief. In
(f’) the scope is broader, and it binds the variable that occurs within the scope
of belief. There is thus a motivation for the distinction between de dicto and
de re at least with respect to belief-ascriptions.131
As we are in this study interested in the phenomenology of belief, one might
ask whether there is from a believer’s first-person perspective any substantial
difference between having a de dicto and a de re belief. That is, are de dicto
and de re beliefs  qualitatively  different  kinds  of  beliefs?  According  to  one
possible analysis, the answer is no. For one could argue that both de dicto and
de re beliefs  are  propositional  beliefs  and  the  alleged  dissimilarity  is  only  a
matter of difference in the propositional contents of the beliefs. This might
mean, for example, that whereas in (e) the proposition Ralph believes is that
there are spies, in (f), when adequately explicated, the proposition can be seen
as being something like that some definite person is a spy.132
Then again, the actual meanings of de dicto and de re indicate one answer
regarding the difference between respective beliefs. According to Justin
Broackes, for example, the “orthodox distinction” can be put as follows: “belief
de dicto is belief that a certain dictum (or proposition) is true, whereas belief
de re is belief about a particular res (or thing) that it has a certain property”.133
In view of that, one might propose that the qualitative difference between
having de dicto and de re belief  lies  in their  intentional  objects.  In de dicto
belief the object of belief is a proposition; in de re belief the object is a non-
propositional thing. This line of argument points to the conclusion that, unlike
de dicto beliefs, de re beliefs are not propositional beliefs.
Taken at face value, the intentional object of de re belief is the real thing
itself of which something is believed (cf. the quantifier’s place in (f’)). But this
cannot mean that when a person has a de re belief, say, of the moon having
craters, it is literally the concrete moon that the person beholds in the interior
of his mind. This would be an absurd claim. Instead, it is more appropriate to
hold that  in many cases,  at  any rate,  the intentional  object  of de re belief  is
some kind of mind-dependent entity, say, an idea, thought, representation, or
a perception of the real object. In this case typical de re belief would involve
an allegedly non-propositional idea of a thing x (the moon) as having a certain
property F (craters).
In  the  above  case,  however,  one  might  wonder  whether  there  is  beyond
linguistic constructions any crucial difference between de dicto belief that x is
F and de re belief of x that it is F. To me it looks like the latter naturally reduces
to the former, in which case the difference between de dicto and de re beliefs
would not be a matter of having dissimilar intentional objects. The distinction
between de dicto and de re beliefs is not pivotal in this study. I shall simply
speak about propositional beliefs and propositional attitudes. Still, the
distinction is not entirely irrelevant either, as we will return to some extent
131 See McKay and Nelson 2010.
132 Cf. Broackes 1986, 377.
133 Broackes 1986, 374.
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similar considerations in the next section where Schellenberg’s view on belief
and its object will be analysed.
1.2.2 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF BELIEF
Pojman describes the discussion on belief  in British philosophy in the early
part of the twentieth century as a dispute between occurrent and dispositional
or behavioural analysis of belief. Occurrentism emphasises belief as nothing
more than a kind of conscious mental state, whereas extreme Behaviourism
tends  to  equal  belief  with  a  mere  disposition  to  act  in  a  certain  way.  In
Pojman’s view it was H. H. Price who eventually brought moderation into the
debate.  According  to  Price’s  mature  view,  belief  is  a  disposition  which  has
occurrent properties, too.134 This  is,  in  essence,  the  view  of  belief  that  is
espoused in contemporary analytic theistic philosophy. Before venturing
further, two things should be noted. First, the concept of belief to be analysed
here covers both “mere belief” and knowledge.135 Second, theistic philosophers
commonly  hold  that  the  key  method  to  survey  the  phenomenal  features  of
belief is by reflection on our inner mental states.136 This seems reasonable at
least  from folk psychological  viewpoint:  it  does look as if  we have a kind of
privileged access to our mental states, beliefs included.137
Pojman claims that a central question for Occurrentism is what happens to
our  beliefs  when  we  do  not  think  about  them.  Taken  literally,  the  theory
implies that when we cease to reflect a belief, we lose it.138 But this looks like a
dubious assertion. To me it seems that I have held many beliefs for years, and
it  is  not  the  case  that  I  have  been  thinking  about  them  all  the  time.
Consequently, Swinburne, for example, holds that beliefs undoubtedly persist
while the believer is unaware of them, and hence they are what he calls
“continuing mental states”.139 Similarly, Alston maintains that “it is clear that
134 Pojman 1986a, 92-96. See Price 1969.
135 Cf. Alston 1996a, 7.
136 See e.g. Kinghorn 2005, 20; Schellenberg 2005, 41; Swinburne 2001b, 38.
137 This does not imply, however, that we always perfectly realise what our actual beliefs are. For
example, unwanted beliefs along with, say, inconvenient desires can presumably be repressed in some
way. For discussion on a related topic of self-deception, see section 3.2..
138 Pojman 1986a, 93. The problems that extreme behaviourism generate seem to be even more
difficult.  For  example,  Pojman  lists  the  following  issues  it  gives  rise  to.  First,  the  account  seems
counterintuitive: we do seem to be immediately aware of our beliefs without having to consult our actions
first. Secondly, given behaviourism, the notion of weakness of will would not make any sense: one could
not, for example, believe that she should exercise while slacking off, since the belief would be discounted
by  one’s  behaviour.  Thirdly,  according  to  the  behavioural  view,  it  would  be  impossible  to  hold
contradictory beliefs: actions cannot be contradictory; one cannot do and not do the same act at the same
time.  (Then again,  one may query whether it  is  possible  consciously to hold contradictory beliefs,  as
Pojman  seems  to  presume.)  Fourthly,  behavioural  analysis  pays  no  attention  to  intentions,  but  an
account of action seems incomplete without them: any behaviour is compatible with multiple intentions
(or beliefs, in this case). For example, merely observing my behaviour does not tell whether by eating
vegetables  I  believe  that  I  am  nourished  or  I  believe  that  I  am  preventing  the  apocalypse.  Pojman
concludes that “strong dispositionalism” (that is, behaviourism) seems to be an overreaction to an
exaggerated occurrentism and “there seems no good reason to deny that we have access to our belief
states directly through introspection”. Pojman 1986a, 95-96.
139 Swinburne 2001b, 38.
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belief is something one can have in a latent as well as in an active state”. In
Alston’s view a disposition of a suitable sort satisfies this constraint.140
What kind of  disposition is  belief?  Alston argues that  we can answer this
question by thinking of various outcomes that would be expected if a subject S
believes that p. Alston offers the following, in his view, partial list:
(1) If  Bsp,  then  if  someone  asks  S  whether  p,  S  will  have  a  tendency  to
respond in the affirmative.
(2) If Bsp, then if S considers whether p, S will tend to feel it to be the case
that p with some degree of confidence.
(3) If Bsp, then S will tend to believe propositions that she/he takes to follow
from p.
(4) If Bsp, then S will tend to use p as a premise in theoretical and practical
reasoning where this is appropriate.
(5) If Bsp, then if S learns that not-p, S will tend to be surprised.
(6) If Bsp, then S will tend to act in certain ways that would be appropriate if
it were the case that p, given S’s goals, aversions and other beliefs.
Alston  notes  that  in  each  case  S’s  belief  is  only  a  tendency  to  a  certain
manifestation, since what eventuates is also influenced by other psychological
states and attitudes of S.141 Consider (1),  for  example:  Bob may believe that
there is ice cream in the fridge, but when Jill asks whether there is ice cream,
Bob will respond in the negative because he desires to have it solely for himself.
Some of the conditions in Alston’s list may seem more relevant to belief than
others;  some  of  them  may  just  typically  accompany  belief  without  being
features of it. For, to utilise Schellenberg’s line of argument, if each condition
of Alston’s list were part of belief, belief could not occur without each of them.
But,  on  the  face  of  it,  this  seems  quite  implausible.142 Which  of  Alston’s
conditions, then, are central to belief? In theistic philosophy the emphasis has
been put especially on (2) or something close to it. The way Alston phrases the
condition conveys several features that need closer scrutiny. We may start with
his claim that belief that p includes a feeling, namely, a feeling of confidence
that p is the case.
To argue that belief involves a feeling is not peculiar to Alston alone. For
example,  Hume  held  a  similar  view,  and  Swinburne  appears  to  have  some
140 Alston 1996a, 4. One might note here a special case having to do with belief as a latent disposition.
There are numerous propositions we have never thought about. Suppose a person S, like presumably
most of us, have never thought of the proposition that cats are not insects. What is S’s belief-attitude
towards this proposition? Should we say that S is agnostic towards it (in the sense of (d)), because S has
never entertained the proposition in his  mind? This  seems somewhat implausible.  For were S to pay
attention to the proposition, it seems natural to think that S would claim to believe it rather than non-
or disbelieve it. Maybe we should then say that S latently or implicitly believes that cats are not insects.
Cf. Pojman 1986a, 155. Audi, however, is not satisfied with this proposal. According to him, we would in
this case have to attribute to us far more beliefs than we actually have. Audi claims that what may seem
to be antecedently held, unarticulated dispositional belief is really something quite different, namely, a
disposition to believe. Audi 1994, 419. So, regarding S’s case, in Audi’s view it is not correct to say that S
latently or dispositionally believes that cats are not insects, but that S only has a disposition to believe it.
Then again, after S has carefully thought about the proposition’s truth, she may perhaps begin to believe
it dispositionally.
141 Alston 1996a, 4. Cf. Alston 2007, 130-131; Audi 1972, 43-62.
142 Cf. Schellenberg 2005, 60. See also Cohen 1992, 8-11.
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sympathy towards Hume’s account.143 Pojman plainly claims that belief is “a
feeling of conviction about p”.144 In a somewhat similar manner Plantinga
maintains that a proposition believed “has a certain felt attractiveness about
it”  and  that  it  “has  about  it  a  sense  of  rightness,  or  fittingness,  or
appropriateness […]”.145 This is what Plantinga calls a “doxastic experience”,
and  it  is  something  propositions  not  believed  in  his  view  lack.146 Plantinga
maintains that this phenomenology is hard to describe, but familiar to us all. 147
It is perhaps worth noting that taking belief to involve a feeling is not restricted
to theistic philosophers, but the view has supporters in analytic philosophy, on
the whole.148
While  the  view  has  been  espoused  by  many,  Audi  and  Schellenberg,  for
example, have expressed their doubts about the claim that belief necessarily
includes a feeling. Schellenberg’s view will be surveyed later in this section.149
As  regards  Audi,  he  explicitly  says  of  Alston’s  condition  (2)  that  though  it
perhaps normally holds, it is not clear whether it has to hold. Audi notes that
much depends on what “feel that p” is taken to involve.150 Alston argues that
by “feel” he is not implying some type of emotional state or sensation. Instead,
in his  view the term is  broad enough “to range over a great  variety of  inner
experiential states”.151 He holds that what he calls the “feel that p is the case”
is in the philosophical literature often termed as “consciously believing that p”
or “occurrently believing that p”.152
If “feel” is elaborated in Alston’s wide and elusive way, one perhaps cannot
but agree with him that belief involves some sort of “feeling” (we will return to
Alston’s view in the next section). But if we understand “feel” as some type of
vivid emotional or affectional state, Audi’s tentative doubts may be advised.
Someone might deny having any feelings of this kind attached to her beliefs
even after careful reflection, but surely such a person would nonetheless have
beliefs. What is more, the claim that belief involves, say, a palpable feeling of
conviction or a sense of rightness, as if this were a universal psychological fact,
requires empirical research to support its truth. But one may query whether
such research has been conducted. In the end, however, one should probably
not  read  too  much  into  “feel”  in  this  connection.  Besides,  there  may  be
something else instead of feeling that is more central to belief. This leads us to
a second remark on Alston’s condition (2).
143 Swinburne 2001b, 39-40. See Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Appendix. See also Pojman
1986a, 59-64.
144 Pojman 2001, 137.
145 Plantinga 1993a, 190.
146 Plantinga 2000, 183.
147 Plantinga 1993a, 191.
148 This is illustrated, for example, by Raul Hakli’s comment on the debate concerning the distinction
between belief and acceptance: “In the contexts where the distinction has been made, beliefs have been
characterized in various ways, but often a belief that p is taken to involve thinking that p is true, having
a feeling that p is true, or having a disposition to feel that p is true.” Hakli 2006, 288.
149 See Schellenberg 2005, 50-59.
150 Audi 2007, 242-243.
151 Alston 1996a, 5.
152 Alston 1996a, 241 n. 5. Cf. Pojman 1986a, 152; Price 1969, 288-289.
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The second point in (2) that needs to be accentuated is the “to be the case
that p” part of the phrase, that is, beliefs are concerned with the way things are
in reality. In a similar way, Swinburne maintains that “a person’s beliefs are
his  or  her  ‘view’  of  the  world,  what  they  ‘hold’  to  be  true  about  it  […]”.153
Correspondingly, Bishop argues that “to believe that p is, I shall say, to hold
that the proposition p is true […].”154 The view at issue could be expressed in
the well-known slogan “belief  aims at  truth”,  which is  often associated with
Bernard Williams.155 In isolation this catchphrase may be ambiguous, but we
may think of it as conveying, in Pascal Engel’s terms, the “truism that to believe
something  is  to  believe  that  it  is  true  […]”.156 That belief aims at truth
distinguishes it from such truth-indifferent attitudes as imagining and
supposing.157
Truth-directedness  in  the  sense  just  discussed  may  be  a  candidate  for  a
central  property  of  belief.  For  suppose  that  someone  were  to  deny  that
believing that p is to hold p true. It seems that such a person would eventually
have to admit that it is coherent to assert “I believe that p, but p is not true”.
But the coherence of such a statement is not obvious. As Engel notes, Moore’s
paradox reminds us that it is prima facie queer to say “I believe that p, but p
is false”.158 In line with this consideration, Roy Edgely holds that from the first-
person perspective the answers one gives to “Do I believe that p?” and “Is it
the case that p?” are indistinguishable.159 This, as Andrei Buckareff aptly notes,
echoes  Wittgenstein’s  comment  on  Moore’s  paradox:  “If  there  were  a  verb
meaning  ‘to  believe  falsely’,  it  would  not  have  any  significant  first  person
indicative.”160 So, given that the opposing view is, as one might say, logically
odd, it does seem that belief aims at truth. From the first person point of view
to believe is “to believe truly”. This does not mean that a proposition S believes
could not be false, but only that if S believes it, S holds that it is true.
We  have  said  that  to  believe  that  p  is  to  believe  or  hold  that  p  is  true.
However, Alston argues that it is a mistake to deploy the concept of truth in
connection with belief.  In his  view, one can have beliefs  without possessing
this concept at all. Because of this Alston prefers to speak of “to be the case
153 Swinburne 2001b, 32.
154 Bishop 2007, 29-30. Cf. Lad Sessions 1994, 52.
155 See Williams 1973.
156 Engel 2004, 77. In the article Engel distinguishes and discusses three different interpretations of
truth-directedness of belief: causal, normative, and intentional. The causal account amounts to the
“truism” mentioned above. The normative view means that we ought to believe true propositions. The
intentional interpretation is equal to respecting and maintaining the normative view. See Engel 2004
78-79, 81, 84.
157 Cf. Buckareff 2005, 438.
158 Engel 2004, 79. What is wrong with Moorean sentences? One way to explain the oddity in the
Moorean “I believe that p but it is false that p” is to argue that by asserting “it is false that p” the speaker
implies that she believes that not-p. But then the speaker claims both to believe that p and believe that
not-p, which is a contradiction. Cf. Cohen 1992, 68-69. A different analysis of Moore’s paradox has been
put forward by Jaakko Hintikka. In his view, Moorean sentences violate the assumption that the speaker
believes or can conceivably believe what she asserts. Hintikka maintains that it is impossible for the
speaker to believe a Moorean sentence as a whole. See Hintikka 1962, 64-71.
159 Edgely 1969, 90; cited from Buckareff 2005, 438-439.
160 Buckareff 2005, 444 n. 15; Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 190.
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that p” instead of something like “to be true that p”.161 Alston may be right, but
we  may  nonetheless  continue  to  speak  of  truth  in  this  connection,  as  this
concept  is  not  used  in  any  technical  sense,  but  in  a  sense  that  makes  it
equivalent to such expressions as the one Alston favours.
A third and final point in Alston’s condition (2) that needs closer scrutiny is
the idea of degrees of confidence or, to use a more familiar expression, degrees
of belief. Though Alston declares having “some uneasiness” about this view, he
maintains that beliefs can be “more or less firm, assured, confident, certain”. 162
The idea is, roughly, that a person can be more or less certain about p’s truth,
and this exemplifies the degree of her belief that p: the more certain the person
is that p is true, the higher the degree of her belief that p. Swinburne espouses
degrees of belief and says that his belief that the Second World War ended in
1945 is a strong one; he is strongly convinced of it. Then again, his belief that
the War of the Roses ended in 1485 is less strong, because he thinks that he
could have got the date wrong.163
How can a person measure the degree of her belief that p? The aforesaid
suggests  that  one  route  is  simply  considering  and  observing  the  level  of
confidence one has towards p being true. This approach seems to presume that
beliefs  include  some  type  of  feeling  of  conviction  whose  intensity  can  vary.
Those  who  do  not  share  this  assumption  will  likely  find  the  proposal
wanting.164 Pojman notes that another way to test the strength of belief is to
imagine how surprised you would be if the proposition believed turned out to
be false (cf. Alston’s condition (5)). In this case, the greater the surprise is, the
higher the degree of the belief in question.165 A  third  conceivable  way  to
measure or fix the degree of belief that p is by reflecting upon one’s evidence
or  reasons  for  thinking  p  true.  Having  plenty  of  evidence  for  p  would  then
161 Alston 1996a, 5.
162 Alston 1996a, 5-6.
163 Swinburne 2001b, 34.
164 For example, in Frank Ramsey’s view the assumption is problematic and even observably false,
“for the beliefs which we hold most strongly are often accompanied by practically no feeling at all; no
one feels strongly about things he takes for granted.” Ramsey 1926, 169. Ramsey claims that the degrees
of belief can nonetheless be tested by observing one’s readiness to bet on a proposition’s truth. Ramsey’s
claim is, in short, that if S is willing to pay at most x for a bet that will pay y if a proposition p is true,
then the degree of S’s belief that p is x/y. See Ramsey 1926, 179-180. So, for example, if S would be willing
to  put  3  euros  on  a  bet  that  pays  5  if  it  rains  tomorrow,  the  degree  to  which  S  believes  that  it  rains
tomorrow  is  3/5.  However,  as  Ramsey  himself  notes,  his  proposal  is  not  wholly  unproblematic.  See
Ramsey 1926, 172. Plantinga captures one issue in Ramsey’s account: a person’s degree of belief might
not correspond with her betting behaviour, since the person may be, say, excessively cautious and will
not bet unless she gets odds better than her actual degree of belief warrants. Plantinga 1993b, 118. So,
for example, maybe the degree to which S believes that p is 3/5, and yet she will not pay 3 euros on a bet
that pays 5 if p is true unless she gets odds of 4/5 to win.
165 Pojman  1986a,  154.  Kinghorn  holds  that  the  notion  of  surprise  is  instructive  to  the
phenomenology of belief. He emphasises that it needs to be distinguished from other “emotive states”
like  shock  or  trauma  that  may  accompany  the  discovery  that  one  has  believed  something  false.  The
greatness of such emotions will not indicate the degree of belief but how important the subject matter
otherwise is to the believer. For example, if I were to learn, contrary to my beliefs, that my cat is missing
and that the cafeteria is not open today, I imagine that my “epistemic surprise” would be fairly equal in
both cases and so the degrees of the beliefs is the same. However, only the former finding would arouse
in me a great deal of emotion, as I am quite fond of my cat but do not care much about the cafeteria’s
opening hours. Kinghorn maintains that the notion of surprise includes the discovery that something
about the world is not as one had expected: “And it is this feeling of expectancy, it seems to me, that best
captures the phenomenology of believing.” Kinghorn 2005, 21-22.
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imply a high degree of belief that p.166 As with the first suggestion, opinions
may vary on the accuracy or even adequacy of the second and the third ways
to discern one’s degree of belief.
Some philosophers think that  the idea of  degrees of  belief  can be further
elaborated with the help of the concept of probability. Pojman, for example,
maintains  that  the  degree  of  one’s  belief  that  p  can  be  defined  in  terms  of
person-relative subjective probability, that is, the probability a person thinks
p has of being true. Accordingly, on an interval from 0 to 1, Pojman holds that
if S thinks that P(p) > 0.5, S has some degree of positive belief that p;167 if S
thinks that P(p) < 0.5, S has some degree of disbelief that p or, rather, some
degree of belief that not-p; and if S thinks that P(p) = 0.5, S is agnostic towards
p or suspends judgment about p.168 One might add that if S thinks that P(p) =
1, S is absolutely certain and is thus perhaps in a position to claim to know that
p. Similarly, when P(p) = 0, not-p is known.
Though  Pojman’s  proposal  is  clear,  it  might  be  asked  how  often  we  are
capable of locating the precise or even approximate numerical probability of
our  beliefs.  In  line  with  this,  Swinburne  holds  that  for  most  “ordinary
propositions” one cannot give an exact numerical value, but the most one can
say is that one proposition is more probable than another one.169 This leads us
to Swinburne’s view of belief, which also makes use of the concept of subjective
probability. To begin with, in Swinburne’s view belief is a contrastive notion:
one proposition is believed against alternatives. Swinburne holds that
normally the alternative to a proposition is its negation, but sometimes there
are more alternatives. Thus, “Liverpool will win the cup” is typically contrasted
with  “Liverpool  will  not  win  the  cup”,  but  at  times  there  can  be  a  range  of
alternatives, say, “Arsenal will win the cup”, “Aston Villa will win the cup”, and
so on.170
Swinburne  maintains  that  to  believe  that  p  is  to  believe  that  p  is  more
probable than any alternative, which can be either just not-p or some set of
relevant  propositions.  Note  that  in  the  latter  case  p  is  believed  to  be  more
probable than any alternative,  but not necessarily  more probable than their
disjunction.  Thus,  p  can  be  believed  even  if  it  is  not  believed  to  be  more
probable than not-p. For example, suppose S believes that P(p) = 0.4, P(q) =
0.3, and P(r) = 0.3. Here S believes p against q and r, since P(p) > P(q) and
P(p) > P(r), though neither P(p) > P(q ∨ r) nor P(p) > P(not-p).171 Swinburne’s
view of belief has an odd consequence. Consider the stated example: when S
166 Cf. Pojman 1986a, 156; Swinburne 2005, 13-14. On belief and evidence, see section 2.1.1.
167 It may strike one as awkward to say that S believes that p if S thinks that the probability of p is
only marginally higher than 0.5. According to Swinburne, the hesitation arises here because the rules for
the application of the concept of belief are not precise enough. Swinburne, nonetheless, follows the same
use  as  Pojman.  In  his  view  it  would  be  “extremely  arbitrary”  to  choose  some  value  of  probability  X
between 0.5 and 1 such that only if S held that P(p) > X, S would believe that p. Swinburne concludes
that though the use of the words may not be precise, there is a case to be made for the claim that if S
thinks that P(p) > 0.5, S believes that p with some strength or another. Swinburne 2001b, 35-37.
168 Pojman 2003, 536-537.
169 Swinburne 2005, 16.
170 Swinburne 2001b, 34, 36.
171 Swinburne 2001b, 36; 2005, 6-7.
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reflects  whether  p  or  not-p,  S  does  not  believe  that  p,  but  when  S  reflects
whether p, q, or r, S does believe that p. Swinburne seems to think that there
is nothing anomalous in this.172
Although we may sometimes believe against alternatives, to conceive belief
universally  as  a  contrastive  notion  might  seem  a  bit  strange.  Typically,  we
seem to believe something without doing any comparisons.173 The claim that
we  think  about  probabilities  when we  believe  may  also  strike  one  as  weird.
Alston  remarks  that  some  people,  say,  small  children,  might  lack  the
conceptual resources for even elementary probability judgments, but clearly
they  do  have  beliefs.  Additionally,  Alston  holds  that  it  is  implausible  to
suppose that believers, who do have the resources for probability estimations,
frequently make use of them, whether deliberate or unnoticed.174 Swinburne
appears to grant these points to Alston as he replies that on his account beliefs
about p’s probability entail beliefs about p, but not necessarily vice versa.175
He says that his account “constrains which beliefs about p’s probability can be
held by a believer that p, but is compatible with her not having such beliefs”. 176
While at least my experience seems to show that mine and others’ beliefs
can  be  more  or  less  certain,  some philosophers  have  cast  doubt  against  the
whole  notion  of  degrees  of  belief.  We  already  noted  that  Alston  has  some
discomfort about the idea. Though he eventually embraces the view, he is
inclined to think that belief excludes any doubt or uncertainty. In this case, he
holds, other terms than “believe” can express states where one feels positive
about p without feeling certain about it. So, instead of a degreed belief that p,
Alston says that one may, for example, “be of the opinion that p”, “be inclined
to suppose that p”, or “think it to be more likely that p than not”.177
It  may  be  queried  how  reasonable  Alston’s  proposal  is,  but  his  last
alternative nonetheless indicates one way in which an attempt has been made
to eliminate the notion of degrees of belief. As Schellenberg puts it, “many
belief experiences that seem weak may really be experiences of probability
beliefs”.178 That is, maybe what to S looks like a degreed belief that p does not,
in fact, express the degree to which S believes that p, but the degree to which
172 See Swinburne 2005, 7.
173 Cf. Schellenberg 2005, 63-64.
174 Alston 1994, 26-27. Kinghorn argues that “Alston is certainly correct in noting that we do not
typically make conscious judgments of comparative probability […]. What seems less clear, however, is
whether we do not commonly make unconscious probability assessments in daily life.” Kinghorn 2005,
30. Alston says that he does not oppose positing unconscious cognitive operations when there is a reason
to do so,  but  he can “think of  no reason here more respectable than the desire to save a  theory from
refutation.” Alston 1994, 26.
175 Swinburne holds that this reply also avoids another objection Alston has made. According to
Alston, Swinburne’s view of belief involves an infinite regress. For example, if to believe that p amounts
to  believing  that  p  is  more  probable  than  not-p,  then  to  believe  that  p  is  more  probable  than  not-p
amounts to believing that (p is more probable than not-p) is more probable than not-(p is more probable
than not-p),  and so on ad infinitum.  Alston 1994,  27-29.  However,  since Swinburne now claims that
beliefs  about p do not  entail  belief’s  about p’s  probability,  his  account seems to be unaffected by the
regress, since it cannot even begin. Swinburne 2001b, 36 n. 8.
176 Swinburne 2001b, 35-36, 36 n. 8.
177 Alston 1996a, 6.
178 Schellenberg 2005, 54.
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S firmly believes that p is probable.179 For example, if S thinks that P(p) = 0.7,
why say that  S believes to that  degree that  p instead of  saying that  S firmly
believes  that  the  probability  of  p  is  0.7?  In  less  exact  cases  where  evoking
probabilities is not a feasible option it could be argued that what appears to be
a degreed belief that p really amounts to something like a strong belief about
p’s plausibility, truthfulness, or something in this vicinity.
Maybe the notion of degrees of beliefs can thus be dispensed with. Still, it
might be pointed out that unless the concept is in some crucial way defective,
there is no necessary reason to reduce degreed beliefs to flat-out beliefs about
probability,  certainty,  plausibility,  and  the  like.  Besides,  belief  that  p  and
belief, say, that p is likely appears to be different beliefs inasmuch as they have
different propositions as their contents. The former is a belief about p’s truth;
the latter is a belief about p’s likelihood. These beliefs need not exclude each
other. A person may believe weakly that p and at the same time firmly believe
that the likelihood of p is only modest.
Up till now we have surveyed fairly typical views about the nature of belief.
Schellenberg, however, has challenged the rather common way of conceiving
“belief as confidence”, as he calls the approach. In his view, beliefs neither
involve a feeling of confidence nor do they come in degrees in the sense
discussed. What is more, Schellenberg argues that belief does not amount to
thinking of a proposition under the appearance that it is true. In its place, he
holds that to believe is to think of a state of affairs under the impression that
it obtains.180 The object  of  belief  in Schellenberg’s  account is  thus a state of
affairs, not a proposition. The distinction between thinking of propositions
and states of affairs is obviously important in Schellenberg’s account and thus
requires clarification.
What are states of affairs? Schellenberg holds that we can mentally put or
view  things  or  possible  things  in  various  arrangements,  and  thus  we  can
represent to ourselves what he calls states of affairs. When this takes place, in
Schellenberg’s view we have a thought whose object is the state of affairs in
question—or, rather, its representation. For example, Schellenberg says that
“my cat chasing a mouse may at a certain time come to mind or be before my
mind  or  be  the  object  of  a  thought  of  mine  in  this  way”.181 Schellenberg
emphasises that what one is thinking of in this case “is a possible arrangement
of things, not a proposition indicating or representing or reporting that
arrangement”.182 On the face of it, this looks like an unusual view, but Andrew
179 Cf. Plantinga 1993a, 166; 1993b, 118.
180 Schellenberg 2005, 43-44. Schellenberg has offered multiple characterisations for belief. For
example, in his view a believer has a thought of the relevant state of affairs “being actual”; she is “simply
thinking of the world”;  she  is  “consciously experiencing (and reexperiencing) states of affairs as
realized, or as belonging to what is real”; she apprehends states of affairs “under the concept reality”;
or she has a “world-thought”. Schellenberg 2005, 46, 48, 50. Schellenberg’s italics.
181 Schellenberg 2005, 41-42.
182 Schellenberg 2005, 42. Schellenberg’s distinction bears some resemblance to the dispute between
analog and propositional (or picture and description) accounts of mental imagery. According to Nigel J.
T. Thomas, the analog side holds that mental representations we experience as mental imagery are much
like pictures: they have intrinsic spatial representational properties of the sort pictures have (consider,
for example, the spatial relationships on a photograph’s surface). In contrast, Thomas holds, the
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Chignell  notes  that  Schellenberg’s  account  of  the  state  of  affairs  has  some
points of resemblance to the views of Roderick Chisholm, D. M. Armstrong,
and Bertrand Russell.183
If states of affairs are in Schellenberg’s view arrangements of things that can
figure as the objects of thought, what are propositions? Apart from saying that
they indicate, represent, or report states of affairs, Schellenberg actually leaves
the nature of propositions unanalysed. He says that “some would hold that a
proposition itself is a state of affairs, since it is an arrangement of things of a
certain  sort,”  but  in  his  view  “here  it  suffices  to  say  that  a  person  who
experiences belief has before her mind a state of affairs that is not a
proposition […]”.184 But this is not very helpful elucidation. One might also ask
is  the  way  Schellenberg  makes  the  distinction  between  states  of  affairs  and
propositions  a  viable  one.  I  would  propose  as  a  candidate  for  the  nature  of
propositions just such things Schellenberg calls states of affairs.
Then  again,  there  may  be  a  difference  between  thinking  of  a  non-
propositional thing, say, my red cat, and thinking of a proposition, say, that
my cat is red. And perhaps the former object of thought is what Schellenberg
calls states of affairs. So, suppose we grant to Schellenberg his distinction and
hold,  like  he  does,  that  to  believe  is  to  think  of  a  state  of  affairs  under  the
impression that it obtains. Thus, when I consciously believe that my cat is red,
according  to  Schellenberg’s  account  I  am  thinking  of  a  state  of  affairs
consisting of my red cat as obtaining.
As  said  earlier,  Schellenberg  maintains  that  conscious  belief  does  not
involve  a  feeling  of  confidence  and  it  is  “all  or  nothing”,  that  is,  one  either
thinks of a state of affairs obtaining or one does not.185 But why should these
conditions hold? Evidently, one either thinks of a certain state of affairs or one
does not do that, but I cannot see why one would have to necessarily think of
it either as obtaining or not. I seem to have many thoughts of what supposedly
are states of affairs, and all I can say about whether they obtain is maybe or
probably. For example, the state of affairs consisting of nothing more than my
friend  being  182  cm  tall  is  such  a  thought  for  me.  Furthermore,  in  this
particular case I even appear to recognise minor confidence when I think of
this state of affairs. So, in other words, I seem to have a degreed belief here.
propositional side argues that mental representations are more like linguistic descriptions of visual
scenes, and they are without inherently spatial properties. See Thomas 2014, ch. 4.4. Given this cursory
depiction of the analog-propositional distinction, it seems that Schellenberg’s states of affairs go well
together with the analog view. This is further supported by the remark that Schellenberg actually uses
pictorial  language  in  his  account.  For  example,  he  says  that  we  might  compare  conscious  belief  to  a
photograph.  See  Schellenberg  2005,  50  n.  13.  What  is  more,  perhaps  the  things  Schellenberg  calls
propositions similarly match with the propositional view of mental imagery. Then again, maybe these
assimilations are too hasty. For example, I presume that Schellenberg could claim that states of affairs
as objects of thought do not have intrinsic spatial properties. In this case his account would fall into the
propositional group of the debate. It is also appropriate to note that in Thomas’s view the analog and
description  accounts  are  irreconcilable:  one  cannot  join  them  in  the  way  done  here  as  regards
Schellenberg’s account.
183 See Chignell 2013, 200-201.
184 Schellenberg 2005, 44 n. 8.
185 Schellenberg 2005, 50, 52.
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Schellenberg would likely reply to me that  what I  am experiencing is  not
actually a belief, that is, a thought of a state of affair obtaining, but what he
calls  a  proposition-directed  thought.  Schellenberg  argues  that  thoughts  of
propositions can come with feelings of confidence in some degree or another,
especially  when  the  epistemic  status  of  the  proposition  is  thought  about.186
However, I do not see why I would have to be thinking of a proposition in the
case  at  hand.  But  if  that  is  what  I  am  doing,  I  am  missing  Schellenberg’s
distinction between thinking of  states of  affairs  and propositions.  Perhaps I
am just so contaminated by propositional thinking that I cannot find states of
affairs as objects of thought.
On the other hand, if I do discern states of affairs, Schellenberg’s views on
the  phenomenology  of  belief  seem  to  me  unwarranted.  What  is  more,  if  I
recognise  the  states  of  affairs,  I  would  probably  rather  label  them  as
propositions  and  thus  get  rid  of  Schellenberg’s  distinction.  The  task
Schellenberg gives to propositions would in this case be fulfilled by something
else,  for  example,  by  such  linguistic  entities  as  sentences  that  can  by
convention indicate or represent or report the objects of thought, that is, the
possible arrangements of things. It is worth pointing out that by this clearance
I do not wish to say that  some other notion of  states of  affairs  could not be
viable.187 Still,  in  this  study  I  shall  be  speaking  of  propositions  and
propositional beliefs.
1.2.3 CRITIQUE OF DIRECT DOXASTIC VOLUNTARISM
There  is  one  aspect  of  the  phenomenology  of  belief  that  deserves  its  own
section,  given  the  subject  of  this  study.  This  is  the  question  about  the
voluntariness of belief. The view that beliefs can be at least sometimes directly
chosen at will is called direct doxastic voluntarism or volitionalism for short. 188
Although the thesis has in certain forms some supporters,189 it is frequently
held  in  theistic  philosophy  and  analytic  philosophy,  in  general,  that
volitionalism is implausible: beliefs are not the kind of things we can choose
to  have  by  a  simple  fiat  of  the  will.  In  what  follows,  theistic  philosophers’
arguments  against  volitionalism  will  be  analysed.  But  for  starters  it  is
appropriate to consider what exactly is involved in believing at will directly.
Pojman argues that three conditions are necessary and together sufficient
for a minimal thesis of volitionalism. First, the acquisition of belief is a basic
act. That is, some beliefs are acquired by acts of will directly.190 Belief itself,
186 Schellenberg 2005, 52.
187 For some further discussion on Schellenberg’s view of belief, see Chignell 2013, 200-205; Mourad
2008.
188 Cf. Pojman 2003, 537.
189 See e.g. Ginet 2001; Montmarquet 1986; Mourad 2008; Ryan 2003; Shah 2002; Zeis 2013.
190 We need not explore the notion of basic act closely, but a short note on it is nonetheless in order.
Alston defines a basic act as an act that “can be done without doing it by doing something else”. Alston
1996a, 7. In this way moving one’s hand is presumably a basic act: it does not seem to be done by doing
something else. Then again, to utilise Andrei Buckareff’s example, scoring a goal in an ice hockey match
is a non-basic act: the goal is done by shooting the puck, which is done by moving one’s arms. The latest
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Pojman  notes,  does  not  have  to  be  an  action—it  may  still  be  a  disposition.
Second, the acquisition of belief must be done in full consciousness. Pojman
holds that acts of will can take place in greater or lesser awareness. Sometimes,
he maintains, an “act of will” simply means a desire manifesting itself in action,
such as finding myself going to the refrigerator when hungry.191 In Pojman’s
view a proponent of volitionalism must assert that believing at will is not like
this. Instead, it is a decision of which the person is fully aware. Thirdly, the
belief must be acquired independently of evidential considerations; evidence
is not what is decisive in forming the belief. In sum, Pojman says, “a volit must
be an act of will whereby I acquire a belief directly upon willing to have the
belief,  and  it  is  an  act  made  in  full  consciousness  and  independently  of
evidential considerations”.192
Volitionalism may be initially an attractive thesis. It may even look like a
trivial  truth.  Although we occasionally  speak as if  belief  is  not voluntary (“I
cannot believe anything like that!”), at the same time our experiences seem to
confirm that sometimes beliefs can be and are formed at will. 193 Carl Ginet has
defended this in his view “naïve intuition”. According to him, so that one can
acquire the belief that p at will, one needs “to count on its being the case that
p”. To count on its being the case that p, Ginet elaborates, is to stake something
on p’s  being so and to adopt a dismissive attitude towards the possibility  of
not-p, that is, to not prepare oneself for not-p. As one example, Ginet offers a
person who may be uncertain whether she closed the door after leaving home,
but who can nonetheless decide to count on her doing so in order to silence
her worries and not having to go back to check the door. In this case the person
has in Ginet’s view decided to believe at will that she closed the door.194
While Ginet’s description may seem feasible, one may query whether the
notion  of  belief  underlying  his  account  is  akin  to  the  one  considered  in  the
previous section. For if one subscribes to certain aspects of that view of belief,
as the critics of volitionalism typically do, there seem to be compelling reasons
to think that we do not, in fact, have direct control over beliefs. Volitionalism
may give the impression of being supported by experience, because in
everyday language the term “belief” appears to be used broadly to stand for a
wide  range  of  propositional  attitudes,  some  of  which  are  by  all  means
voluntary.195 So,  possibly  situations  that  seem  to  support  the  truth  of
volitionalism, like Ginet’s example, are best seen not as decisions to believe
but as decisions to do something else, say, to act as if one believed.196
act is basic, and thus it could be argued that non-basic acts are in the end generated by basic acts. See
Buckareff 2011, 315-316.
191 Compare this to some habits, say, chewing one’s fingernails or stroking one’s beard. These actions
can be done with lesser awareness. One just finds oneself doing them, if one notices the actions at all.
192 Pojman 1986a, 157-158; 2003, 537-538.
193 Cf. Pojman 1986a, 149-150.
194 Ginet 2001, 63-66.
195 Cf. Alston 1996a, 20; Pojman 1986a, 150.
196 Cf. Alston 1988, 266-267. Buckareff has argued against Ginet in this manner. According to him,
in the type of cases Ginet considers one does not decide to believe a proposition, but she accepts it for
practical purposes. See Buckareff 2004. See also Ginet 2001, 68, 74-75. On the notion of acceptance, see
especially section 4.2..
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What  reasons,  then,  are  there  to  suspect  the  cogency  of  volitionalism?
Alston’s early argument against this thesis simply consists in asking us to
consider whether we have the power to believe at will. So, suppose you are
offered 500 million dollars for believing that the U.S. is still a colony of Great
Britain (while you hold that this is obviously false). Can you, Alston ask, at this
moment start to believe this? Alston maintains that it seems clear to him that
he has no such power, and he doubts that any human being has the power of
acquiring beliefs at will.197 Similar considerations against volitionalism have
been  offered,  for  example,  by  Jeff  Jordan,  Plantinga,  Pojman,  and
Schellenberg.198
As such, Alston’s argument is not very convincing. A volitionalist might
simply reply that contrary to Alston and his reservations, she can sometimes
believe at will. It is appropriate to emphasise that volitionalism does not imply
that each belief has to be voluntary. Ginet, for example, admits that there are
many propositions one cannot decide to believe,199 and  among  these
propositions  are  presumably  the  ones  that  are  seen  as  blatantly  false,  like
Alston’s example. Hence, merely pointing out that one cannot in a certain case
or  even  in  any  conceivable  case  believe  at  will  does  not  imply  that  it  is  an
impossible feat for each person in any instance.
Alston’s further criticism against volitionalism is based on the feeling that
beliefs in his view include. Alston argues that this occurrent aspect of belief
has  a  kind  of  immediacy  that  is  something  one  experiences  rather  than
carefully thinks out, that is, “it is a matter of one’s being struck by (a sense of)
how things are rather than deciding how things are.”200 This, Alston holds, is
connected to beliefs’ involuntary character. This critique against volitionalism
may be more convincing than Alston’s first one. If beliefs do involve the kind
of feeling Alston depicts, it seems hard to acquire them at will.201 But in this
case, too, some person, say, a master of autosuggestion, might claim that she
can accomplish the act.
Pojman has criticised volitionalism by taking cognisance of  the events of
acquiring beliefs. He claims that considering typical cases of belief-acquisition
confirm that forming a belief is an event in which the world forces itself upon
the subject. This seems quite credible when we think about simple sense
beliefs and elementary logical beliefs. Pojman says that upon seeing a white
paper or hearing music, it seems obvious that we do not choose to believe these
things before we believe them. The same appears to hold with respect to
memory beliefs, which perhaps pertain more to the sustenance of beliefs than
their acquisition. In Pojman’s view, parallel analysis goes for abstract and
logical beliefs. We do not choose to believe that the law of non-contradiction
197 Alston 1988, 263-264.
198 Jordan 2006, 38; Plantinga 2000, 96; Pojman 1986a, 167; Schellenberg 2005, 65-67.
199 Ginet 2001, 74.
200 Alston 1996a, 5.
201 If one argues that the feeling that belief purportedly involves is some kind of strong emotional
confidence, this also confirms the view that belief is involuntary, since emotions are typically conceived
as involuntary. However, this argument loses much of its plausibility, if, as I assume is sensible, it is
denied that belief necessarily includes a robust emotion.
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applies universally or that 2 + 2 = 4. Instead, Pojman holds, we are compelled
to believe these things after we understand what they assert.202
Pojman  argues  that  a  similar  process  is  at  work  regarding  theoretical
beliefs, including scientific, religious, ideological, political and moral beliefs.
As  he  puts  it,  “given  a  whole  network  of  background beliefs,  some views  or
theories  are  simply  going  to  win  out  in  my noetic  structure  over  others“.203
This may be true, too, but again it should be noted that no matter how much
experiential support one takes Pojman’s argument to have, in the end it only
shows that typically beliefs are not acquired voluntarily. Pojman actually
makes this concession here. He says that it seems dubious whether we believe
at will, but yet such behaviour can never be conclusively ruled out (however,
see his argument below).204
Both Alston’s and Pojman’s so-called phenomenological arguments against
volitionalism point to the conclusion that believing at will is, as Alston phrases
it, “psychologically impossible”.205 That is, it happens to be an ability we do
not, or most of us do not, in fact, have. This leaves open the possibility that if
our  mental  structure  were  different,  believing  at  will  might  be  possible.
However, some have defended a stronger claim according to which believing
at will is not merely psychologically difficult but conceptually or logically
puzzling. For example, Swinburne claims that not being able to believe at will
is “a logical matter, not a contingent feature of our psychology”.206
To  me  it  looks  like  the  arguments  for  the  stronger  conclusion  against
volitionalism use as a  key premise some form of  the Williamsian claim that
belief aims at truth, that is, that to believe is to believe true (see section 1.2.2.).
This does not seem to be a coincidence. According to Pojman, Williams’s to
this  day  influential  “Deciding  to  Believe”  (1972)  is  largely  responsible  for
making  volitionalism  once  more  a  discussed  subject  in  modern  Anglo-
American philosophy, and Williams holds that it is not only a contingent fact
that beliefs cannot be acquired at will.207 The crux of Williams argument can
be construed as follows: merely willing to believe that p does not indicate that
p is true; believing that p at will would thus imply believing that p whether p
was seen as true or not; but believing irrespective of what seems to be the truth
is  inconsistent  with  belief’s  truth-aimed  nature;  so,  believing  at  will  is
conceptually incoherent.208
Swinburne has offered an argument against volitionalism which is similar
to that of Williams. He claims that if I knowingly chose at will to believe that I
now see a table, I would realise that the belief originated from my will and thus
had no connection with whether the table is there or not. But then I would have
no  reason  for  thinking  that  the  belief  indicates  how  things  are,  and  thus  I
202 Pojman 1986a, 159-161.
203 Pojman 1986a, 161.
204 Pojman 1986a, 166-167; 2003, 539-540.
205 Alston 1988, 263.
206 Swinburne 2001b, 40.
207 Pojman 1986a,  110.
208 See Williams 1973, 148. For subsequent discussion on Williams’s argument, see Classen 1979;
Govier 1976; Holyer 1983; Winters 1979; Pojman 1985; 1986a, 110-112.
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would not actually believe. Swinburne notes that a parallel point goes for our
inductive criteria, that is, to what we see as evidence for what. For if we decided
on  the  criteria,  we  would  realise  that  beliefs  resulting  from  the  use  of  the
criteria were the result of our own choice and thus had no link with whether
things were as the beliefs claimed. In Swinburne’s view it is because one set of
inductive criteria seems intuitively correct and the use of it is not voluntary
that we trust that the resultant beliefs indicate how things are.209
For reasons akin to Williams’s and Swinburne’s, Pojman has also argued
that volitional believing is “broadly a logical mistake”.210 Pojman explicitly
starts with the premise that belief aims at truth, that is, to believe is to believe
true.  His  argument  is  worth  reciting  here  (I  have  made  some  stylistic
modifications to it):
(1) If S believes that p, S believes that p is true (by the concept of belief).
(2) Typically, the truth of p is wholly dependent on the state of affairs,211 S,
which either corresponds to p (and makes p true) or fails to correspond
to p (and makes p false).
(3) Typically, whether the state of affairs S that correspond to p obtains is a
matter that is independent of S’s actions and volitions.
(4) Typically, S subconsciously or consciously believes or presupposes
premise 3 (that is, we recognise intuitively that wishing does not make it
so).
(5) Therefore,  typically,  S  cannot  both  believe  that  p  and  that  S’s  belief  is
presently caused by her willing to believe that p. Instead, S must believe
that what makes his belief true (if it is true) is state of affairs S, which
obtains independently of her will.
Pojman makes several comments on his argument.212 I will mention two of
them, as I believe them to be the most important ones. First, Pojman says that
Audi has made an objection to his argument: it has force only if one supposes
that the believer is rational; an irrational believer can presumably believe at
will in some sense. Pojman doubts this—and he actually has no other options.
The so-called logical arguments against volitionalism exclude as inconsistent
the  possibility  of  any  type  of  conscious  believing  at  will.  As  Pojman  says,
volitional believing is not simply irrational believing but “incoherently
irrational”,  “for  it  represents  confusion  at  the  very  heart  of  the  concept  of
belief”.213
Secondly, Pojman remarks that his argument has not, in fact, ruled out the
possibility of acquiring a belief at will in “less than full consciousness”. This
seems  like  a  reasonable  concession.  Presumably,  we  can  at  times  acquire
beliefs  rather  unconsciously,  and  it  does  not  seem  impossible  that  in  some
209 Swinburne 2005, 25.
210 Pojman 1986a, 170.
211 This is not to be confused with Schellenberg’s notion of state of affairs (see section 1.2.2.). For
Pojman, the notion does not seem to be technical but means just the way things are in the world. See e.g.
Pojman 1986a, 172.
212 See Pojman 1986a, 171-177.
213 Pojman 1986a, 172-173.
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such cases our will brings about the belief. But even so, Pojman holds that once
one discovers that one’s only basis for believing is the will, the belief withers
away  from  one’s  noetic  structure.  According  to  Pojman,  sustaining  a  belief
merely at will in full consciousness has a similar incoherence attached to it,
like the Moorean “I believe that p, but p is false”.214 I find Pojman’s reasoning
persuasive (see section 3.1.3.).
Thus far we have seen that there are reasons to suppose that one cannot
knowingly acquire or sustain a belief at will. But this is not to say that volitions
could  not  have  any  impact  on  the  beliefs  we  hold.  Instead,  it  is  widely
acknowledged  that  the  will  can  have  an  indirect  effect  on  what  beliefs  we
have.215 The  ways  in  which  this  can  happen  is  diverse,  and  this  topic  will
receive closer analysis in later parts of this study (see especially section 3.3.;
see  also  sections  2.1.  and  3.2.).  Here  simple  examples  will  suffice.  So,  for
example, if I lack belief about the current weather, I can just look out of the
window and belief follows. Then again, if I want to believe that I have cleaned
my cat’s litter box, I can get myself to believe that by actually cleaning the box.
I can also try to train myself to be more critical towards different sources of
belief, and this may in the course of time have an effect on which beliefs I hold.
In addition, some suppose that beliefs can be acquired by questionable means,
too, which require, say, some sort of manipulation of one’s doxastic states (see
section 3.2.).
1.2.4 CONCLUSION
As we have seen, in analytic theistic philosophy propositional belief is typically
seen as a disposition towards certain outcomes, especially to a certain mental
state. Alston’s description of this conscious or occurrent aspect of belief aptly
captures views of many theistic philosophers: to believe occurrently that p is
to “feel it to be the case that p with some degree of confidence”. Hence, belief
is often taken to involve a feeling of conviction; typically, belief is assumed to
come in degrees; and our beliefs are what we hold to be the case, that is, belief
aims  at  truth.  I  would  argue  that  one  should  not  think  of  the  feeling  belief
allegedly involves as a kind of robust emotional state. Alston, for example, only
appears  to  seek  to  illustrate  the  passive  nature  of  belief  by  using  the  term
“feel”. Given the nature of belief, it has been argued that consciously acquiring
or sustaining a belief at will is psychologically puzzling and even conceptually
incoherent. But this does not mean that volitions could not have an indirect
impact on beliefs.
214 Pojman 1986a, 170, 176-177; 2003, 540. On Moorean sentences see section 1.2.2..
215 See e.g. Alston 1996a, 7; Bishop 2007, 30-33; Jordan 1996, 409-410; Plantinga 2000, 96; Pojman
1986a,  ch. 9; Swinburne 2001b, 165.
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2 FAITH, EVIDENCE, AND THE CAUSE OF
BELIEF
In the previous chapter we saw that according to the analytic theists’ appraisal,
the cognitive aspect of faith is typically taken to consist of belief—or, rather,
firm belief—towards the preferred propositions of faith. In the previous
chapter we also saw that it is a widely held view in analytic theistic philosophy
that belief is not under our direct voluntary control. These claims point to the
conclusion that the cognitive aspect of faith, when it entails belief, cannot be
chosen at will. Although this is a coarse inference, as such it has been generally
embraced by theistic philosophers who discuss the voluntariness of faith.
Some questions immediately arise. If the will is excluded as a possible basis
of faith-beliefs, as Bishop calls them,216 what then grounds them? How are the
beliefs acquired? What is more, if faith-beliefs are not directly voluntary, can
the  will  have  some indirect  influence  on  the  acquisition  of  the  beliefs?  Still
further,  can  an  account  of  faith  that  involves  belief  still  be  in  some  sense
voluntary? Problems like these and the issues they highlight will be the main
topics of this and the subsequent chapter. The theological question of the merit
of  faith  and  related  topics  is  also  relevant  here  and  will  be  described  and
discussed to some extent in this chapter.
In order to believe propositions of faith, one clearly needs to be aware of
them. But this recognition will not by itself yield belief in the propositions—at
least not typically. For example, merely knowing that Christianity teaches that
God is triune does not imply that one believes that God is triune. So, there is
something needed that turns mere apprehension of a proposition into a belief
in that proposition. What might this something be? In theistic philosophy one
fairly typical answer is evidence.217 This view could be described as the claim
that having reasons or grounds which indicate the truth of p, that is, having
evidence  for  p,  produces  or  causes  belief  that  p.  That  believing  is  tied  to
evidence goes well together with the view that belief aims at truth (see section
1.2.2.): one presumably comes to hold a proposition true (believes) once one
has truth-indicating reasons for doing so (evidence).218
That we believe in response to evidence may have some credibility in
certain circumstances. For example, everyday perceptions (say, hearing a dog
bark) may indicate the truth of certain propositions (there is a dog around the
corner).  That  is,  the  perceptions  or  their  propositional  reports  stand  as
evidence for certain other propositions, and thus they dispose us to believe
these other propositions. But while this portrait of belief-acquisition may seem
plausible in some situations, it may strike one as far-fetched with respect to
some other cases, perhaps especially with respect to faith. It does not look like
216 See Bishop 2007, 21.
217 See e.g. Bishop 2007, 113; Kinghorn 2005, 25-28; Pojman 1986a, 172-173.
218 Cf. Buckareff 2005, 438.
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persons of faith often form or hold their faith-beliefs due to evidence, whatever
that might be. However, precisely this is, in essence, the evidentialist Richard
Swinburne’s understanding of how one acquires and sustains faith-beliefs. His
view on the evidence for the propositions of faith and the account of faith are
analysed in section 2.1..
But besides going against prima facie experience, the view that faith-beliefs
depend on evidence appears to go against traditional theological affirmations.
Christian  tradition  has  generally  given  to  God,  or,  more  specifically,  to  the
Holy  Spirit,  an  active  role  in  a  person’s  coming  to  have  faith  and  so  in  a
person’s coming to hold faith-beliefs.219 At first glance, this view seems to bear
little resemblance to the claim that faith-beliefs are acquired via evidential
considerations. The view that the Holy Spirit has a significant role in a person’s
acquisition of faith-beliefs has been recently espoused by Alvin Plantinga, who
is  the  foremost  proponent  of  Reformed  epistemology.  Plantinga’s  model  of
faith  is  chiefly  influenced  by  the  thought  of  Jean  Calvin  and  Calvinism,  in
general, but he also considers his model to reflect Aquinas’ view. Plantinga’s
model of faith is analysed in section 2.2..
2.1 SWINBURNE ON FAITH AND EVIDENCE
In  what  follows,  I  will  first  analyse  Swinburne’s  view  on  what  can  be
considered evidence for the propositions of  faith.  Secondly,  I  will  scrutinise
Swinburne’s assessment of the merit of faith and related topics. This subject
gives  proper  background  to  the  subsequently  analysed  account  of  faith
Swinburne presents in his influential Faith and Reason (1981; 2005).220
Swinburne can be seen as the initiator of the contemporary analytic theistic
discussion on the nature of faith. He is best known for his extensive work on
the  evidential  justification  of  theism and Christianity.  However,  as  we  shall
see,  his  concerns  are  quite  different  regarding  the  question  of  what  an
adequate account of faith is. As an introductory remark one may say that in his
discussion  on  faith  Swinburne  is  not  so  much  focused  on  the  evidential
justification  of  the  propositions  of  faith,  which  in  our  terms  pertains  to  the
cognitive aspect of faith, as on the practical aspect of faith and the questions it
gives rise to. This emphasis is hinted at by the name Swinburne gives to the
account of faith he chiefly elaborates: the Pragmatist view of faith.
219 See e.g. Kinghorn 2005, 3-4.
220 Faith and Reason is  the  last  book  of  Swinburne’s  trilogy  concerning  the  coherence  and  the
justifiability  of  theism.  See  Swinburne  1977;  1979;  1981.  The  second  revised  editions  of  the  trilogy
appeared in 1993, 2004, 2005. In Faith and Reason Swinburne already begins to deal with specifically
Christian themes on which he subsequently wrote a tetralogy. See Swinburne 1989; 1991; 1994; 1998. I
will use here the second revised edition of Faith and Reason.
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2.1.1 EVIDENCE FOR THE PROPOSITIONS OF FAITH
Before considering what in Swinburne’s view can count as a person’s evidence
for the propositions of faith, some remarks about his general understanding of
belief  and evidence are in order.  So,  to begin with,  Swinburne holds that  to
believe that p is to believe that p is more probable than any alternative (see
section 1.2.2.). The probability involved in believing is in his view subjective
probability, which is inductive probability as weighed by a particular believer’s
inductive criteria. In general, inductive probability is a measure of the extent
to  which  one  proposition  q  makes  another  proposition  p  likely  to  be  true
(where q and p can also stand for several propositions). Typically, Swinburne
holds, p is some hypothesis and q is the evidence relevant to the hypothesis.
Inductive probability is thus relative to evidence: whether a proposition is
inductively  probable  depends  on  the  evidence-class  according  to  which  the
probability is assessed. As a result, Swinburne’s ultimate claim about belief is
this: S believes that p if and only if S believes that the total evidence available
to him makes p more probable than any alternative.221
Some propositions, Swinburne holds, a person believes solely on the
grounds of other propositions which she believes make the former probable.
In this case, I would say, the person believes a proposition by the propositional
evidence that supports it.222 But, Swinburne continues, certain propositions
the person does not believe merely because of such propositional evidence but
because  the  propositions  just  seem to  be  true  and  the  person  is  inclined  to
believe them: “he is inclined to believe that they are forced upon him by his
experience of the world”. Such propositions Swinburne call the person’s basic
propositions.223
Among a person’s basic propositions Swinburne lists ordinary
propositional reports of perceptions and memories (I see a clock; It rained
yesterday); propositions reason as opposed to experience seems intuitively to
show true (2 + 2 = 4; if A is taller than B and B is taller than C, then A is taller
than C); very general propositions about what there is in the world and how
things work (China is  a  big country;  almost everyone dies before the age of
125);  and  hunches  and  intuitions,  which  a  person  thinks  are  justified  but
cannot  really  say  why  (a  person  lost  in  the  woods  may  have  a  hunch  that  a
particular path leads home).224 I  presume that the first  and second types of
propositions in Swinburne’s list are fairly unproblematic, as they are mostly
standard examples of basic propositions.225 It may also be apt to consider some
221 Swinburne 2005, 15-17. See also Swinburne 2001b, 62.
222 Cf. Jordan 2006, 44.
223 Swinburne 2005, 17.
224 Swinburne 2005, 17-21. Regarding very general propositions, Swinburne maintains that we do
not normally recall how we learned them, but we do believe that we did learn them, have been told them
often, and everything we learn fits with them. Swinburne holds that these propositions often form our
“background knowledge” or “background evidence”, which we also take into account when we judge the
probability of beliefs of more limited scope. Here Swinburne refers to Wittgenstein’s On Certainty
(1969),  and  his  view  on  the  very  general  propositions  may  bear  some  minor  resemblance  to  that  of
Wittgenstein. Swinburne 2005, 21, 21 n. 8.
225 Cf. e.g. Plantinga 1993a, 61, 177-178.
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propositions in the third group as basic,226 and I see no insuperable reasons
why propositions in the last category could not be that, too. I suppose that it is
not unusual to experience “epistemic gut feelings” occasionally.
Swinburne argues that a person has different degrees of confidence in her
basic propositions. In other words, basic propositions have for the person
different degrees of  prior probability,  which is  the probability  a  proposition
has  as  such  without  reflection  on  other  relevant  propositions.  Swinburne
seems to hold that a basic proposition p acquires the status of basic belief that
p for a person if p’s prior probability is taken by the person to be greater than
0.5 and other propositions the person has do not render p improbable. But if
a  basic  proposition  needs  support  from  other  propositions  to  render  it
probable overall and thus constitute a belief, it is not according to Swinburne
a basic belief.227
As a terminological point I would suggest that just as some propositions are
believed by propositional evidence, basic propositions and beliefs are held on
the grounds of non-propositional evidence. This kind of evidence includes the
various kinds of just-seeming-to-be-trues that accompany basic propositions
and beliefs (they are self-evident, obvious, apparent, and the like). Jeff Jordan
labels evidence of this type experiential evidence.228 Given these preliminary
remarks,  we  can  next  consider  what  in  Swinburne’s  view  can  count  as  a
person’s evidence for the propositions of faith. It is very important to note that
what is  adequate evidence for the propositions is  a  different question.  With
respect to this latter issue, philosophers’ views may diverge from each other
remarkably.
To  start  with,  Swinburne  holds  that  some  people  clearly  have  a  basic
proposition that there is a God, which is produced by an apparent awareness
of God’s presence. When this awareness is overwhelming, the proposition can
in Swinburne’s view amount to a basic belief. Swinburne seems to think that
the  awareness  of  God  is  somewhat  similar  to  the  awareness  people  have  of
material objects or perhaps of such truths as 2 + 2 = 4. Such awareness of God
is,  then,  non-propositional  evidence  for  the  basic  proposition  or  belief  that
God exists.229 Swinburne holds that basic belief that there is a God may often
come  to  persons  through  participation  in  church  worship.  He  notes  that
Plantinga in his early Reformed epistemology argued that belief that there is a
God can be properly basic, that is, people can be rational in holding the belief
as basic.230 Swinburne doubts whether people are often in this position. In his
view many have had less than an overwhelming awareness of God’s presence,
226 Anthony Kenny, for example, includes similar propositions in his account. See Kenny 1992, 13-
18.
227 Swinburne 2005, 18-19.
228 Jordan 2006, 44.
229 I assume that basic propositions or beliefs with religious content can be produced by a wide range
of religious perceptions which then are non-propositional evidence for the basic propositions and beliefs
in question.
230 See Plantinga 1983. While Plantinga’s later Reformed epistemology is more extensive than his
earlier, in the later one he also argues for the proper basicality of Christian and theistic beliefs. See
Plantinga 2000. See also section 2.2.
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but they often know about evidence against God’s existence, and so their basic
proposition needs backing up by further evidence.231
For some theists, Swinburne holds, basic beliefs about the events of their
lives  constitute  a  strong  argument  for  the  existence  of  God—many  of  their
prayers  may  seem  to  have  been  answered,  for  example.  Another  class  of
argument which in Swinburne’s view has had an influence at all periods is the
argument from authority. For example, he holds that many medieval villagers
believed that there is a God because their parents or the priest told them so.
Moreover,  in  Swinburne’s  view  the  fact  that  people  have  come  to  live
“sacrificial lives” in consequence of religious experiences and arguments
provides some evidence for the truth of those experiences and arguments for
other people.232 Paul  Moser  appears  to  give  a  central  place  to  this  kind  of
evidence on authority, as he speaks of persons of faith becoming “personifying
evidence of  God’s  reality,  in virtue of  their  willingly receiving and reflecting
God’s distinctive moral character for others”.233
In  the  end,  Swinburne  argues  that  in  the  midst  of  religious  scepticism,
when there  are  good  arguments  against  theism,  and  there  are  authoritative
atheists  as  well  as  theists,  most  theists  need  arguments  for  the  existence  of
God. Swinburne maintains that these arguments must start from rightly basic
beliefs held by atheists and theists alike, and then proceed by mutually shared
inductive criteria. To produce such arguments, Swinburne says, is the aim of
natural theology.234 In  addition,  he  holds  that  the  historical  truths  of
Christianity also need to be backed up by argument, beginning, in part, from
generally recognised historical data.235 While Swinburne admits that historical
arguments have not normally been conceived as a part of natural theology, in
his view they belong to the same category of objective reasoning from public
data.236 As a proponent of evidential theism Swinburne obviously stresses the
significance  of  this  kind  of  public  propositional  evidence  in  assessing  the
evidential status of the propositions of faith.
Swinburne notes that his view of belief and evidence is compatible with a
person having nearly any belief, whether it is supported by public evidence or
not. Consider a person who believes that there is a God while admitting that
public evidence seems to count against the belief. Besides the possibility that
the person can in this case hold the belief that there is a God as basic on the
grounds of strong non-propositional evidence, in Swinburne’s view the person
231 Swinburne 2005, 23, 88-90.
232 Swinburne 2005, 90-91.
233 Moser 2010, 215.
234 Swinburne also acknowledges that some philosophers have produced arguments for God’s
existence from premises reporting some supposedly logically necessary truth (consider, for example, the
ontological argument). Swinburne is highly doubtful whether the truths are necessary. Swinburne 2005,
91.
235 “I stress ‘in part’ because the important events of the life, death, and Resurrection of Jesus are
events far more likely to have occurred if there is a God than if there is not, and hence the evidence of
natural theology [concerning the existence of God only] is also evidence relevant to these events; and,
conversely, detailed historical evidence about these events is relevant to arguments about whether or not
there is a God.” Swinburne 2005, 92.
236 Swinburne 2005, 91-92.
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can claim that the public evidence has been wrongly or incompletely assessed.
The  person  may  hold  that,  contrary  to  appearances,  the  public  evidence
actually makes God’s existence probable. Alternatively, Swinburne holds, the
person can have private evidence, which may be a religious experience, say, of
the Virgin Mary, from which the person infers that God must exist.237 When
Moser argues that proper evidence for God’s existence can be discerned in each
person’s conscience where God calls the person into a moral transformation,
this presumably counts as a specific kind of private evidence from which God’s
existence can be inferred.238
While  Swinburne’s  account  of  belief  and  evidence  is  compatible  with  a
person having almost any belief, he argues that it rules out the possibility that
a  person  could  believe  that  p  while  recognising  that  all  the  public  evidence
rendered p improbable and that she had no other evidence. As an example,
Swinburne considers Tertullian’s claim that it is worthy to believe that the Son
of God was buried and rose again, because that is impossible. If this claim is
taken at face value, in Swinburne’s view the right response is that impossibility
is  not  just  an  improper  ground  for  belief,  but  that  no  one  can  believe  a
proposition on such grounds. For Tertullian’s assertion would involve
claiming  that  all  evidence  counts  against  the  relevant  proposition.  But  if
Tertullian believes this, he must believe that the proposition is improbable,
and thus he cannot believe that it is true. Swinburne concludes that “there are
logical limits to the possibilities for human irrationality, and even Tertullian
cannot step outside them”.239
As a result, in Swinburne’s view the link between belief and evidence is a
close one: one cannot believe a proposition unless one thinks one has some
kind  of  evidence  for  it.  And the  same goes  for  believing  the  propositions  of
faith. Swinburne’s reasoning strikes me as cogent (for further discussion see
section  3.1.3.).  But  it  must  be  highlighted  that  the  evidence  required  for
believing need not be some sort of objective or adequate evidence, whatever
that is taken be. Instead, all that is required for a person to believe that p is
that she from her subjective viewpoint sincerely thinks that she has evidence
for p, and such evidence may be something that other persons deem entirely
inadequate.
2.1.2 FAITH, MERIT, GRACE, AND THE WILL
Thus  far  we  have  analysed  Swinburne’s  understanding  of  what  can  be  a
person’s evidence for the propositions of faith. In his view, a person must have
some such evidence in order to believe the propositions. But, Swinburne notes,
what Christianity commends is not holding beliefs but having faith. The view
that identifies faith with believing certain propositions Swinburne labels the
Thomist  view  because  in  his  view  Aquinas  among  others  advocated  it.
237 Swinburne 2005, 22-23.
238 Moser 2010, 145, 147-149, 200-202.
239 Swinburne 2005, 23-24.
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Swinburne holds that this account of faith is odd. In what follows, I will in the
main  consider  Swinburne’s  reading  of  Aquinas’  view  of  faith.  This  will
illuminate such themes as the nature, voluntariness, and merit of faith, on the
one hand, and the relationship between God’s grace and faith, on the other.
Attention will be paid to Swinburne’s appraisals about these issues, as they are
relevant for his own account of faith.
In Swinburne’s view the Thomist view of faith as mere belief is strange for
the following reason. Christianity normally regards faith as a virtue: a person
who has faith deserves praise or merit and/or will be rewarded with salvation
(and this rendering is no doubt attributable to God). But, Swinburne argues, a
person with Thomist faith can be a complete scoundrel because it is possible
to  have  the  required  faith-beliefs  and  yet  seek  to  do  only  evil.  According  to
Swinburne’s conviction, such a person cannot attain salvation.240
Consequently,  Swinburne holds that  Thomist  faith cannot be a saving faith,
which must then amount to something else than just believing something.
However,  as  Swinburne interprets it,  Aquinas grants that  having faith in
the  sense  of  having  mere  belief  is  not  meritorious.  Aquinas  holds  that  the
devils  have such faith,  but they lack two things that  would make their  faith
meritorious. First of all, in Aquinas’ view the faith of the devils is imperfect,
because the beliefs  which constitute their  faith are not acquired in the right
way,  namely,  voluntarily.  Secondly,  Aquinas  maintains  that  the  faith  of  the
devils is not “formed by love”. Let us consider the former first. Aquinas holds
that the devils  are involuntarily  forced to believe “by the evidence of  signs”.
Thus, as Swinburne puts it, the devils’ faith is not meritorious faith, because it
is not voluntary faith. In contrast, Aquinas in Swinburne’s view holds that the
signs are not so evident for humans, and thus humans can choose whether to
believe the relevant propositions of faith. And if we choose to believe them, it
is to our credit.241 It may be worth mentioning that a similar view according to
which faith-beliefs are acquired at will has been held by many in the Christian
tradition.242
Swinburne’s analysis of Aquinas is close to what John Jenkins has labelled
“the voluntarist interpretation” of Aquinas. In short, this view claims, in our
terms,  that  in  Aquinas’  view  there  is  for  humans  some  evidence  for  the
propositions of faith but not enough to yield firm belief, and that is why belief
in them must be produced by an act of the will. Jenkins argues, however, that
even  nuanced  voluntarist  interpretations,  which  he  takes  James  Ross  and
240 Swinburne 2005, 138, 140.
241 Swinburne 2005, 140. See Summa Theologiae 2a. 2ae. 5.2.
242 Kinghorn describes this as follows: “The Christian tradition seems widely to have assumed that
among those morally significant decisions a person makes are decisions whether or not to hold certain
Christian beliefs. Origen remarked that, if the word of God does not change some people’s nature, ‘the
cause must be held to lie in their own will, which is reluctant to accept the belief that the God over all
things is a Judge of all the deeds done during life’. Augustine cited St Paul as an example of one who
‘refused to believe’ but was turned by Christ into a ‘willing believer’. Kierkegaard, in reference to those
religious beliefs central to Christian commitment, commented that an individual ‘may believe if he wills
it’. And Vatican II, following Aquinas, described the person of faith as one who is ‘freely assenting to the
truth revealed by [God]’.” Kinghorn 2005, 83.
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Eleonore Stump to advocate, are implausible.243 In their place Jenkins argues
for “a supernatural externalist interpretation” of Aquinas. According to this
view, for Aquinas acquisition of faith-beliefs requires supernatural gifts or
graces from God.244 Jenkins’s construal is detailed, but a brief analysis of it is
relevant for our discussion.
Jenkins  holds  that  for  Aquinas  the  theological  virtue  of  faith  is  a  gift  or
grace  infused  into  a  human  by  God,  and  it  amounts  to  a  “rudimentary
inclination”  to  believe  the  propositions  of  faith.  Two  further  things  are
required for this virtue to be turned into a steady habit of firm belief. First, the
virtue must be complemented by the prompting of the Holy Spirit along with
the infused Gifts of Understanding and Scientia (donum intellectus and
donum scientiae).  By  the  former  gift  one  immediately  understands  the
propositions of faith as those that should be believed on divine authority and
adhered to despite contrary considerations. By the latter gift one subsequently
believes the propositions of faith in an immediate, non-inferential manner—
in a basic way, in our terms. The second prerequisite for firm belief is God-
infused “light of faith” (lumen fidei), which makes manifest the propositions
of  faith  in  the  same  way  as  natural  intellectual  light  makes  manifest  such
naturally known principles as “man is a rational animal”. Thus, by the infused
light  of  faith  along  with  the  gifts  and  the  promptings  of  the  Holy  Spirit
(henceforth simply grace/graces), the soon-to-be believer non-inferentially
understands  the  propositions  of  faith  adequately  and  believes  them  to  be
divinely revealed.245
Jenkins’s  Aquinas  does  not  seem to  leave  much room for  the  will  in  the
acquisition  of  faith-belief:  the  graces  from  God  seem  to  do  all  the  work.
However,  this  is  an  inference  Jenkins  disputes.  His  interpretation  of  the
voluntariness issue is quite complex, but he does say that for Aquinas forming
faith-belief, unlike forming belief about naturally known principles, requires
“a deliberate act of the will co-operating with grace, and so it is voluntary and
meritorious”.246 Hence,  in  Jenkins’s  view  Aquinas  holds  that  for  the
acquisition of faith-beliefs an act of will is required by the human in addition
to the graces.
In this connection one might note that to claim that grace is irresistible,
that  is,  that  it  is  not  just  a  necessary  but  also  a  sufficient  condition  for  the
acquisition of faith-belief, would entail the doctrine of predestination. On the
other hand, to claim conversely that a human can acquire faith-beliefs without
God’s  help  and  grace  would  be  something  akin  to  the  heretic  view  of
Pelagianism. Incidentally, if not further elaborated, the first-mentioned
voluntarist interpretation of Aquinas can be accused of embracing
Pelagianism,  since  it  claims  that  faith-belief  must  be  produced  by  an  act  of
243 See Jenkins 1997, 175-185. See Ross 1985; 1986; Stump 1991.
244 Jenkins 1997, 186.
245 Jenkins 1997, 156, 190, 192, 196. See e.g. Summa Theologiae 1a. 2ae. 62.1., 68.2., 110.3.; 2a. 2ae.
8.6., 9.1.
246 Jenkins 1997, 196.
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will.247 In contrast, Jenkins’s preferred interpretation of Aquinas seems to be
between the predestinarians and the pelagians: grace is necessary, but in
addition an act of will is required by the human for the acquisition of faith-
belief.
Swinburne makes here an objection to Aquinas’ view that is obvious given
our  discussion  about  the  nature  of  belief  and  seems  to  apply  both  to  the
voluntarist and to Jenkins’s supernatural externalist interpretation of
Aquinas.  The  objection  is  that  belief  is  not  voluntary  (see  section  1.2.3.).248
Humans cannot just choose to believe at will the propositions of faith in the
way Aquinas seems to suppose. And, one must apparently add, this cannot
happen even if aided by God’s grace. To me it seems that there is also another
problem for Jenkins’s Aquinas to which I have already pointed. If the graces
make the propositions of faith manifest for a prospective person of faith in the
way Jenkins describes, it is hard to see why an act of will by a human would be
required to produce belief in them. Instead, the graces, as one might say, look
like they make the propositions believed by some kind of  non-propositional
evidence.
Jenkins appears to contend with a similar problem.249 Ultimately he seems
to hold fast to the view that in Aquinas’ view the will does command belief. But
he  also  highlights  another  way  Aquinas  thinks  the  will  is  involved  in  the
formation of faith-belief, and this way does not seem to entail doxastic
voluntarism. Jenkins’s point could be put as follows. The prospective believer
must have by her prior voluntary acts developed such a suitably good character
that forming the faith-beliefs by the graces can occur efficiently. An improper,
bad character can apparently obstruct this process and resist the graces. So, in
this  “indirect  sense”  Aquinas  in  Jenkins’s  view  sees  the  will  as  having  an
influence on the formation of faith-beliefs.250 One might also suggest that the
will  may be needed when the graces begin to form belief  in a person in the
sense that it keeps the person attentive in this process.
Whatever one thinks about Jenkins’s explanation about the voluntariness
issue, Swinburne at any rate opts for a different solution. He argues that if we
want to maintain that having faith-belief is voluntary and thus meritorious, we
have to say that the voluntariness of it results from adequate investigation.
That  is,  one  can  voluntarily  start  an  impartial  inquiry  by  which  one  can
eventually come to have evidence sufficient to yield belief in the propositions
of faith.251 It is noteworthy that this view is not far from what Jenkins calls the
“naturalist interpretation” of Aquinas. According to this view, Aquinas claims
that one comes to hold faith-beliefs on the basis of evidence gained by sound
arguments for the propositions of faith.252 In this case, one believes eventually
247 While commenting specifically on Aquinas’ view of faith, Swinburne does not mention that
Aquinas stresses the importance of  grace.  Elsewhere,  however,  he is  aware of  this  aspect  of  Aquinas’
thought. See Swinburne 2005, 118-119.
248 Swinburne 2005, 140. Cf. Kinghorn 2005, 83.
249 See Jenkins 1997, 203-204.
250 Jenkins 1997, 206-210.
251 Swinburne 2005, 140-141.
252 Jenkins 1997, 163.
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by appreciating acquired evidence, and thus the naturalist view does not entail
direct doxastic voluntarism. For this reason the naturalist view diverges from
the voluntarist interpretation, where the evidence is taken to be insufficient
and an act of will is seen as a necessary requirement in order to believe. (Given
his grace-focused interpretation, Jenkins obviously thinks that just like the
voluntarist interpretation, the naturalist reading of Aquinas is defective.)
Swinburne’s naturalist solution to the problem of voluntariness and
meritoriousness of faith-beliefs seems feasible only on the supposition that the
evidence which the investigation yields does, in fact, support the truth of the
propositions of faith. In this case believing the propositions can perhaps be in
a certain sense meritorious: holding evidentially justified beliefs as a result of
honest inquiry presumably deserves praise, maybe from God, too, as
Swinburne apparently supposes. What is more, Swinburne seems to hold that
those to whom faith-beliefs are from the outset overwhelmingly obvious—he
presumably means those who have strong faith-beliefs held in a basic way—
will be in the same position as the devils. Their having faith-beliefs is neither
voluntary nor meritorious.253
Is Swinburne in his naturalist solution embracing the Pelagian view that
grace is not necessary for the acquisition of faith-beliefs? This is a conclusion
he seeks to avoid. Swinburne wishes to construe the doctrine about the need
for grace as the view that grace normally operates by leading us to appreciate
the strength of the arguments for the propositions of faith. But in his view
there is no reason from the Christian tradition to insist that this grace is always
or even usually supernatural “in the sense of God intervening in our mental
processes in a miraculous way” so that one comes to hold faith-belief. Instead,
Swinburne holds, “if there is a God, he gives us, and sustains in us, our rational
nature  and  may  help  us  in  many  other  ways  to  understand  the  force  of
arguments”.254 As a result, and all things considered, in Swinburne’s outline
God’s  grace  is  not  in  any  crucial  sense  vital  for  the  acquisition  of  Christian
belief. From the traditional Christian viewpoint, which emphasises the
importance  of  supernatural  grace,  this  may  strike  one  as  a  defect  (see  also
section 2.2.).
Returning to the devils’ lot, we have seen that in Aquinas’ view one reason
why  the  devils’  faith  is  not  meritorious  is  that  their  faith-beliefs  are  not
voluntary  in  any  way.  As  to  the  second  and  in  Swinburne’s  view  more
substantial reason why the devils’ faith according to Aquinas lacks merit is that
it  is  not  “formed  by  love”  (fides caritate formata).255 That  is,  Swinburne
elaborates,  the devils’  faith is  not joined to the firm purpose of  doing those
actions which love for God involves. Swinburne holds that the Council of Trent
put the point similarly, and it did not in his view insist that actual good works
are  needed  for  meritorious  faith  but  only  a  complete  readiness  to  do  them,
253 Swinburne 2005, 141.
254 Swinburne 2005, 118-120.
255 It is perhaps suitable to note that caritas, which is typically translated as charity, is a theological
virtue along with hope (spes) and faith (fides). According to Thomism, each of these virtues presupposes
supernatural grace. See e.g. Jenkins 1997, 148.
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since someone might acquire love and then die before she had any opportunity
to do any good actions.256 So, in the terminology introduced in section 1.1.2.,
meritorious Thomist faith, as construed by Swinburne, stresses the
importance of the practical aspect of faith accompanied by, in a specific sense,
voluntary belief as its cognitive aspect.257
In  the  view  of  faith  he  elaborates,  Swinburne  emphasises  the  practical
aspect  of  faith,  and he does that  for  much the same reason as stated above:
doing or being disposed to do good works is meritorious and leads to salvation.
Before analysing Swinburne’s account of faith we should briefly consider his
assessment of the Lutheran view of faith, as it includes ideas relevant to his
own view. Swinburne argues that the Lutheran view stresses, besides believing
certain propositions, trust in God.258 What  does  this  mean?  Swinburne
proposes that trusting in God, like trusting any person, amounts to a sort of
action:
[Trusting in God] is presumably to act on the assumption that He will do for us what
he knows that we want or need, when the evidence gives some reason for supposing
that  He  may  not  and  where  there  will  be  bad  consequences  if  the  assumption  is
false.259
In Swinburne’s view trusting appears to be in some sense vulnerable: a person
who  trusts  exposes  herself  to  bad  outcomes,  if  things  do  not  turn  out  as
assumed (for further discussion, see section 4.4.1.).260
Swinburne thinks that Lutherans would likely agree with his interpretation
according to which adequate trust in God is basically equivalent to pursuing
the  good  purposes  love  of  God  according  to  the  Thomist  view  involves.  A
person who trusts God with evil purposes cannot in Swinburne’s view exhibit
trust that is suitable for salvation. So, to give a crude example, a person who
does morally good actions on the assumption that God will give her salvation
is, according to Swinburne’s depiction, trusting God in the right way, whereas
a person who tries to oppress others on the assumption that God helps her in
this task is not doing that. Swinburne points out that for Lutherans exhibiting
trust does not involve merit, as they hold that persons’ salvation is not based
on merits.261
The way Swinburne elaborates the Thomist and the Lutheran view makes
it possible for him to say that the Thomist meritorious faith, that is, faith
formed by love, will, in fact, entail and be entailed by the Lutheran faith, and
that thus the Reformation controversy about whether faith alone secures
salvation  seems  only  a  dispute  based  on  confusion  about  the  meaning  of
words. Swinburne holds that both sides of the debate could agree that love is
256 Swinburne 2005, 141. See Summa Theologiae 2a., 2ae., 4.3., 4., 5..
257 To speak about “faith formed by love” and “love of God” might seem to imply that we are talking
about some kind of emotion and so about the evaluative-affectional aspect of faith instead of the practical
aspect. However, this is misplaced if Swinburne’s interpretation is correct. Love of God, as he conceives
it, is not chiefly a matter of feeling something but doing something.
258 Swinburne 2005, 142-143. Cf. McGrath 1994, 127-128.
259 Swinburne 2005, 144.
260 Cf. Schellenberg 2005, 110. See also McLeod 2011, ch. 1. For a broader discussion on the nature
of trust, see e.g. Lagerspetz 1998; McLeod 2011.
261 Swinburne 2005, 145.
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needed  in  addition  to  Thomist  faith  (that  is,  faith  as  mere  belief),  while
admitting that Lutheran faith suffices, since it includes love.262 Although I will
not  here  consider  the  accuracy  of  Swinburne’s  claims  in  detail,  one  might
query, for example, whether his action-focused description of trust properly
reflects the Lutheran view of trust.263 Still, here Swinburne’s notion of trust is
taken  for  granted  and  it  has  been  anyway  influential.  We can  thus  say  that
trusting God is to exemplify the practical aspect of faith.
2.1.3 TRUSTING GOD WITH WEAK BELIEF: THE PRAGMATIST VIEW
OF FAITH
In  his  own view Swinburne  accentuates  faith  as  goal-oriented  action.  As  he
succinctly  says  on  one  occasion,  “the  faith  needed  for  religion  is  basically  a
commitment  to  seek  a  goal  by  following  a  way”.264 Swinburne holds that
following the Christian way amounts to doing those actions which the love of
God would lead one to do, and this in his view is equal to pursuing three goals:
rendering proper reverence to God, attaining one’s own salvation, and helping
others attain theirs.265
Committing oneself  to the Christian way can obviously take place with a
firm (convinced, strong) belief that the way is truthful and leads to the goals
sought  after.  However,  Swinburne  holds  that  such  a  strong  belief  is  not  a
necessary requirement for the rational pursuit of the Christian way. In terms
of the Lutheran faith, as he understands it, Swinburne argues that it is possible
to  trust  God  without  convinced  belief.  This  is  what  Swinburne  labels  the
“Pragmatist view of faith”.266
How can one trust without belief? Swinburne argues that besides acting on
beliefs  it  is  possible  to  act  on  assumptions,  which  amount  to  doing  those
actions one would do if one did believe. And what is relevant for the present
case, Swinburne holds that one cannot merely act on the assumption that God,
whom  one  believes  to  exist,  will  do  for  one  what  one  wants  or  needs  (the
Lutheran view of faith), but also on the assumption that there is such a God.
Consequently, Swinburne holds that in the Pragmatist view,
a person has Christian faith if he acts on the assumption that there is a God who has
the properties which Christians ascribe to him and seeks to do those good actions
which the love of God (if there is a God) would lead him to do.267
262 Swinburne 2005, 146.
263 For example, Petri Järveläinen’s construal of Luther’s notion of trust is wholly dissimilar to that
of Swinburne. Järveläinen argues that for Luther trust (fiducia) pertains to the certainty of faith: it is an
affection that is formed in a person as she realises in conjunction with the experience of grace that her
convinced faith-belief is supernaturally caused by the Holy Spirit. Järveläinen 2000, 100-104. From this
point  of  view one could say that  trusting does not  so much belong to the practical  aspect  of  faith,  as
Swinburne seems to suggest, but to its cognitive aspect. Incidentally, Järveläinen’s interpretation of
Luther’s  trust  bears  a  resemblance  to  Plantinga’s  model  of  faith,  which  is  influenced  by  Reformed
thought. See section 2.2..
264 Swinburne 2001a, 211.
265 Swinburne 2005, 167, 188.
266 Swinburne 2005, 147.
267 Swinburne 2005, 148.
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Since in Swinburne’s view doing the good actions love of God involves is the
same as trusting in God (see his interpretation of the Lutheran view), it follows
that a person who exemplifies the Pragmatist view of faith trusts God without
a belief that there is a God.
Following John Bishop, one might ask what could motivate a person to do
the  good  actions  if  one  does  not  believe  that  there  is  a  God.268 Swinburne
argues that the person does the actions because she conceives the goals thus
possibly attained so worthwhile, more worthwhile than some mundane goals,
that “it is worth doing them in the hope that they will attain those goals”.269
When  stated  in  this  way,  Swinburne’s  view  of  faith  somewhat  surprisingly
resembles the views of those who argue that having faith is feasible with mere
hope (see Pojman’s view in section 4.3.). Paul Helm even seems to suggest that
it  would  be  better  to  characterise  Swinburne’s  Pragmatist  faith  as  a  case  of
religious hope.270
Swinburne  says  that  he  has  labelled  the  account  of  faith  at  hand  as  the
Pragmatist view owing to James’s “The Will to Believe” (see the introduction).
According to Swinburne’s interpretation, James was commending faith as
acting-as-if a religious hypothesis were true, since it can offer vital good now
and possibly eternal well-being hereafter. Swinburne holds that James just
confuses things by calling this “acting-as-if” “believing”. So, according to
Swinburne’s analysis, adopting a religious hypothesis in the Jamesian sense
does not amount to believing the hypothesis at will, as the title of the article
suggests,  but  living  or  acting  as  if  it  were  true.  Swinburne  holds  that  the
Pragmatist view was also espoused by Kierkegaard. “The leap of faith”, which
Kierkegaard commends, is in Swinburne’s view a matter of acting-as-if with
“the passion of the infinite”.271
Swinburne claims that  the person of  Pragmatist  Christian faith need not
believe that there is a God in the sense that it is more probable than not that
there is a God. However, he holds, a person does need another kind of belief,
namely,  the  so-called  weak  belief:  to  pursue  the  Christian  way  in  order  to
achieve  the  goals  sought  after,  the  person  needs  to  believe  that  it  is  more
probable that the pursuit of that way will attain the goals than the pursuit of
any other way will, including doing nothing.272 For example, Swinburne says,
the person needs to believe that she is more likely to honour God by attending
to Christian worship than by doing nothing, and more likely to get to Heaven
by feeding the starving than by taking heroin. This kind of means-end beliefs
Swinburne takes to derive from the Christian creed, broadly understood (cf.
268 Bishop 2007, 120.
269 Swinburne 2005, 148. As Swinburne is here speaking about the positive evaluation of the possible
outcomes of having faith, we are somewhere in the neighbourhood of the evaluative-affective aspect of
faith.
270 Helm 2000, 148-149.
271 Swinburne 2005, 148-149. See Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Vol. 1.
272 This is a simplification of Swinburne’s view, but it suffices for our needs. The possibility that more
than  one  way  will  equally  likely  attain  the  sought  goal  is  omitted  here.  For  further  discussion,  see
Swinburne 2005, 9-10, 197-198. See also Swinburne’s view on belief as a contrastive attitude in section
1.2.
Faith, Evidence, and the Cause of Belief
64
Audi’s creedal faith in section 1.1.1.). So, in Swinburne’s view the weak belief
which faith calls for is that the Christian creed is more probably true than its
relevant alternatives. And this, of course, presumes that the person believes
that there is some probability that God exists.273
So, it is not that the Pragmatist view of faith lacks belief altogether but, as
Swinburne  puts  it,  “it  involves  less  in  the  way  of  belief-that”.274 It  may  be
instructive to consider an artificial illustration. When lost in a maze and faced
with a choice of several routes, a person may think on the evidence at hand
that none of the routes has a probability above 0.5 of leading out of the maze,
but she can still think that one of them has the best chances of doing that. The
person may think, for example, that a certain route’s probability of leading out
is 0.3, whereas the probability of each other route is somewhere below 0.25.
In this case, the person does not firmly believe that any of the routes leads out
of the maze, and yet she does weakly believe that one of them does that. In a
comparable way, a person may not think it very likely that the pursuit of any
religious way leads, say, to salvation, but she may think that Christianity has
the best chances of doing that. In this case, the person believes weakly in the
efficacy of the Christian way to lead to salvation.275
There may be diverse views as to how low the probability in the weak belief
can  be  so  that  acting  on  it  is  still  sensible.  This  will  likely  depend  on  how
pursuit-worthy the goals of Christianity are seen.276 For example, a person may
think that the prospect of salvation is so appealing that it is according to her
appraisal still rational to pursue the Christian way even if the probability of its
being true is very low (but not lower than that of the relevant rival ways). As
for Swinburne, he holds that Christianity has the best goals to pursue, and he
has argued for the high probability of its creed being true on public evidence.
So, according to Swinburne’s assessment, exercising Christian faith is highly
rational. As he says, “it will be the best thing for anyone to do with his life.”277
Could  not  a  person  pursue  the  Christian  way  without  the  weak  belief?
Swinburne  claims  that  it  would  not  be  merely  irrational  but  logically
impossible  to  pursue  a  religious  way  in  order  to  obtain  a  goal  if  the  person
believed that pursuing that way would make it less likely for her to obtain the
goal than otherwise.278 Perhaps  this  is  true,  but  in  looser  terms  I  find  no
unfeasibility in having a kind of Pragmatist faith without the weak belief.
Consider a person who finds the Christian worldview attractive but believes
that there are only very slim chances of its being true. I see no reason why such
a  person  would  necessarily  have  to  form  a  weak  belief  about  the  relative
probabilities of rival religious ways before she can meaningfully realise a type
of tentative Christian faith. Surely such a person could, for example, seek and
273 Swinburne  2005,  149-150,  198,  225-226.  For  further  discussion  on  the  “creedal  belief”,  see
Maitzen 1991; Swinburne 2005, 151-153.
274 Swinburne 2005, 150.
275 Cf. Swinburne 2005, 32, 197.
276 Cf. Swinburne 2005, 265.
277 Swinburne 2005, 266, 268.
278 Swinburne 2005, 197.
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call out to God and make an agnostic prayer beginning with the words “God, if
you are there…”.279
Paul Helm argues that there are some problems in Swinburne’s account of
faith. To begin with, whereas Swinburne maintains that a person can trust in
God whom she does not, on balance, believe exists, in Helm’s view this does
not  seem  plausible  at  all.  Helm  allows  that  a  person  may  trust  S  while
unbeknownst to the person S does not exist, which in Helm’s view is “a case of
mistakenly directed belief”. But, Helm asks, how could the person trust S while
being aware that she does not believe that S exists? Helm holds that “I trust
God but I do not believe that he exists” looks like a paradox of belief that rivals
Moore’s (see section 1.2.2.). And in his view the same conclusion holds if the
non-belief is substituted for the belief that it is merely possible that God
exists.280
Helm’s critique may be prima facie credible, but if we presume
Swinburne’s notion of trust, there does not seem to be any problem in trusting
someone  who  is  not  believed,  on  balance,  to  exist.  Consider  an  analogy
Swinburne has offered. A prisoner is told that she will be rescued by the Big
Chief from the yard of the prison if she can get there at night. The prisoner,
however, does not believe this rumour; she does not believe that there is any
Big Chief. Still, she admits that the rumour has some credibility, and she finds
it impossible to escape the prison in any other way. So, the prisoner believes
that it is more probable that she will attain her goal of escaping by acting on
the assumption that the Big Chief exists and rescues her than by acting on any
other assumption. Hence, the prisoner tries to get to the yard while knowing
that she will be punished unless she has succeeded in escaping. According to
Swinburne, the prisoner is here appropriately described as putting her trust in
the Big Chief, whom she does not, on balance, believe exists.281 So, it is possible
to trust S while not firmly believing that S exists, and thus Helm’s critique fails.
Helm’s further criticism against Swinburne pertains to the question of the
merit and voluntariness of faith. According to Helm, Swinburnean trust, “that
is, to act on the assumption that p, is to act as if p were more certain than it is”.
Because  of  this,  Helm  sees  Swinburnean  trust  as  making  up  for  evidential
deficiency.282 Helm’s point seems to be that trust is called for where one lacks
evidence and thus firm belief  about the dependability  of  the object  of  trust.
But,  Helm  argues,  to  decouple  trust  and  belief  in  this  way  leads  to  a
paradoxical  situation  in  the  case  of  faith.  His  ultimate  claim in  this  respect
seems to be that, given Swinburne’s account, the more evidence one has for
279 Cf. Kenny 1979, 129; Price 1969, 484-486.
280 Helm 2000, 149.
281 Swinburne 2005, 226-227. As Helm’s critique illustrates, it seems natural to argue that, or at least
ask  whether,  “trust  in  God”  and  similar  locutions  “to  have  faith  in  God”  and  to  “believe  in  God”
presuppose the propositional belief that there is a God. However, as long as one does not carefully define
what is meant by the former group of attitudes, there is no point in asking whether they imply, say, a
propositional belief concerning their object’s existence. As Swinburne’s view illustrates, if trust is defined
in the way he does, there is nothing odd in the claim “I trust in God but do not (on balance) believe that
God exists”. For a similar claim as regards “faith in”, see Schellenberg’s view of faith in section 4.4.1..
282 Helm 2000, 143.
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the propositions of faith and the stronger Christian belief one thus has, the less
room there is  for  the exercise of  voluntary and hence meritorious trust.  So,
since trusting is in Swinburne’s view central to exemplifying the Pragmatist
faith, having a strong belief seems to exclude or reduce the opportunities for
its exercise.283
Helm holds that here appears to be a conflict of aims in Swinburne’s work.
On the one hand, Helm says, Swinburne has argued that there is good evidence
for  God’s  existence  and  holds  that  persons  have  as  an  intellectual  aim  to
ground their belief in adequate evidence as firmly as they can. But, on the other
hand, as Helm just reasoned, the more evidence one has for God’s existence,
the less room there is for meritorious trust and faith. And this sounds, if not
paradoxical, as Helm says, at least slightly strange.284 Helm calls views of faith
similar to Swinburne’s “evidential deficiency views”. According to him, such
views  see  faith  and  especially  trust  as  making  up  for  lack  of  evidence  by
adopting  a  degree  of  certitude  not  warranted  by  the  evidence.  These  views
Helm contrasts  with the one he favours and calls  “the evidential  proportion
view”, which he takes, in essence, as proportioning the strength of faith and
trust with the strength of belief: strong belief, strong faith; weak belief, weak
faith.285
There may be some truth to Helm’s interpretation. Swinburne seems to
have  a  tendency  to  think  that  some  kind  of  evidential  deficiency  is  a
prerequisite for trust and hence faith. This is illustrated, for example, by his
definition  of  trust,  as  it  speaks  about  acting  on  an  assumption  when  the
evidence  to  some extent  counts  against  the  assumption.  But  despite  this,  it
seems to me that Helm’s critique is not wholly convincing. For it does not seem
to make much sense to say, like Helm does, that the stronger belief one has,
the less room there is for one to exercise meritorious trust and faith. It is not
clear  how  the  strength  of  a  person’s  belief  could  exclude  or  reduce  her
possibilities to seek to do the actions constituting trust in God. Consider the
following example. Suppose X has a weak Christian belief whereas Y’s belief is
a strong one. Helm’s claim is that unlike X, for Y there is not much room to
trust  in  God.  But  how  could  that  be?  It  seems  that  quite  regardless  of  the
strength of their beliefs, X and Y have equal opportunities to choose whether
to trust in God, that is, whether to seek to do the actions constitutive of trust.
And if  both X and Y decide to do these actions with equal  determination,  it
seems that their trust in God is equal and similarly meritorious, as they have
made the same choice and do the same actions.
283 Helm 2000, 144.
284 Helm 2000, 145.
285 Helm 2000, 18, 139. Helm has reservations regarding Swinburne’s account of trust, too: “But is
trust  in  God  a  case  of  a  morally  good  action,  perhaps  the  paradigm  case  of  such  an  action,  as  he
[Swinburne] maintains, and as he needs to maintain if he is to link faith and merit as robustly as he does?
Is there not a critical moral difference between trust as the basis of the action of doing something and
trust as the basis for receiving something? And is not the basic religious stance of trustfulness, at least
in Christianity, that of one who trusts he will receive, rather than trusting as the basis of doing something
and so of gaining merit thereby?” Helm 2000, 150-151.
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As I see it, all of this is in line with Swinburne’s views. He seems to hold
that anything less than absolute certainty that there is a God who will provide
for us what we want or need requires exercising trust in God.286 This illustrates
that in Swinburne’s view trusting is actually compatible with firm as well as
weak belief. So, Helm’s critique seems unconvincing. Then again, it must be
conceded that with strong belief, in contrast to weak belief, it is presumably
easier to make the voluntary choice to trust God. To give a crude example, if a
person  firmly  believes  that  there  is  a  God  worthy  of  worship  and  He  is  a
punisher of bad actions, she would not likely have much temptation to choose
other things than to trust in God and live a life of faith, in general. However,
things may be otherwise as regards a weak believer. For her the temptation to
do  other  things  than  trust  God may  be  substantial.  Perhaps  in  this  specific
sense  a  strong  belief  makes  the  choice  to  trust  in  God  “less  free”  and  thus
somewhat less meritorious.287 Whether this is what Helm really intends by his
critique is not obvious, but the critique can be anyway re-construed in this way.
Supposing  then  that  this  criticism is  adequate,  we  can  say  that  having  a
strong belief somewhat weakens the merit one gains by exercising trust. Does
this mean that in the Swinburnean outlook having a strong belief weakens the
overall  merit  one  gains  by  having  faith?  Not  necessarily,  for  that  will  also
depend on how the belief is acquired. If a strong belief is acquired via honest
investigation, one gains merit by holding that belief, as Swinburne argued (see
section 2.1.2.).288 This probably compensates for the loss of merit strong belief
allegedly implies for trust. Helm actually acknowledges a comparable
possibility,  which to me seems to vitiate his  reservations about Swinburne’s
view on the merit of faith.289
On the other hand, if a person’s strong Christian belief is based on, say, a
powerful religious experience, which she was not expecting at all, her holding
the belief is not meritorious according to Swinburne’s analysis: the person has
not done anything to acquire the belief, but the belief is simply forced on her.
We may suppose that for such a person the temptation to do other things than
trust  in  God is  quite  low,  and  so  her  trust  in  God is  less  meritorious  in  the
discussed sense. This is plausibly a case of a person whose faith is minimally
286 See Swinburne 2005, 146. Consequently, a person who acts on the absolute certainty that there
is a God who will provide for her what she needs is not trusting in God but doing something else, perhaps
showing her gratitude to God. One could say that in Swinburne’s view there is no need to trust in God in
Heaven. Cf. Helm 2000, 144.
287 This is actually a Swinburnean point. He holds that God’s existence not being immediately
evident and firmly believed from the outset makes it possible for persons to make the genuine choice
whether to pursue good or evil purposes, which is an intrinsically good thing. To illustrate with the
previously  mentioned  crude  example,  if  persons  knew  from  the  outset  that  there  is  a  God  worthy  of
worship and He is a punisher of bad actions, they probably would not have much temptation to do wrong
(or so Swinburne apparently thinks), and in this sense their choice to do good would be less free, as it
would  be  quite  a  natural  and  easy  thing  to  do.  But  if  God’s  existence  is  not  immediately  obvious  to
persons, they have the genuine choice to pursue good as well as evil purposes: without a strong fear of
punishment, they presumably now also have a real temptation to do evil. Swinburne notes that in this
case  among  the  good  choices  is  starting  to  investigate  whether  God  exists  and  what  God’s  possible
exhortations to us might be. See Swinburne 1998, 203-212. See also Swinburne 1979, 211-212.
288 Cf. Swinburne 2005, 105-106.
289 See Helm 2000, 146-147.
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meritorious in the Swinburnean scheme. But the person’s faith is nonetheless
meritorious, as she has voluntarily chosen to trust in God, and this is a choice
she could have withdrawn and still can withdraw, though her temptation to do
so may be negligible.
2.1.4 CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION
In summary, Swinburne holds that having Christian faith primarily means
seeking certain goals, namely, the worship of God and the salvation of oneself
and  others.  He  maintains  that  seeking  these  goals  amounts  to  doing  the
actions that love of God would lead one to do, which in his view is also equal
to trusting in God. This is the practical aspect of Swinburne’s Pragmatist view
of faith. In his view this aspect is largely voluntary and exemplifying it deserves
merit.  If  one  is  not  prepared  or  disposed  to  do  good  acts,  one  cannot  have
salvific faith.
In Swinburne’s view a necessary condition for instantiating the practical
aspect of faith is not strong belief but a so-called weak belief, that is, the belief
that the Christian creed is more probable than any relevant rival creed. Thus,
in our terminology, a weak belief is a sub-doxastic, “less-than-strong-belief”
attitude  (see  section  1.1.2.).  Weak  belief  forms  the  cognitive  aspect  of
Swinburne’s account of faith. Swinburne maintains that the belief required for
having faith is formed involuntarily in response to evidence, and in his view it
is not possible to believe without evidence. Swinburne claims that holding a
Christian belief can be nonetheless voluntary in a sense and thus meritorious,
too.  This  is  the  situation  if  the  belief  is  acquired  as  a  result  of  voluntarily
started adequate investigation, in which case the belief is, for want of a better
term, indirectly voluntary.
I  find  many  aspects  of  Swinburne’s  view  convincing.  It  does  seem  that
believing is tied to evidence, and hence the cognitive aspect of faith, insofar as
it consists of a belief of any strength, is not directly voluntary (for further
discussion see section 3.1.3.). In contrast, the practical aspect of faith, as it is a
matter of practical action, is naturally conceived of as a voluntary choice and
conduct. But where I deviate from Swinburne’s view is that I do not think that
a weak belief  is  a  necessary requirement for having a sort  of  tentative faith,
since in my view epistemic-wise still weaker—and non-contrastive—
propositional attitudes suffice for such faith (see section 4.5.). Swinburne
would likely disagree, as he emphasises that faith amounts to pursuing certain
specific goals, and such a pursuit is not in his view possible without the weak
belief. But Swinburne’s view according to which faith is a goal-oriented action,
which  is  also  meritorious,  may  for  some  look  like  an  objectionable  view  of
faith. In the following section we will analyse a model of faith which is in this
way against Swinburne’s account.
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2.2 PLANTINGA’S AQUINAS/CALVIN MODEL OF FAITH
In  Plantinga  we  find  quite  a  different  view  of  faith  to  that  of  Swinburne.
Plantinga maintains that his model reflects Calvin’s and Aquinas’ accounts;
hence the name the Aquinas/Calvin (A/C) model. He holds that the kernel of
the model is captured by Calvin’s summary of faith:
[faith is] firm and certain knowledge of God’s benevolence towards us, founded upon
the truth of the freely given promise in Christ, both revealed to our minds and sealed
upon our hearts through the Holy Spirit.290
This description already illuminates the central features of Plantinga’s
model of faith. Faith is produced by the Holy Spirit, and it includes a cognitive
and an evaluative-affective aspect: it is certain knowledge both “revealed to
our minds” and “sealed upon our hearts”.291 Unlike Swinburne, Plantinga does
not  focus  on  the  practical  aspect  of  faith  (for  a  discussion  of  his  view,  see
section 1.1.2.). In addition, contrary to Swinburne, Plantinga gives a central
role to the Holy Spirit in a person’s acquisition of faith.
Plantinga presents his model of faith in his Warranted Christian Belief
(2000), which is the last book of his trilogy on epistemology.292 The topic in
these books is the notion of warrant, which for Plantinga is the property that
turns true belief into knowledge. He holds that warrant is best conceived in
terms of proper function:
a  belief  has  warrant,  for  a  person,  if  it  is  produced  by  her  cognitive  faculties
functioning  properly  in  a  congenial  epistemic  environment  according  to  a  design
plan successfully aimed at the production of true or verisimilitudinous belief.293
In Warranted Christian Belief Plantinga’s aim is to show how theistic and
Christian  beliefs,  when  held  in  a  basic  way,  could  have  warrant  sufficient
enough to constitute knowledge. This is where the A/C model or, actually, two
interrelated A/C models enter the picture. Plantinga holds that theistic belief,
which has to do with a general knowledge of God and some of God’s qualities,
is  arrived  at  by  a  different  route  than  a  specifically  Christian  belief,  which
concerns  such  things  as  the  Trinity,  incarnation,  atonement,  and  the  like.
Consequently, Plantinga’s first (plain) A/C model tries to explain the warrant
of theistic beliefs, whereas the second extended A/C model accounts for the
warrant of Christian belief, too. It is the extended model that relates to faith
proper.294
“Model”  is  Plantinga’s  technical  terminology,  and  he  claims  four  things
about the A/C models. First, the models are in his view epistemically possible:
290 Calvin, Institutes of Christian Religion, III, ii, 7, 551. See Plantinga 2000, 201-202.
291 Plantinga 2000, 168. Cf. Bishop 2007, 104-105.
292 The other books are Plantinga 1993a; 1993b.
293 Plantinga 1993a, 237. See also Plantinga 2000, xi. Kvanvig (ed.) 1996, for example, addresses
Plantinga’s theory of warrant from different perspectives. One might note that here, too, is a difference
between Swinburne and Plantinga. While Swinburne basically holds that S’s belief that p is epistemically
justified if S has “internal” access to adequate evidence for p, Plantinga maintains that S’s belief is
epistemically justified or, more precisely, warranted, if p is produced “externally” by S’s properly
functioning cognitive faculty. Swinburne’s theory of epistemic justification is an internalist one, while
Plantinga’s is externalist. On the internalist/externalist distinction in epistemology, see e.g. Pappas
2005.
294 Plantinga 2000, 168.
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they  are  consistent  with  what  we  know,  that  is,  they  can  be  true.  Secondly,
Plantinga holds that there are no cogent objections to the models’ truth that
are not also cogent objections to the truth of theistic or Christian belief. Third,
while Plantinga believes that the models are true or at least verisimilitudinous,
he does not claim to show that they are that.  This  is  for  the reason that  the
models entail the truth of theism and Christianity, and Plantinga says that he
does  not  know “how to  do  something  one  could  sensibly  call  ‘showing’  that
either of these is true”.  Fourth,  Plantinga  maintains  that  there  are  other
models similar to the A/C models, and if Christian belief is true, in his view
one of these models is very likely also true.295
The way Plantinga conceives the nature of the A/C models is linked to his
epistemological project in Warranted Christian Belief.296 But  what  we  are
interested in is not Plantinga’s epistemology but his account of faith and the
voluntariness of faith. So, though it is good to be aware of Plantinga’s claims
about the nature of  the A/C models,  for  our needs it  suffices to conceive of
them as pieces of philosophical theology. They are Plantinga’s attempts to
elaborate theological ideas with philosophical methods.297 In fact, this
understanding of the models seems to be compatible with Plantinga’s claims
about the character of the models. In what follows, then, I will first survey the
(plain) A/C model, after which the extended A/C model is scrutinised.
2.2.1 NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD BY SENSUS DIVINITATIS: THE
A/C MODEL
Natural knowledge of God is readily associated with natural theology, which is
the enterprise of trying to gain knowledge about God’s existence and character
without the aid of special revelation. Generally, natural theology comes in the
form of seeking to offer arguments for God’s existence, which start from some
purportedly shared public evidence.298 Swinburne is an exemplar of a natural
theologian (see section 2.1.1.).299 Plantinga, however, does not link a natural
knowledge  of  God  to  natural  theology.  He  actually  rejects  the  necessity  of
natural  theology  for  faith,  as  is  typical  in  the  Reformed  tradition  he
espouses.300 In its place, following Calvin’s outline Plantinga argues that all of
us have so-called sensus divinitatis,  a  sense  of  divinity,  which  according  to
295 Plantinga 2000, 168-170.
296 See e.g. Plantinga 2000, 169, 190-191. For an evaluation of Plantinga’s religious epistemology see
e.g. Beilby 2005.
297 Cf. Plantinga 2000, xiii-xiv.
298 Cf. Beilby 2005, 117.
299 See e.g. Swinburne 2005, 91-92.
300 James Beilby has distinguished three Reformed objections to natural theology. First, due to sin’s
effect on humans’ intellect, human reasoning is incapable of attaining reliable knowledge of God. Second,
because human reason is depraved in this way, knowledge of God must come “from the outside”, that is,
from Scripture alone (Sola Scriptura). Third, since many people have a robust faith but no arguments
for the propositions of their faith, this must mean that the arguments of natural theology are not required
for having faith, and so they are irrelevant, perhaps even injurious. See Beilby 2005, 118-119. As we shall
see  in  due  course,  Plantinga  emphasises  the  noetic  effects  of  sin  and  holds  that  arguments  are  not
required for having faith. However, he does not claim that the arguments are of necessity injurious. For
a discussion, see e.g. Beilby 2005, 119-124; Plantinga 1991; 2001; 2007.
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Plantinga’s interpretation is a cognitive faculty whereby humans can acquire
theistic beliefs. He maintains that this capacity for knowledge of God is part of
each person’s original cognitive makeup.301
Plantinga holds that sensus divinitatis is a disposition to form theistic
beliefs  in  circumstances  that  trigger  the  sense,  for  example,  when  one  is
marvelling  at  nature  or  feeling  guilt  or  in  danger.  In  his  view,  these
circumstances form the occasion on which the beliefs arise, the beliefs being,
for example, that God is great, God disapproves of my doings, or God helps me
if he sees fit. Plantinga accentuates that beliefs formed by sensus divinitatis
are  not  inferred  from the  circumstances  but  occasioned  by  them.  Plantinga
says, for example, that awareness of guilt is not an evidential basis for a theistic
argument of the form: I am guilty; so there must be a God. Rather, he holds, a
feeling of guilt is the circumstance where one finds oneself with the belief that
God disapproves (and exists).302
Plantinga  holds  that  beliefs  produced  by sensus divinitatis resemble
perception, memory, and a priori beliefs. All of these beliefs are in his view
basic in the sense that they are not accepted on the evidential basis of other
propositions.  The  general  view  here  is  akin  to  that  of  Swinburne  on  basic
propositions and beliefs (see section 2.1.1.). For example, in Plantinga’s view
seeing flowers in bloom or remembering eating pancakes are not premises for
simple arguments to the conclusion that, in fact, the flowers are in bloom or
that pancakes were eaten. Instead, he maintains, the beliefs arise
spontaneously in appropriate circumstances. And, Plantinga says, the same
goes for beliefs about God when they are formed by sensus divinitatis: they are
not inferred but arise spontaneously in the circumstances that trigger the
operation of the sense. In short, theistic beliefs are formed in a basic way and
hence they are basic beliefs.303
One might from the outset query whether we could possibly have the sense
of  divinity on the grounds that  it  is  not part  of  common knowledge that  we
have  that  kind  of  faculty  as  it  is  that  we  have  such  natural  faculties  as
perception, intellect, and memory. Plantinga holds, however, that a person
who acquires theistic beliefs via sensus divinitatis need not have any idea
about  the  source  of  the  belief  or  that  there  is  such  a  faculty  as sensus
divinitatis. Similarly, Plantinga holds, most of us do not have well-developed
ideas about the source of our a priori beliefs. Furthermore, Plantinga argues
that persons do not hold theistic beliefs on the basis of the following sort of
argument:  this  belief  seems  to  be  a  product  of sensus divinitatis; sensus
301 Plantinga 2000, 170, 172, 180. I will not here consider whether Plantinga reflects Calvin’s thought
adequately, but some remarks can still be made. For example, according to Paul Helm’s interpretation,
Calvin held that the sensus divinitatis yields  both  epistemic  and  moral  knowledge.  Helm  1998,  88.
Plantinga, however, seems to somewhat one-sidedly emphasise only the epistemic side. Furthermore,
whereas Plantinga, as we will see, sees the sensus divinitatis as causing specifically theistic beliefs, Helm
gives the impression that for Calvin the divine awareness produced by the faculty is broader and more
elusive,  and  that  it  can  thus  be  interpreted  in  many  ways,  and  hence,  I  suppose,  non-theistic
interpretations  cannot  be  excluded.  Helm  1998,  97.  Then  again,  see  Helm  1998,  98-99.  For  further
discussion, see Beversluis 1995; Jeffreys 1997; Helm 1998.
302 Plantinga 2000, 173-175.
303 Plantinga 2000, 175-176.
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divinitatis is a reliable belief-producing mechanism; thus, the belief is
probably true. On the contrary, Plantinga argues that theistic beliefs are not
typically held on the basis of any argument at all: they are basic beliefs.304
If sensus divinitatis is part of each person’s cognitive faculties, why then
are theistic beliefs not much more widely held? Plantinga argues that prior to
faith (discussed in the next section) natural knowledge of God is weakened by
human kind’s sinful state, which has both cognitive and affective
consequences.  As  to  the  latter,  our  affections  are  directed  towards  wrong
objects—we love ourselves and not our neighbours and God, for example.305
The cognitive effects of sin, on the other hand, have to do primarily with our
knowledge of God. “Were it not for sin and its effects,” Plantinga argues, “God’s
presence and glory would be as obvious and uncontroversial to us all as the
presence of other minds, physical objects, and the past.”306 But because of sin,
sensus divinitatis has  been  damaged  just  like,  say,  one’s  hearing  can  be
damaged due to an illness. In addition, Plantinga maintains that sin can cause
us to resist, suppress, and distort the deliverances of the faculty. But despite
this, Plantinga holds that sensus divinitatis remains partially functional in
most of us, even though in some it may not work at all.307
As things stand, it is evident that, according to Plantinga’s model, it is not
up to persons’  volitional  activity whether they have theistic  beliefs.  Either a
person’s sensus divinitatis works  to  some  extent  or  sin  wholly  prevents  its
functioning.  Similarly,  either  a  person’s  vision  works  at  least  partly  or  the
person is blind and cannot but lack visual beliefs. On the other hand, it may be
possible that a person’s sense of divinity is partly working, but sin causes her
to suppress its  productions or interpret  them incorrectly.  Might a person in
this case fight sin by her willpower and pay closer attention to the deliverances
of the sensus divinitatis? Plantinga does not seem to think so. In his view only
God can help humans in their sinful situation.308
So,  in Plantinga’s  model  sin explains why all  of  us do not spontaneously
come to hold theistic beliefs in a basic way when, say, marvelling at nature. But
that  some  persons  do  acquire  theistic  beliefs  in  this  way  is  perhaps  not  an
issue.  To  put  this  point  in  Swinburnean  terms,  perhaps  awareness  of  God’s
presence  which  grounds  the  basic  belief  that  there  is  a  God  can  arise
spontaneously in such circumstances as Plantinga describes.309 However, it is
another question how often in such situations theistic belief is, in fact,
acquired in a basic way rather than by way of an inference. Plantinga’s claim
is  that,  according  to  his  model,  one  does  not  make  “a  quick  and  dirty”  or
304 Plantinga appears to hold that lacking argumentative support for theistic belief is no deficiency.
In his view, it is from an epistemic viewpoint better to hold theistic beliefs as basic rather than as inferred.
Plantinga 2000, 179, 264. One might still ask whether it would be a good thing if one could offer, for
example, evidential support for the premises of the above argument concerning the reliability (and
existence) of sensus divinitatis.
305 Plantinga 2000, 184, 205, 208.
306 Plantinga 2000, 214.
307 Plantinga 2000, 205, 214-215.
308 Plantinga 2000, 205.
309 See Swinburne 2005, 88-89. See also section 2.1.1..
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“ridiculously weak” inference from, say, the grandeur of the mountains or the
night sky to the existence of God.310As a retort one might simply question this
assertion, as Keith Mascord, for example, does.
Mascord’s  fundamental  critique  is  that  Plantinga’s  scenarios  of  theistic
belief formation are best construed in inferential rather than non-inferential
terms, though he adds that the inference involved need not be a very conscious
one.  Mascord  argues  that  otherwise  it  is  hard  to  identify  the  nature  of  the
connection between the experiences Plantinga describes and the resulting
theistic belief.311 Suppose, then, that Mascord is right and that theistic beliefs
are typically arrived at through an explicit or implicit inference, in which case
they are non-basic. Would this undermine Plantinga’s model?
Perhaps some epistemological difficulties would arise, at the very least.312
But, as Plantinga remarks, his model could be developed in such a way that the
role of sensus divinitatis is to enable persons to see the truth of the premise
for a quick theistic argument, such as the heavens can be beautiful only if God
has created them.313 In  this  case,  the  resulting  theistic  belief  would  by  all
appearances be non-basic (though the crucial premise might be held in a basic
way). Questions about basicality also concern Plantinga’s view on specifically
Christian belief formation, and it will be addressed further in that connection.
2.2.2 FAITH AS A WORK OF THE HOLY SPIRIT: THE EXTENDED A/C
MODEL
Plantinga maintains that humankind has fallen into sin, and this has alienated
humans  from  God  both  cognitively  and  affectively.  According  to  him,  sin
makes it impossible for humans to save themselves from this plight. Following
traditional Christianity, Plantinga argues that God has offered humans
salvation  in  Jesus  Christ,  and  he  has  informed  humans  of  this  scheme  of
salvation in the Bible. Subsequently, God has sent the Holy Spirit to produce
the gift of faith in humans. By virtue of the Holy Spirit’s activity humans come
to believe the specifically Christian propositions. This is the proper cognitive
aspect in Plantinga’s model of faith. In addition, Plantinga holds that the Holy
Spirit cures the damaged sensus divinitatis and distorted and disoriented
affections. The corrected affections, such as loving God and one’s neighbours
(see section 1.1.2.), form the evaluative-affective aspect of Plantinga’s model of
faith.314
The way the Holy Spirit produces Christian beliefs and the right affections
is akin to the way sensus divinitatis produces theistic beliefs. I will here focus
on the belief-side of the process, though it is important to remember that the
310 Plantinga 2000, 175-176. More explicitly, the argument could be something like the following:
the mountains are grand; only God could have created such grand mountains; therefore, there must be
a God. This would likely be some form of teleological argument for God’s existence.
311 Mascord 2006, 129, 132. For further discussion, see Mascord 2006, ch. 7.
312 See e.g. Mascord 2006, 144-145.
313 Plantinga 2000, 176.
314 Plantinga 2000, 205-206, 269, 280-281.
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process  also  includes  the  renewal  of  the  affections.315 Plantinga  argues  that
there are three things involved in a person’s coming to believe the “great things
of the gospel”: Scripture (the divine teaching), the internal instigation of the
Holy Spirit, and faith, the belief that results. To put it briefly, Plantinga
maintains that encountering the Scripture in some way or another forms the
occasion for Christian beliefs to arise in a basic way, that is, non-inferentially,
through the activity of the Holy Spirit.316
From a  person’s  point  of  view,  Plantinga  holds,  reading  the  Scripture  or
something presenting it or hearing the gospel preached brings about a sudden
conviction that what is said is true and that it is from God. Plantinga mentions
that the conviction can also arise slowly and the process can actually go “in a
thousand ways”, but in each case there is the phenomenon of being convinced
in response to the Christian teaching.317 It seems that in Plantinga’s model the
Holy  Spirit  works  incognito:  when  a  person  acquires  convinced  Christian
beliefs, she does not discern that the Holy Spirit produces the beliefs; that is
not part of the overall experience. One might ask, though, why the Holy Spirit
does not work openly.
Plantinga maintains that for the person of faith in paradigmatic instances
Christian beliefs, like theistic beliefs, are conviction-wise on a par with her
memory and a priori beliefs.318 But, he admits, in typical cases the degree of
Christian belief will be less than maximal, and it can vary from time to time. 319
This  seems  problematic,  however.  To  put  the  issue  in  Swinburnean  terms
again,  it  seems  odd  that  the  Holy  Spirit’s  activity  would  result  in  a  person
having  basic  Christian  beliefs  (or  propositions)  whose  prior  probability  is
relatively low and change over time.320 Should  not  the  Holy  Spirit  always
produce,  and  presumably  also  sustain,  very  convinced  Christian  beliefs  in
persons of faith?
The  view  that  in  Plantinga’s  model  Christian  belief  comes  in  different
degrees  among persons  James  Beilby  labels  as  the  variability  of  belief  (VB)
problem. Beilby holds that one answer to this problem would be to argue that
some persons have received a weakened version of the internal instigation of
the Holy Spirit. But, Beilby maintains, this is unsatisfactory inter alia for the
reason that it is hard to explain why God would mute the effectiveness of his
chosen means to produce faith in persons.321 Then  again,  perhaps  the  VB
problem is not so much due to God as to human flaws. This is the stance Beilby
prefers, as he holds that the VB problem is best explained for Plantinga by the
noetic effects of sin: they continue to some extent to affect the believer even
315 For further discussion on the affections, see Plantinga 2000, ch. 9.
316 Plantinga 2000, 249-251, 258-259.
317 Plantinga 2000, 250-251.
318 Plantinga 2000, 264.
319 Plantinga 2000, 264 n. 43. See also Beilby 2007, 146.
320 Swinburne 2005, 18-19.
321 Beilby 2007, 154-155.
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after the Holy Spirit’s renewal.322 This,  however,  invites  a  further  question:
why does not the Holy Spirit remove sin altogether from the believer?323
Besides  the  VB  problem  Beilby  pays  attention  to  another  issue  in
Plantinga’s view of the formation of Christian beliefs, which is influenced by
Keith Lehrer’s critique. The problem can be put as follows. Suppose a person
reads for the first time about Christian teaching and as a result is suddenly (or
eventually) convinced that what she read is true. According to Plantinga, the
resulting beliefs are in this case formed in a basic way; they are not inferred
from, say, the supposed reliability of Scripture. But for this reason from the
person’s viewpoint the conviction involved in her belief seems to come to her
in  an  abnormal  way  from  nowhere  or,  as  Beilby  puts  it,  from  “out  of  the
blue”.324 And, Beilby continues, by virtue of this fact the person, if reflective,
would discount the belief.325 That  is,  the  person  would  not  believe  after
reflection. (This criticism may also apply to some instances of theistic belief
formation which Plantinga describes.)
The stated problem is probably not insuperable for Plantinga. In response
he could say something along the following lines, for example. Granted that
the person of the above scenario might at first find her new beliefs puzzling,
she can and should learn from other persons of faith (like Plantinga) that the
way she has acquired the beliefs is not at all awkward but just what is to be
expected, and so the person should not find her beliefs mystifying and out of
context.326 But be that as it may, this “beliefs coming from ‘out of the blue’”
problem would not arise if one held that persons’ Christian beliefs are typically
non-basic  and  thus  arrived  at  by  an  inference,  say,  from  the  purported
reliability of the Scripture or of the proclaimer thereof, whether an individual
322 Beilby 2007, 155.
323 Beilby also goes over and rejects two other possible answers to the VB problem. According to the
first explanation, those who exemplify the VB problem have not, in fact, received the internal instigation
of the Holy Spirit. Such persons’ Christian beliefs, Beilby says, “are the products of cognitive faculties
that are still wholly mired in sin”. While Beilby holds that this is logically and theologically possible, he
maintains that it cannot be the solution to the VB problem for Plantinga, as he holds that doubt is not
wholly excluded by the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit. The second explanation to the VB problem
refers to the “epistemic distance” between a transcendent God and the person of faith: this distance can
somehow affect the strength of the person’s belief. Beilby holds that this answer to the VB problem is not
viable, because Plantinga argues that epistemic distance is no barrier to human knowledge of God.
Furthermore, Beilby notes, invoking epistemic distance is excluded by Plantinga’s Calvinist soteriology
according to which God is necessarily the cause of Christian belief in persons. Beilby 2007, 154.
324 Were the Holy Spirit  to  work openly instead of  incognito,  this  problem would not  necessarily
arise. For if a person from her viewpoint experienced the Holy Spirit’s activity, that would be a kind of
religious experience, which could presumably ground Christian beliefs.
325 Beilby 2007, 151-153. See Lehrer 1996. Linda Zagzebski has made a similar objection against
George Mavrodes, whose view bears some resemblance to that of Plantinga. In Mavrodes’s example God
inserts theistic belief in a person while she is sleeping. See Mavrodes 1988, 37-38. Zagzebski argues that
“the  Mavrodes  case  violates  one  of  the  strictures  on  epistemological  methodology  […]  by  not  giving
sufficient weight to the self-reflectiveness of human nature. A self-reflective person ought to worry if he
wakes up with a firm belief of some sort with no memory of how he got the belief or how it might be
justified. […] Even if he cannot help believing at that moment, he ought to rethink the matter later and
worry about it.” Zagzebski 1993, 218.
326 Compare this  to the following remark by Plantinga:  “You have considered how it  [that  is,  the
acquired belief] fits in with your other beliefs, engaged in requisite seeking for defeaters, considered the
objections that you have encountered, compared notes with the right people, and so on. Clearly, on the
model (and even apart from the model), someone who accepts the Christian beliefs in question can easily
meet these conditions.” Plantinga 2000, 255. Cf. Mascord 2006, 140.
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or  a  community.  Such  a  way  to  acquire  beliefs  is  typical,  and  it  gives,  so  to
speak, a proper context for acquiring and holding belief.
As already suggested, one can query whether Christian beliefs are typically
basic  and  acquired  accordingly  just  like  one  can  question  the  basicality  of
theistic  beliefs  (see  section  2.1.2.).  This  is  a  fairly  common  critique  of
Plantinga’s view.327 For  example,  Swinburne  thinks  that  many  Christians
believe “the great things of the gospel” because they have heard primitive
versions of arguments for them, that is, they have “heard arguments from the
pulpit that if God is love, He must be triune, or that there were many witnesses
who  saw  the  risen  Christ”,  and  they  believe  that  arguments  like  these  fit
together to yield a coherent Christian understanding of the world.328
To take another critique of the purported basicality of Christian belief, in
reference to the works of Esther Meek and Paul Helm, Keith Mascord argues
that frequently influential in a person’s coming to hold Christian belief is the
belief’s  perceived  plausibility  or  accuracy,  that  is,  its  ability  to  profoundly
integrate already existing beliefs, suspicions, and possibilities. Mascord holds
that this is best seen as a process involving “inference to the best explanation”
(cf. abductive reasoning). In the case at hand this means, in brief, that a person
comes to hold Christian beliefs by inferring, not necessarily very consciously,
that  they  make  the  best  explanation  of  the  way  she  has  conceived  diverse
worldly phenomena. Here beliefs about the phenomena are the person’s
evidence for the propositions of faith, and the resulting beliefs are thus held in
a non-basic way.329
As a rejoinder Plantinga could, of course, define his model. For example,
he could argue that even when from a person’s viewpoint it looks like she has
acquired Christian belief inferentially, the belief is, in fact, in some way due to
the promptings of the Holy Spirit—after all, the Holy Spirit works in disguise
(cf. Plantinga’s similar suggestion concerning the role of the sensus divinitatis
in  section  2.2.1.).  Something  like  this  is  actually  Mascord’s  own position.330
One  could  put  the  point  at  issue  in  the  following  way:  perhaps  holding
Christian belief in a basic way is not the only possible indication of the belief’s
being instigated by the Holy Spirit, as Plantinga seems to think, since the Holy
Spirit can also be at work when a person comes to hold Christian belief by way
of inference.
Why does Plantinga hesitate to include in his  model  non-basic  Christian
beliefs as promptings of the Holy Spirit? His reasons for this are plausibly both
epistemological and theological. Regarding the former, basicality is a crucial
327 See e.g. Beilby 2007; Fales 2004; Mascord 2006; Swinburne 2001a.
328 Swinburne 2001a, 211.
329 Mascord 2006, 153. See Helm 1992; Meek 1997. For further discussion and critique, see Mascord
2006, ch. 8. Swinburne’s brief remark on theism’s credibility bears a resemblance to Mascord’s view: “It
may be that not many theists believe on the basis of argument, though my view is that quite a number
do believe on the basis of the crudest form arguments that theism ‘makes sense of the world’.” Swinburne
2001a, 207.
330 “My own opinion is that the Holy Spirit is involved in and through argument and evidence, and
by other means as well. He does not, at least typically, by-pass the ordinary workings of human cognitive
faculties. Rather, he works through and by them.” Mascord 2006, 162. See also Swinburne’s rather thin
view about the need for grace in coming to hold Christian beliefs in section 2.1.2..
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feature  in  Plantinga’s  work,  as  he  has  sought  to  argue  that  theistic  and
Christian beliefs can have warrant when held in a basic way (that is, they are
properly basic). As to theological motives, some of Plantinga’s remarks against
historical investigation as an argumentative route to yield Christian belief are
illuminating. First of all, Plantinga seems to have an inclination to think that
because  of  sin,  coming  to  hold  Christian  belief  necessarily  requires  God’s
activity;  the  belief  cannot  be  acquired  by  such  human  efforts  as  historical
investigation (unaided by God’s help, one must add). Plantinga also holds that
acquiring Christian belief via historical investigation would not entail the
change of affections which faith involves—though, one might add, it does not
rule that out either. Still further, Plantinga appears to think that making a case
for the central claims of Christianity would be possible for only a few people
after great effort, and the resulting belief would still be “uncertain and shot
through with falsehood”,  which in his  view is  not compatible with the ideal
firm knowledge that faith involves.331
There  may  be  diverse  evaluations  about  the  credibility  of  Plantinga’s
claims, but many disagree with the last point, at the very least. They hold that
while faith may ideally involve firm knowledge, it is feasible with quite a weak
epistemic attitude,  too.  A view like this  was already defended by Swinburne
(see section 2.1.3.), and in chapter 4 we will survey similar accounts further.
Even Plantinga affirmed that Christian belief is typically of less than maximal
certainty. In a personal response to Beilby he admits that “for whatever reason,
the deliverances of the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit seem to come in
all different degrees of strength”.332 Might the degree of strength be in some
instances  nothing  more  than  that  involved  in  hoping  (for  discussion,  see
sections 4.2. and 4.5.)?
2.2.3 THE WILL IN THE EXTENDED A/C MODEL
There  does  not  seem  to  be  much  room  for  volitional  activity  in  Plantinga’s
scheme of the acquisition of faith or conversion, as one might say. One cannot
but read the Scripture or listen to it proclaimed and except that sooner or later
one acquires the conviction and the affections that constitute the faith in
question. So, from a person’s viewpoint acquiring Plantingian faith is largely a
passive  matter.  Presumably  sustaining  this  faith  or  “acting  it  out”  (cf.  the
practical aspect of faith) requires the will, though for theological reasons
Plantinga may hold that  even this  cannot come about without the continual
help of the Holy Spirit (who, say, moves the person’s will towards good).
The Calvinist views underlying Plantinga’s model of faith also accentuate
its involuntary nature. Part of Plantinga’s theological view is that in our sinful
state we are unable to save ourselves, and thus faith has to be a gift from God.
The Holy Spirit produces faith in humans who are merely the recipients of this
331 Plantinga 2000, 269-270. See also Beilby 2007, 134, 139, 142.
332 Beilby 2007, 154-155.
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gift.333 It  is  interesting  to  note  that  in  this  respect,  among  other  things,
Plantinga  sees  his  view  as  being  like  Aquinas’.  He  interprets  Aquinas  as
arguing that faith is caused by God, who moves persons inwardly by grace.334
Plantinga’s intepretation of Aquinas and his model of faith are not far from
Jenkins’s supernatural externalist interpretation of Aquinas (see section
2.1.2.). However, unlike Aquinas, Plantinga does not give the impression that
faith is meritorious. That would anyway fit poorly with his Calvinist views.
It is plain that not all who have encountered Christian teaching suddenly
or in the course of time convert to the sort of faith Plantinga describes. For this
reason  it  would  be  suitable  for  Plantinga  to  claim,  in  accordance  with
Calvinism, that the Holy Spirit confers faith only to some predestined humans.
This is Paul Moser’s interpretation of Plantinga, and he is critical towards this
view. Moser’s claim seems to be that God being selective as to who gains faith
and salvation is incompatible with the teaching of the New Testament as well
as  with  God’s  moral  perfection,  which  involves  genuine  love  of  all  humans.
Moser argues that God has offered the gift of faith to everyone, and humans
can  freely  embrace  or  reject  the  gift.  In  Moser’s  view,  having  faith  involves
loving God, and even God cannot cause a person to love others.335
While  Plantinga  seems  to  have  a  tendency  to  affirm  the  doctrine  of
predestination,336 on some occasions he cautiously suggests a role for the will
in the acquisition of faith, which is actually similar to the one Moser described.
Plantinga says that the gift of faith is “given to anyone who is willing to accept
it”337 and that:
it is part of much traditional Christian teaching to hold that a necessary condition of
my receiving the gift of faith is my acquiescing, being willing to accept the gift, being
prepared  to  receive  it.  There  is  a  contribution  to  this  process  that  I  myself  must
make, a contribution that I can withhold.338
Consequently, there may after all be a volitional aspect in Plantinga’s model of
faith. This aspect does not seem to amount to any kind of will to believe—that
would be anyway a problematic idea—but appears to be some sort of rather
vague readiness to receive the gift of faith in contrast to being reluctant to have
it.339 But  this  seems  to  leave  unexplained  why  some  persons  who  by  all
appearances are willing to receive the gift do not receive it (cf. the problem of
divine hiddenness).
2.2.4 CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION
In  sum,  Plantinga  maintains  that  faith  is  caused  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  it
ideally involves a strong Christian belief as the cognitive aspect of faith and the
right affections as the evaluative-affective aspect of faith. Beliefs formed by the
333 Plantinga 2000, 205, 269.
334 Plantinga 2000, 249.
335 Moser 2010, 132-133. In this respect Moser refers to Meadors 2006.
336 See e.g. Plantinga 2000, 253-254
337 Plantinga 2000, 244.
338 Plantinga 2000, 257.
339 See Beilby 2007, 157.
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Holy Spirit as well as by the repaired sensus divinitatis are in Plantinga’s view
acquired non-inferentially and thus held as basic. Plantinga maintains that
because of sin faith has to be a gift from God; from a person’s viewpoint coming
to have Plantingian faith is also a passive event. Still, Plantinga suggests that
the acquisition of faith may be subsequent to the willingness to have it. This is
the volitional aspect of his model of faith.
What  is  more,  Plantinga’s  model  does  not  exclude  the  potential
voluntariness of seeking faith, that is, reciting the Scripture and listening to it
proclaimed,  which  supposedly  occasion  or  assist  the  formation  of  faith.
Perhaps this can be seen as part of the willingness to accept the gift of faith.
Still  further,  Plantinga’s  model  does  not  eliminate  the  possibility  that
sustaining faith and “acting out” one’s  faith in practical  action is  something
that requires the will. Then again, Plantinga might claim that because of sin
these acts necessarily require the aid of the Holy Spirit. In this case it would
be unclear whether the actions are ultimately up to a person’s own voluntary
efforts.
As we saw, Plantinga’s view according to which Christian or theistic beliefs
are typically non-inferentially attained and basically held has been questioned.
I find this critique quite plausible. Presumably some persons hold Christian
beliefs  on  inferential  grounds,  as  Swinburne  and  Mascord  accentuated.  But
otherwise, Plantinga has drawn attention to important issues about the nature
of Christian faith. If traditional Christian insights are taken at face value, as
Plantinga seeks to do, it seems relevant to somehow take into account the view
that faith is due to the supernatural grace of God and the promptings of the
Holy  Spirit.  As  regards  this  topic,  one  Christian  perspective,  which  is  more
inclusive than that of Plantinga, could be the following.
According to John Duns Scotus, as Swinburne describes it, each person of
faith should be of the view that they have the right sort of “infused faith”, which
is  faith  completed  by  divine  grace.  And  they  should  be  of  this  view,  Duns
Scotus held, although no person of faith can know with certainty whether they
have infused faith or mere “acquired faith”, which is faith that is arrived at by
the mere use of natural faculties. Apparently, the difference cannot in Duns
Scotus’s view be known, because from a person’s internal viewpoint infused
and acquired faith look exactly alike.340 In keeping with the basics of this view,
one might suggest that perhaps each person of faith should think of her having
faith as an indication of having received divine grace, and each person should
think like this regardless of how from their internal viewpoint they conceive
their  faith  being  acquired,  that  is,  regardless  of,  say,  whether  they  see  their
Christian belief as being formed in a basic way or via an inference.
Lastly,  I  would  like  to  end  this  chapter  with  a  comparison  between
Swinburne’s  and  Plantinga’s  views  of  faith  on  a  general  level,  which
illuminates the topic of  voluntariness of  faith from a broader point of  view.
340 See Swinburne 2005, 119-120. The view that a person cannot know with certainty whether her
faith is supernaturally or just naturally caused was common in High Scholasticism. Aquinas, for example,
espoused and elaborated it. For further discussion, see Järveläinen 2000, ch. 3.2..
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Swinburne has drawn a distinction between “hard” and “liberal” positions on
Christian doctrinal issues. The distinction is oversimplified and very crude, but
yet  I  find  it  illuminating.  So,  according  to  Swinburne,  for  the  consistent
hardliner:
every man suffers from a total depravity, guilt for his own sins and the sins of Adam,
and  a  total  inability  to  do  other  than  sin;  he  deserves  everlasting  pain  as  a
punishment, but God in Christ bore the punishment in his stead; those who have
explicit faith in Christ will be excused the eternal punishment, made capable of doing
good,  and  given  an  eternal  reward.  The  only  good  actions  are  those  which  seek
intentionally the glory of God. All those without explicit faith in Christ will suffer
torment in Hell for ever; God predestines in advance who will be saved and who will
be damned.341
On  the  other  hand,  Swinburne  holds  that  a  liberal  position  on  Christian
issues looks something like this:
Every man finds it difficult but possible to avoid sin; and although in some way
something is wrong with him as a result of the sins of others, he is not guilty for those
sins himself. Christ redeemed us by his suffering (which was not a substitute for the
punishment which we would otherwise suffer, but in some way God taking our sins
seriously), and made available to us a means of sanctification; but it is up to us
whether we choose to avail ourselves of this redemption and sanctification, and God
has not predestined how we will choose. However, if we choose to follow the good as
we see it, we shall be saved (even if we do not on earth acquire Christian convictions).
Although  those  actions  which  seek  intentionally  the  glory  of  God  are  supremely
good, so many other actions (including many actions of seeking one’s own
happiness, mundane or eternal) are good too. Only if we do not follow the good as
we see it shall we be damned. But there may in the end be none of us in the latter
category, or, if there are, this damnation will not consist of eternal pain.342
If a choice must be made, it is quite apt to say that Plantinga’s view for the
most  part  fits  in  with  the  hard  position,  whereas  Swinburne’s  outlook  is
compatible  with  the  liberal  account.  Plantinga  holds  that  due  to  sin’s
degenerating effects, humans’ possibilities to save themselves by their own
voluntary  efforts  are  dim,  and  that  is  why  they  need  divine  intervention  in
order  to  have  faith  and  receive  salvation.  Swinburne,  on  the  other  hand,  is
more optimistic as regards humans’ possibilities to have an influence on their
destiny.  He maintains that  humans can by their  own voluntary choices and
actions, basically unaided by divine support, eventually acquire faith and thus
merit salvation. One might say that for a hardliner faith is an unmerited gift
by  God  to  a  frail  sinful  person,  while  in  the  liberal  position  faith  is  an
accomplishment of an able person, which God rewards. Because of its more
positive view on human nature and humans’ capabilities, the liberal position
can  give  a  more  substantial  role  for  human  freedom  regarding  religious
matters than the hard position. However, at the same time the liberal position
may easily understate the role supernatural grace has in the acquisition of faith
according to traditional Christianity.343
341 Swinburne 1989, 2. See Duns Scotus, Lib III Sent Dist XXIII q1.
342 Swinburne 1989, 2-3.
343 Cf. Ala-Prinkkilä 2014, 105-106, 110, 118.
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3 BELIEVING WITHOUT EVIDENCE
It  seems  natural  to  consider  the  cognitive  aspect  of  faith  as  consisting  of  a
largely  involuntary  belief  in  some  strength.  This  was  the  claim  of  both
Swinburne and Plantinga, though otherwise their views differ from each other
in  many  ways.  Swinburne  explicitly  argued  that  in  order  to  have  the  belief
required  for  faith,  one  needs  to  have  some evidence  for  the  propositions  of
faith.  Given  our  terminology,  this  claim  is  actually  in  accordance  with
Plantinga’s view. For when the propositions of faith are believed in the basic
way Plantinga describes, they must “just seem to be true” like any proposition
believed in the basic way. But this seeming-to-be-true or some equivalent
“doxastic experience”, which is Plantinga’s notion (see section 1.2.2.), is non-
propositional evidence for the truth of the propositions (for a discussion, see
section  2.1.1.).  Thus,  one  can  say  that  in  Plantinga’s  model  believing  the
propositions of faith requires suitable non-propositional evidence.344
So, in order to believe the propositions of faith, one must apparently have
some  sort  of  evidence  for  the  propositions’  truth.  Otherwise  one  cannot
believe—or so it seems. This conclusion gives rise to a problem for religious
doubters who find propositions of faith as attractive or in Jamesian terms as
live  hypotheses  and  would  like  to  believe  in  them  firmly.  For  a  reflective
religious doubter holds that the evidence for the truth of the propositions of
faith is wanting. But then the doubter lacks evidence sufficient to yield belief,
and so it looks like she cannot believe. After all, she cannot just will to believe
them in this case. Thus, for a religious doubter it does not seem to be possible
to  have  robust  doxastic  faith,  that  is,  faith  consisting  of  a  firm  belief.  This
difficulty encountering religious doubters is the main topic of the present
chapter.
Some theistic philosophers have questioned the alleged problem involved
in believing without sufficient evidence. John Bishop has actually argued for
the contrary conclusion.  He holds that  a  person can have a kind of  fideistic
faith, part of which amounts to having firm faith-beliefs even though the
believer recognises that the propositions she believes in are not adequately
supported by her total evidence. Bishop claims that this is possible since in the
midst of evidential uncertainty beliefs can be acquired and sustained on non-
evidential,  passional  grounds.  Bishop’s  model  of  faith  will  be  analysed  in
section  3.1..  In  addition  to  the  idea  relating  to  the  possibility  of  believing
without sufficient evidence, Bishop’s model includes other pertinent insights
to the topic of voluntariness of faith.
There is also another line of response to the doubter’s problem. This reply
starts from the observation that though beliefs are not directly voluntary, we
do have some indirect control over them: choosing different courses of action
344 A similar remark on Plantinga’s account has been put forward by Philip Quinn. See Quinn 1994,
71-72. Cf. Jordan 2006, 44.
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can  have  an  effect  on  which  propositions  one  comes  to  believe,  and  in  this
sense belief is, as one might say, to some extent indirectly voluntary (cf. section
1.2.3.).345 But  how  does  this  consideration  help  the  religious  doubter  who
would like to believe? Besides a Swinburnean advice that the doubter should
do more impartial investigation (it may yield evidence sufficient to ground
belief) and a Plantingian exhortation to contemplate the great things of the
gospel  (this  can  allegedly  occasion  the  formation  of  Christian  belief),  it  is
widely argued that the doubter can acquire faith-beliefs by means that involve
manipulating or rigging her doxastic states.
In the last case the doubter is advised to try to produce in herself belief in
a proposition which she thinks is not evidentially supported. This resolution
to the doubter’s problem is sometimes associated—though apparently
erroneously—with Blaise Pascal, who is best known for his pragmatic wager
argument  for  faith-belief.  In  contemporary  discussion  this  solution  is
endorsed by Jeff Jordan, also in connection with the pragmatic justification of
faith-beliefs. Jordan’s view is the central topic in section 3.2., where I will also
shortly comment on the nature of pragmatic arguments and Pascal’s view.
Believing or seeking to believe by manipulative means something not
supported by one’s overall evidence strikes prima facie as a blameworthy
conduct. This, if asserted, would be an approach to the ethics of belief, where
the central question is, as Andrew Chignell puts it, “whether there are norms
of some sort governing our habits of belief-formation, belief-maintenance, and
belief-relinquishment”.346 In  view  of  that,  I  shall  end  this  chapter  by
considering views about the ethics of belief that are relevant for our discussion.
So, some related remarks on the ethics of belief will be presented in section
3.3..
3.1 JOHN BISHOP AND FAITH AS DOXASTIC VENTURE
Bishop has argued that faith involves what he calls a doxastic venture, which
at heart amounts to a practical commitment to evidentially uncertain faith-
beliefs.  Thus,  in  Bishop’s  model  of  faith  the  practical  aspect  of  faith  is
emphasised in conjunction with belief as the cognitive aspect. Bishop sees
himself  as  advancing  a  modest  version  of  fideism inspired  by  James’s  “The
Will to Believe”.347 It should be noted, however, that James is not typically seen
as a fideist but as a pragmatist (cf. section 3.2.1.). For Bishop Fideism roughly
amounts to the view that having faith is permissible even if the propositions of
faith lack adequate evidential support.348 Bishop presents his so-called
doxastic  venture  model  of  faith  in  his Believing by Faith (2007), where he
elaborates and expands on some of his previously published ideas.349 In what
345 Cf. Everitt 2004, 196.
346 See Chignell 2010.
347 Bishop 2007, xi.
348 See e.g. Bishop 2007, 2, 22.
349 See especially Bishop 2002; 2005. See also Bishop 2003; 2004; 2010.
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follows, I will first analyse Bishop’s model of faith in outline, after which its
relevant features will be considered in detail.
3.1.1 THE DOXASTIC VENTURE MODEL OF FAITH
Bishop claims that at least meritorious Christian faith is not only a matter of
having faith-beliefs and being pleased about their truth, but it essentially
involves a practical commitment. In this respect Bishop’s view deviates from
Plantinga’s and is more in line with that of Swinburne, who also emphasises
the practical aspect of faith (see sections 1.1.2., 2.1.2., 2.1.3. and 2.2.2.). Bishop
maintains  that  by  practical  commitment  Christians  rely  on  God  for  their
welfare, and they must thus give up “trusting only themselves for directive
control over their lives—and that involves genuine risk and real venture”.350 In
a Swinburnean way Bishop appears to identify this practical commitment or
“venture”,  as  he  calls  it,  with  trusting  in  God,  which  entails  making  oneself
vulnerable to possible bad outcomes if things do not turn out as expected (for
a  discussion  on  Swinburne’s  notion  of  trust,  see  sections  2.1.2.,  2.1.3.,  and
4.4.1.).351
Bishop has named his view of faith as the doxastic venture model of faith,
and it involves three conditions (for simplicity Bishop confines the discussion
to the proposition that there is a God):
(1) taking it to be true (with full weight) that God exists in his or her practical
reasoning;352
(2)doing so while holding that  God exists,  that  is,  while having the belief
that God exists; and
(3) recognising,  correctly  in accordance with the relevant norms,  that  it  is
not the case that his or her total available evidence adequately supports
the truth that God exists.353
These conditions require further elucidation.
Clause  (1)  pertains  to  the  practical  aspect  of  Bishop’s  model  of  faith:  it
equals the claim that a person of faith makes a practical commitment to the
faith-propositions she espouses (see section 3.1.2.). Clause (2) concerns the
cognitive  aspect  of  Bishop’s  model  of  faith  and  states  that  a  person  of  faith
believes  the  propositions  of  faith.  Clause  (3)  exemplifies  the  peculiarity  of
Bishop’s  model:  a  person  who  in  Bishop’s  terms  is  a  “doxastic  venturer”
recognises  that  the  belief  on  which  she  acts  is  not  evidentially  supported.
Doxastic venture is thus a matter of commitment in the face of intellectual
doubt.354 As  an  example  of  doxastic  venture  model  Bishop  proposes
Kierkegaard’s  definition of  faith as “an objective uncertainty held fast  in an
appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness”. Another example
350 Bishop 2007, 105-106.
351 See Bishop 2010, ch. 6.
352 On the face of it, Bishop’s wordings here may suggest some kind of theological realism according
to which God exists (only) in one’s reasoning. However, this is not his intention, as we shall see.
353 Bishop 2007, 106-107.
354 Bishop 2007, 107.
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in Bishop’s view is Tillich’s account of faith as “the state of being ultimately
concerned”, where the object of ultimate concern demands surrender and
promises fulfilment, but the possibility that the object is a “false ultimate”
cannot be rationally excluded, and thus doubt is an element of faith.355
Bishop contrasts his doxastic venture model of faith with what Paul Helm
describes as the evidential proportion models of faith.356 While I find Bishop’s
comparison a bit unclear, I presume that one instructive difference between
these models can be put as follows. Bishop seems to imply that in evidential
proportion models the cognitive aspect of faith consists of a firm belief which
is  backed  up  by  the  amount  of  evidence  required  for  such  a  belief.  As  one
example  he  gives  Plantinga’s  A/C  model  of  faith  (or,  rather,  the  ideal
instantiation of it). Bishop appears to hold that evidential proportion models
can  also  be  described  as  purely  fiducial  models,  because  in  them  the  only
possible venture of faith occurs in trusting in God, which (by all appearances)
pertains to the practical aspect of faith. (In Plantinga’s model trusting God
would presumably count not as a  part  of  faith but as “acting out” faith;  see
section 1.1.2..) By contrast, in the doxastic venture model of faith the venture
takes place not only in the practical  aspect  of  faith but also in the cognitive
aspect,  as  the  doxastic  venturer,  so  to  speak,  ventures  in  believing  against
evidence (and does not, say, try to suppress or hide her belief).357
Bishop also distinguishes the doxastic venture model of faith from what he
calls  the  sub-doxastic  venture  models  of  faith.  These  models,  Bishop  says,
embrace his  model’s  clauses (1)  and (3) but not (2),  which in Bishop’s  view
involves firm, convinced belief. According to sub-doxastic venture models, a
person of faith makes a full practical commitment to faith-propositions (clause
1) in spite of their being inconclusive concerning evidence (clause 3) while, as
Bishop says,  “believing no more than that  theistic  faith-propositions have a
non-negligible  probability  of  being  true”.  As  one  example  of  a  sub-doxastic
venture model Bishop mentions Swinburne’s Pragmatist view of faith.358 This
is accurate enough: Swinburne holds that faith does not require strong belief
but  weak  belief,  which  is  a  sub-doxastic,  “less-than-full-belief”  attitude.  I
would also point out that besides sub-doxastic venture models one could speak
about  non-doxastic  venture  models  of  faith.  Such  models  also  contain
something  along  the  lines  of  (1)  and  (3),  but  they  switch  (2)  to  some  non-
doxastic, “other-than-belief” attitude (for the sub-doxastic/non-doxastic
distinction see section 1.1.2.; for a clear example of the non-doxastic venture
model see Schellenberg’s view of faith in section 4.4. ).
Bishop concedes that sub-doxastic venture models can be adequate
accounts  of  faith.  In  his  view  the  crucial  aspect  of  “authentic  faith”  is
preparedness for full-weight practical commitment, as his model’s clause (1)
355 Bishop 2007, 109. See Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1968), 180; Tillich 1957,
1, 21.
356 Helm 2000, 21. For a short description of Helm’s notion of the evidential proportion model of
faith, see section 2.1.3..
357 Cf. Bishop 2007, 108-109. Then again, see Bishop 2007, 117.
358 Bishop 2007, 110-111.
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indicates. Though Bishop maintains that such commitment does naturally go
with “straightforwardly believing that it is true that God exists”, he admits that
persons can make the commitment without firmly believing the truth of the
relevant faith-propositions. Bishop maintains that sub-doxastic venture
models  of  faith—and non-doxastic  models,  I  would  add—would  be  the  only
rivals to evidential proportion models if fully doxastic venture under evidential
ambiguity  turned  out  to  be  impossible.  But,  Bishop  argues,  the  doxastic
venture model of faith is not impossible.359 The focal question regarding the
feasibility of the doxastic venture model of faith is how the conjunction of (2)
and  (3)  is  possible,  that  is,  how  it  is  possible  to  believe  without  sufficient
evidence.  But  before  analysing  Bishop’s  solution  to  this  problem,  it  is
appropriate to consider the distinction between his model’s clauses (1) and (2),
because it has relevance to the topic of the voluntariness of faith, among other
things.
3.1.2 “HOLDING A PROPOSITION TRUE” AND “TAKING A
PROPOSITION TO BE TRUE”
The distinction between holding and taking a proposition to be true, which is
applied in clauses (1) and (2) of Bishop’s model of faith, refers to what kind of
control over our beliefs we have. The distinction also bears relevance to action
explanation. Bishop basically identifies holding a proposition p true with the
mental state of believing that p, and it is in his view a largely involuntary or,
rather, only to some extent an indirectly controllable state. But in addition to
holding p true, Bishop maintains that belief that p is a disposition to take p as
a premise in one’s theoretical and practical reasoning, whenever salient (like
Bishop,  I  shall  mostly  focus  on  practical  reasoning).  Bishop  maintains  that,
unlike holding a proposition true, taking a proposition to be true can be under
our voluntary control: it is not just a mental event but a mental action.360
Consequently, one can say that the cognitive aspect of Bishop’s model of
faith is largely involuntary (clause 2), whereas the practical aspect is voluntary
(clause  1).  Fundamentally,  the  same  understanding  of  the  voluntariness  of
faith is discernible in Swinburne’s Pragmatist view (see section 2.1.3.).
However, the distinction between holding and taking a proposition to be true
is  not  present  in  Swinburne’s  account,  and  it  is  also  instructive  as  such.  In
addition, the hold/take distinction, as Bishop acknowledges, is closely related
to the better-known distinction between belief and acceptance, which will be
discussed later (see sections 3.2.1. and 4.2.).361 The hold/take distinction thus
serves as a suitable introduction to this subject.
359 Bishop 2007, 110-111, 119-120.
360 Bishop 2007, 23, 29-35.
361 Bishop 2007, 34 n. 12. With respect to the belief/acceptance distinction Bishop refers especially
to  Cohen  1992,  and  his  account  of  taking-to-be-true  approximates  Cohen’s  view.  For  some  further
discussion, see section 4.2.1..
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In order to support his distinction, Bishop considers cases where a person
holds that p but does not take p to be true in reasoning in which p’s truth would
be relevant. Such cases in Bishop’s view show that persons have the capacity
to  do  otherwise  than  take  to  be  true  what  they  hold  true.  And  this,  he
maintains, establishes that taking to be true is an action under our voluntary
control. So, to begin with, Bishop argues that there is a kind of weakness of
will that results in acting only tentatively on what is held clearly true on the
evidence  at  hand.  For  example,  a  person  may  believe  firmly  that  certain
medical advice is correct, and yet, when it is time to put it into practice, she
hesitates. In this case, Bishop says, the weight the person gives to the advice in
her practical reasoning does not match the high degree with which the advice
is held true.362
One might ask what exactly is the person failing to do in the example. Is she
somehow failing to use the proposition about the medical advice as a premise
in her practical reasoning and thereby failing to draw a conclusion about the
appropriate  course  of  action  and  so  failing  to  act?  Or  is  the  person,  while
perhaps  reasoning  correctly  about  the  advice,  simply  failing  to  act  on  the
conclusion which her reasoning process recommends? Bishop’s definition of
taking to be true seems to entail something like the former view. I suppose that
Bishop would say that taking p to be true in practical reasoning of necessity
implies  trying  to  act  on  p  in  appropriate  circumstances.  But  then  it  is  not
possible to take p to be true in one’s reasoning and yet fail to act on p. So, not
trying to act on p means that one has not taken p to be true in one’s practical
reasoning. Whatever the plausibility of this view is, we can here suppose that
taking p to be true in practical reasoning implies seeking to act on p in relevant
situations.
To take another example, Bishop says that occasionally failure to take to be
true what is held true shows strength rather than weakness. A person may, as
Bishop  says,  come  to  suspect  that  certain  beliefs  of  hers  arise  purely  from
prejudice and so refrain from taking them to be true in her practical reasoning.
As an example, Bishop offers his own belief that a man who wears suede shoes
is not to be trusted. Bishop says that while he cannot cease to believe this, he
can refrain from taking it to be true in his practical reasoning. Bishop’s third
example pertains more to theoretical reasoning than to practical reasoning: a
juror  may  believe  that  certain  considerations  indicate  a  certain  verdict,  but
because of the judge’s instruction that the considerations are inadmissible, the
person may refrain from taking them to be true in her theoretical reasoning
towards a verdict.363
Bishop  maintains  that  the  examples  he  gave  are  not  typical.  In  his  view
instances of taking to be true are often neither deliberate nor conscious, and
activated belief typically yields taking to be true quite automatically. Still,
Bishop argues that takings to be true are actions over which we can exercise
voluntary  control.  At  least  in  some  important  cases,  he  says,  “we  can
362 Bishop 2007, 37.
363 Bishop 2007, 37.
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voluntarily go against the habituated flow from what we hold to what we take
to be true”.364 This  may  already  begin  to  look  like  a  plausible  conclusion.
Bishop, however, has one further line of argument to support the view.
Bishop points out that it is clear that we possess a relatively unrestricted
voluntary capacity in our practical  reasoning to take propositions to be true
which we do not believe to be true. For example, we may act as if we believed,
or treat propositions as assumptions, working hypotheses, and so on. In cases
like these, Bishop maintains, the weight we afford to the truth of a proposition
in our practical reasoning exceeds the degree to which we believe it to be true.
Bishop argues that once we recognise that we have this capacity to take to be
true what is not held true, it is in his view not hard to admit that, conversely,
we can at times prevent the flow from holding a proposition true to taking it to
be true. How could it be, Bishop asks, that we possessed the capacity to take
true what is not held true and yet lacked the capacity to not to take true what
is held true?365
In my view there is an important truth in the general distinction between
having  an  involuntary  belief  that  p  and  voluntarily  adopting  p,  whether
believed or not, in one’s theoretical and practical reasoning. In some sense this
distinction  may  look  like  a  truism.  However,  Bishop  maintains  that
philosophers  of  religion  have  not  fully  appreciated  it.366 He holds that
recognition of the capacity to take propositions to be true nonetheless has
import inter alia to the issues concerning the voluntariness of belief. Though
the capacity to take a proposition to be true is not generally doxastic, when we
take it into account, doxastic control does not only amount to indirect control
over  acquisition,  sustenance,  and  revision  of  beliefs.  For,  as  Bishop  says,
doxastic control can “also be a matter of direct control […] over the use made
of  what  is  believed  in  reasoning”.367 This is indubitably a significant
observation, which is relevant to the ethics of belief, for example (see section
3.3.).
3.1.3 BELIEVING WITHOUT EVIDENCE: PASSIONALLY CAUSED
BELIEFS
According to Bishop’s doxastic venture model of faith, a person of faith makes
a voluntary practical commitment (clause 1) to largely involuntarily believed
propositions (clause 2) whose truth the person sees as lacking evidential
support (clause 3). Whereas the practical commitment is definitely possible to
make, it is not obvious whether the commitment is possible with belief whose
propositional  content  is  not  evidentially  supported.  As  already  noted,  it  is
puzzling how a person could believe that p while not having sufficient evidence
364 Bishop 2007, 37-38.
365 Bishop 2007, 39-40.
366 Bishop 2007, ix-x.
367 Bishop 2007, 41.
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for  p.  So,  the  conjunction  of  clauses  (2)  and  (3)  in  Bishop’s  model  is
problematic.
Bishop maintains that the difficulty at hand is answerable. In his response
he  sees  as  his  main  influence  James’s  “The  Will  to  Believe”.  However,  as
should  be  clear  by  now,  Bishop  is  not  suggesting  that  doxastic  venture  is  a
matter of  will  to believe,  since belief  is  not according to him voluntary.  But
neither is  Bishop suggesting a Swinburnean reading of  James  according to
which the doxastic venture would be a matter of acting as if some propositions
were true (see section 2.1.3.). Instead, doxastic venture involves genuine belief.
Bishop’s  construal  of  James is  thus quite different from the above analyses,
but, that being said, the view Bishop develops is not intended as a scholarly
interpretation of James. As he says, his account is Jamesian only in the sense
that it is James-inspired.368
How, then,  could a person believe a proposition,  if  she recognises that  it
lacks evidential support? At first, Bishop admits that one typical cause of the
attitude of belief is rational consideration of the evidence, which indicates
truth, and thus prompts belief. But this, Bishop argues, is not the only way to
form beliefs. In addition, he maintains, there is what James labels passional
causes and which he prefers to call non-evidential causes of belief (I shall use
these notions equivalently). According to Bishop’s definition, the term
“passional”  includes  all  types  of  causes  of  belief  that  “do  not  consist  in
providing the believer with grounds (relative to the assumed correct evidential
practice) for holding the proposition believed to be true”.369 Bishop maintains
that  a  wide  variety  of  passional  causes  of  belief  must  be  acknowledged—he
mentions emotions, wishes, desires, evaluations, and people’s affiliations.370
For our concerns it is just important to note that passional causes are from the
believer’s viewpoint grounds that do not indicate truth in the way evidential
grounds do. Bishop sees passional causes as supporting the possibility of
believing without sufficient evidence.
On the face of  it,  to me it  looks odd that  reflection upon one’s  passional
grounds for a proposition p (say, a desire that p) could alone cause or sustain
belief  that  p  in  the  same  way  as  considering  evidence  for  p  does.  Bishop
concedes that lack of evidential support for p, when one becomes aware of it,
tends  to  undermine  any  inclination  to  believe.  But,  he  argues,  this  is  not  a
universal psychological law. Instead, he argues, suitable passional causes can
sustain belief even if the believer recognises that the truth of the proposition
believed lacks adequate evidential support.371 I assume that in cases like this
the believer acknowledges that her belief is passionally caused and sustained:
she  discerns  that  passional  factors  are  the  reason  why  she  believes  as  she
does.372 I  suppose that  Bishop would say that  if  one’s  passional  grounds for
368 Bishop 2007, 112.
369 Bishop 2007, 114. Cf. Schellenberg 2009, 208-209.
370 Bishop compares his list to that of James: “fear and hope, prejudice and passion, imitation and
partisanship, the circumpressure of our caste and set”. James 1897, 9.
371 Bishop 2005, 114-115.
372 Cf. Bishop 2007, 116-117.
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believing a proposition disappear, the belief fades away, too. It is noteworthy
that  passional  believing  is  close  to  what  John  Heil  has  labelled  doxastic
incontinence. According to him, doxastic incontinence concerns cases where a
person believes against her better epistemic judgment. Heil’s view about the
possibility of incontinent believing seems to be, in essence, similar to that of
Bishop.373
As things stand, in Bishop’s view the conjunction of his model’s (2) and (3)
is possible, because in the midst of evidential uncertainty faith-beliefs can be
caused  and  sustained  on  passional  grounds.  Moreover,  Bishop  argues  that
passional grounds can motivate the believer to take the believed propositions
to be true in her practical reasoning. For example, Bishop says that through
being  moved  by  an  encounter  with  a  theistic  tradition,  a  person  may  be
passionally caused to believe that there is a God, and this belief can in his view
remain  even  if  the  believer  comes  to  realise  that  God’s  existence  is  not
supported by the evidence. Bishop maintains that such a person also has the
passional  motivation  to  take  the  proposition  to  be  true  in  her  practical
reasoning.374 And if the person voluntarily chooses to take the proposition to
be true, she is exemplifying the doxastic venture model of faith.
Bishop argues that his doxastic venture model of faith accommodates both
the active and the passive or gifted aspects of Christian faith. The latter is in
his  view illustrated  by  the  feature  that  doxastic  venture  is  possible  only  for
those who happen to have passionally caused faith-belief, and having such a
belief is beyond a person’s own direct voluntary control. Bishop seems to opine
that on a Christian understanding one’s passionally caused faith-belief
ultimately comes only by the grace of God.375 On the other hand, the active,
voluntary aspect of the doxastic venture model of faith is, as Bishop puts it, the
passionally motivated choice “to take to be true what one holds true through
causes that one recognizes oneself to be non-evidential”.376
Bishop appears to see the phenomenon of passional believing in a positive
light, at least with respect to faith. However, I suppose that it can occasionally
be something negative, too. This is the case when, say, a person has dubious
beliefs, whether religious or not, caused passionally/non-evidentially by
indoctrination with no regard to the truth of the matter. Amber Griffioen has
drawn attention to a similar problem in Bishop’s model. She argues that beliefs
arrived at by, say, wishful thinking, self-deception, hypnosis, electroshock
therapy, and a bump on a head may all be candidates for doxastic venturing,
as long as they are passionally held and paired with the correct judgment about
their evidential ambiguity.377 But  believing  in  this  way  is  surely  a  sign  of
373 See Heil 1984, 68-69. On doxastic incontinence, see also Mele 1986; 1987, ch. 8.
374 Bishop 2007, 116.
375 This presumably means that from Christian viewpoint a person of faith can think of her believing
on passional grounds as an indication of having received grace. For some relevant discussion on this
theme, see the evaluation of Plantinga’s model in section 2.2.3..
376 Bishop 2007, 116-117.
377 Griffioen 2014, 8.
Believing without Evidence
90
irrationality.  Bishop  would  thus  probably  want  to  exclude  certain  types  of
passional believings from his account.378
However, there is an additional and more serious critique against Bishop’s
model.  Andrei  Buckareff  has  argued  that  the  possibility  of  believing  by
passional  causes  can  be  altogether  questioned.  He  holds  that  belief’s  truth-
aiming  nature  (on  which  see  section  1.2.2.)  counters  the  possibility  of
acquiring and sustaining a belief by mere passional causes. Buckareff argues
as follows. Suppose p’s truth is not supported nor excluded by one’s evidence.
If in this case one could come to believe that p by a passional cause alone, then
one could do so with no regard for the truth of p or, as I would rather say, with
no regard to what seems to one to be the truth of p, since passional causes do
not indicate the truth of p. But then one would per impossibile believe that p
is true while also failing to believe that because one’s evidence does not
support the truth of p. Buckareff argues that we are here “somewhere in the
vicinity of Moore’s paradox”.379
In his reply Bishop appears to think that Buckareff is erroneously criticising
him for espousing some form of direct doxastic voluntarism.380 I do not think
that this reading is adequate, although I do think that granting the possibility
of passional believing implies something akin to direct doxastic voluntarism
(see  below).  Either  way,  to  me  Buckareff’s  main  assertion  seems  sound:
passional believing is inconsistent with belief’s truth-aiming nature. Before
taking Buckareff’s  critique further,  it  is  appropriate to consider one proviso
Bishop introduces into the concept of belief.
We have thus far taken it for granted—though also initially argued for—that
in order to believe that p one needs to have evidence to support p. While this
seems to be Buckareff’s assumption, too,381 Bishop denies it. He maintains that
consciously “to believe is, indeed, to believe true” (that is, belief aims at truth),
but “it is not necessarily to believe evident”.382 Bishop notes that this claim is
in conflict with Jonathan Adler’s view according to which it is intrinsic to the
notion  of  belief  that  one  cannot  believe  a  proposition  whose  truth  one
recognises as insufficiently supported by evidence.383
If, following Bishop, it is denied that belief is necessarily tied to evidence,
can there be room for non-evidential, passional believing after all? I presume
that persons can have acquired beliefs via passional causes unconsciously or
unbeknownst to them. I also assume that such beliefs can be sustained if not
properly reflected upon, that is, if their evidential status, origin, and coherence
with other beliefs are never considered.384 So, from this point of view the link
378 Cf. Bishop 2007, 165. See also Griffioen 2014, 9.
379 Buckareff 2005, 438-439.
380 Bishop 2005, 447.
381 See e.g. Buckareff 2005, 438.
382 Bishop 2007, 115.
383 Adler 2002, 26-27; Bishop 2007, 115 n. 25.
384 What is more, Buckareff holds that non-epistemic, passional reasons may explain why a person
believes as she does. For example, passional causes can make the evidence a person has more vivid or
salient than it actually is. But this, Buckareff maintains, does not mean that from the person’s viewpoint
she considers her belief as being caused and sustained by passional reasons. Buckareff 2005, 438.
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between belief and evidence is not a necessary one. However, I am inclined to
think that things are otherwise with regard to belief held in full consciousness
or  awareness.  In  this  case  it  seems  that  believing  is  unavoidably  tied  to
evidence,  given the premise that  belief  aims at  truth.  I  would argue for this
conclusion as follows.
Consciously believing on mere non-evidential grounds entails believing
irrespective of what seems to one to be the truth, since non-evidential causes
do not indicate truth. However, believing irrespective of what seems to one to
be the truth is inconsistent with belief’s truth-aiming nature. But this is just to
say that consciously believing irrespective of truth-indicating evidence is
inconsistent with belief’s truth-aiming nature. But then it seems that
consciously only believing on evidential grounds is possible. If a person has,
say,  unconsciously  acquired  a  belief  on  passional  grounds,  the  belief  will
wither away once the person fully acknowledges its cause (unless the person
now happens to have proper evidence for the proposition believed).
To further support  the view that non-evidential  believing is  conceptually
problematic,  one  might  note  that  our  argument  for  that  conclusion  closely
parallels  the  logical  arguments  against  the  possibility  of  acquiring  and
sustaining  belief  at  will  in  full  consciousness  (see  section  1.2.3.).  Buckareff
appears to acknowledge this similarity,385 which does not seem to be a mere
coincidence. The significant consideration here is that volition is by all
appearances one possible non-evidential cause of belief. But then it seems that
the  influential  logical  arguments  against  believing  at  will  apply mutatis
mutandis to  any  type  of  non-evidential  believing.  (Incidentally,  Pojman
appears to make this inference when he presents his argument against direct
doxastic voluntarism.)386
Given what was just said, it is worth pointing out that if one argues, like
Bishop,  that  conscious  non-evidential  believing  is  possible,  one  would
eventually  have  to  admit  that  it  is  also  possible  to  believe  by  a  sufficiently
strong  volition,  since  volition  is  one  non-evidential  cause  of  belief  among
others. But then it seems that the idea of non-evidential believing entails as
one special case of it direct doxastic voluntarism or something close to it. With
respect to this, Bishop is not actually consistent: although he generally argues
for the possibility of passional believing, he denies the possibility of believing
at  will  by  referring  to  Williams’s  logical  argument  (on  which  see  section
1.2.3.).387
The  claim  that  non-evidential  believing  is  not  possible  may  go  against
everyday experiences. It may look as if many people fairly consciously believe
non-evidentially. However, such counter-examples must be merely apparent
if  non-evidential  believing  is  not  possible.  Indeed,  I  assume  that  such
385 Cf. Buckareff 2005, 439.
386 In one occasion Pojman concludes that  one cannot believe in full  consciousness “that  p and I
believe that p for other than truth considerations”, where Pojman equates truth considerations with
evidential considerations. Pojman 1986a, 170.
387 Bishop  2007,  30.  For  a  somewhat  more  detailed  critique  of  the  possibility  of  non-evidential
believing, see Eklund 2014.
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examples can be explained away. For example, a person may obviously claim
to believe passionally while she does not, in fact, believe. The person may have
incorrectly identified her propositional attitude as belief when it is more aptly
described, say, as hope. In common parlance there may be a tendency to use
the term “belief” to refer to various propositional attitudes that should be
distinguished from belief and each other. In addition, a person may seem to
believe non-evidentially because her belief is sustained on grounds some of us
would deem non-evidential, but which the believer sincerely sees as evidential.
Consciously believing that p requires only that from the believer’s subjective
viewpoint p has evidential support, whatever that support is.388
3.1.4 CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION
In  sum,  according  to  Bishop’s  doxastic  venture  model  of  faith,  having  faith
involves (1) voluntarily taking it to be true with full weight that God exists in
his  or  her  practical  reasoning;  (2)  doing  so  while  involuntarily  believing
(holding) that God exists on passional grounds; and (3) recognising that it is
not the case that the total available evidence adequately supports the truth that
God exists.389 Clause (1) pertains to the practical aspect of Bishop’s model of
faith and (2) to its cognitive aspect. Clause (3) illustrates the evidential
circumstance where faith is exemplified. Bishop claims that the conjunction of
clauses (2) and (3) is possible, because in the midst of evidential uncertainty it
is possible to consciously sustain belief via non-evidential, passional causes
like emotions and desires.
However,  following  Buckareff  I  argued  against  Bishop  that  there  are
reasons to doubt whether conscious passional  believing is  possible.  But this
does not entail that Bishop’s insights are insignificant. His hold/take
distinction is noteworthy regarding the voluntariness of faith and doxastic
control, in general. Bishop also indicated that not strong belief but full-weight
practical commitment, that is, not (2) but (1), is only necessary for “authentic
faith”. This consideration points to the feasibility of some sort of sub- or non-
doxastic  model  of  faith.  However,  even  here  I  would  partly  disagree  with
Bishop. Whereas he holds that exemplifying the sub-doxastic model of faith
requires  full-weight  practical  commitment,  I  am  not  sure  whether  that  is
justified given that (3) holds. Instead, I propose that the practical commitment
should be cautious and tentative (for a discussion, see sections 4.3.2. and 4.5.).
What is more, in my view appropriate passional grounds can have a positive
role in sub- or non-doxastic models of faith, too. Bishop argued that passional
factors  can  motivate  one  to  take  propositions  to  be  true  in  one’s  practical
reasoning. Something like this can be seen as the correct function of suitable
388 Bishop’s  early  example of  passional  believing is  a  bereaved son whose emotions cause him to
believe that his dead father is still somehow with him. Bishop 2005, 448. If this means that the son has
some kind of feeling of his father’s presence and conceives this as evidence for his actual presence, then
he may believe. But if the son merely wishes that his father were still with him, it is hard to see how this
wish alone could cause and sustain a corresponding belief.
389 Bishop 2007, 106-107.
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passional  grounds:  instead  of  causing  belief  (clause  2),  as  Bishop  chiefly
emphasises,  passional  factors  can  motivate  one  to  exemplify  sub-  or  non-
doxastic faith in practice (clause 1). Incidentally, Buckareff appears to reason
in a similar way when he proposes a sub-doxastic venture model of faith as a
viable alternative to Bishop’s doxastic venture model.390
In general, a given religion can be passionally attractive for a person while
perhaps being wanting from an evidential point of view. Being attracted to a
religion in this way, which is likely for the most part to be beyond one’s direct
voluntary control,391 can motivate one not so much to believe that the religion
is true but to make a tentative voluntary commitment to it, which may then
amount to exemplifying a type of sub- or non-doxastic faith. After some further
elaboration this might be presented as one possible reconstruction of what it
means to embrace,  in Jamesian terms,  a  hypothesis  presented in a genuine
option (see section 4.5.). Whether this course of action can be in some sense
reasonable will be briefly addressed in section 3.3., where the ethics of belief
will be discussed.
3.2 PRAGMATIC ARGUMENTS AND THE ACQUISITION
OF BELIEF
While  it  may  not  be  possible  to  consciously  believe  without  evidence,  it  is
widely  argued  in  analytic  theistic  philosophy  that  one  can  intentionally  get
oneself to believe something not supported by one’s overall evidence through
means which involve some sort of manipulation of one’s doxastic states. In
analytic theism, this sort of belief-formation is often discussed in connection
with pragmatic arguments for religious belief. Accordingly, in what follows, I
shall  first  briefly  describe  the  nature  of  pragmatic  arguments  as  they  are
characteristically understood by analytic theistic philosophers.392 This  puts
the  main  issue  in  a  proper  context,  the  main  issue  being  how or  whether  a
person  can  by  some  type  of  intentional  manipulation  come  to  believe
propositions not warranted by her overall  evidence.  I  will  here for the most
part  make  use  of  Jeff  Jordan’s  defence  of  pragmatic  argumentation  in  his
Pascal’s Wager: Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God (2006), where he
elaborates his previously published thoughts.393
390 Buckareff 2005, 440-442. In his account Buckareff follows Joshua Golding, who argues that the
cognitive stance of a person of faith is “best understood as an assumption that God exists for the purpose
of pursuing a good relationship with God”. Golding 1990, 486.
391 Cf. Bishop 2007, 116.
392 There may be other, perhaps more adequate ways to conceive pragmatic reasoning as regards
religious belief and faith, in general, but here we should take analytic theists’ interpretations for granted.
After all, that is what we are interested in at the moment.
393 See e.g. Jordan 1994; 1996; 1997; 2005. See also Jordan 2013.
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3.2.1 PRAGMATIC ARGUMENTS AND THE PROBLEM OF BELIEF-
ACQUISITION
Typically arguments for a proposition p seek to provide evidential justification
for p. In this way the arguments attempt to indicate that p is true, and thus, if
they are convincing, they prompt us to form the belief that p. Such evidential
arguments are truth-directed. Pragmatic arguments, on the other hand, are
utility-directed. One class of such arguments, as Jeff Jordan puts it, seeks “to
motivate the acquisition of a belief just because of the benefits generated by
holding that belief”.394 For example, an unfit runner might acknowledge that
she  is  not  in  best  shape,  and  thus  she  does  not  have  sufficient  evidence  to
believe that she will do well in the upcoming race. However, the runner may
still argue that it is in her interests to believe that the race will be a success
because having that belief would boost her confidence and reinforce her effort.
In  this  case  the  runner  has  a  pragmatic  motivation  to  believe;  a  pragmatic
argument for belief that she will do well in the race. As the example illustrates,
pragmatic considerations are typically evoked in situations where evidence is
taken to be inconclusive.
Religious beliefs have also been defended on pragmatic grounds. Jordan
distinguishes between truth-dependent and truth-independent pragmatic
arguments for religious belief. The former recommend belief because of the
benefits  gained  if  the  proposition  believed  turns  out  to  be  true.395 A crude
version of Pascal’s wager may serve as an example: one should believe that
there is a God, since one will thus attain supreme good, that is, salvation, if
there really is a God who grants salvation to believers.396 In contrast, a truth-
independent pragmatic argument commends belief just because of the
benefits gained by having that belief, whether or not the proposition believed
turns out to be true.  A suitable example of  such argument is  what Nicholas
Everitt calls the argument from solace: one should have religious belief
because  it  gives  as  such  purpose  to  life  and  helps  one  to  cope  with  life’s
misfortunes,  whether  it  is  true  or  not.397 One  can  also  combine  truth-
dependent and truth-independent arguments. This is the stance Jordan
adopts.  He  is  influenced  by  James’s  and  Pascal’s  ideas  and  claims  in  his
“Jamesian Wager” that having religious belief is intrinsically beneficial,
whether or not there is a God, and it will be even more so if it turns out to be
true that there is a God.398
There  is,  however,  a  problem in  making  the  step  from having  pragmatic
reasons for belief that p to actually believing that p. As Richard Foley points
out, pragmatic reasons are ordinarily ineffective in producing belief. Since
belief aims at truth (see section 1.2.2.), in order to believe that p one needs to
have truth-indicating evidential reasons for p. Pragmatic reasons for p are not
394 Jordan 1996, 409.
395 Jordan 1996, 410.
396 Cf. Swinburne 2005, 125. Whether mere belief is enough for salvation can be questioned. See
section 2.1.2.. See also Everitt 2004, 197-198.
397 Everitt 2004, 205-206.
398 Jordan 2006, 5.
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truth- but utility-indicating reasons for p, and thus pragmatic reasons do not
prompt belief that p.399 The problem here is essentially the same as that with
Bishop’s suggestion that one can consciously believe on non-evidential,
passional grounds (see section 3.1.3.). This is to be expected, since pragmatic
reasons  are  no  doubt  a  sub-class  of  non-evidential  reasons  for  believing  a
proposition.
Jordan  acknowledges  the  ineffectuality  of  forming  a  belief  on  pragmatic
grounds. But, he argues, all that follows from this is that in order to acquire
pragmatically vindicated belief, some sort of “belief-inducing technology” will
be necessary.400 In analytic theists’ discussion it is fairly commonly held that
such technologies are readily at hand. If we omit such extreme procedures as
hypnosis and science-fictional belief-inducing pills, the method to acquire a
belief  specified  in  advance  is  taken  to  involve  following  kinds  of  things:
selective reading of evidence, socialising with persons who believe,
indoctrination, subliminal suggestion, and acting as if one believed.401 These
look  like  biased  belief-forming  techniques  in  contrast  to  honest  inquiry:  a
person using these methods is seeking to believe a proposition which from her
viewpoint is not, on balance, evidentially justified.402 These techniques
illustrate one way to try to acquire beliefs indirectly at will.
The discussion on cultivating religious beliefs in the above-mentioned ways
has been mainly focused on the permissibility of such actions (see section 3.3.).
The possibility of getting oneself to believe by such means has not very often
been questioned.403 However,  I  believe  that  precisely  that  can  be  done.  To
begin with, Foley has offered preliminary considerations which indicate that
deliberately manipulating oneself to believe is more difficult than it is typically
assumed.404 First of all, Foley argues that manipulating one’s beliefs is to “plot
against ourselves so as to get ourselves in what we would now regard as a worse
evidential  situation”.  He  points  out  that  such  plottings  are  unlikely  to  be
narrowly constrained, since in his view beliefs cannot be ordinarily altered one
by one, but significant clumps of belief have to be altered if any belief is to be
altered.405
Foley does not elucidate his claim further, but I assume that his idea is that
if a person tries to believe that p, and p is not evidentially vindicated for her,
the person would also have to get rid of all of her beliefs (or evidences) which
she acknowledges are inconsistent with p’s truth or imply not-p. In addition,
one might argue that when it is a set of propositions that is attempted to
believe, the number of beliefs in need of alteration would likely increase. This
indicates that manipulating oneself to believe, say, that the Christian creed as
399 Foley 1994, 38.
400 Jordan 2006, 54
401 See e.g. Bishop 2007, 118; Jordan 2006, 55; Pojman 2003, 541; Swinburne 2005, 26.
402 Cf. Foley 1994, 41.
403 Cf. Everitt 2004, 196-197.
404 Nicholas Everitt has also raised similar reservations, but more needs to be said than he says, for
his ultimate claim seems to be just that, on the face of it, it is doubtful whether intentional belief-
manipulation can be “practically effective” for some persons. See Everitt 2004, 197.
405 Foley 1994, 41. Cf. Pojman 1986a, 190.
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a  whole  is  true  would  likely  require  a  considerable  change  in  one’s  noetic
structure, and one may query how easily such a change is realised.
 In  addition,  Foley  holds  that  in  order  to  succeed,  the  project  of
manipulating  one’s  beliefs  must  conceal  its  tracks.  He  argues  that  self-
deception will be necessary, whereby a person somehow gets herself to forget
that she has deliberately manipulated her evidential situation to produce the
belief sought after. Otherwise, Foley maintains, the person would not at the
end of  the manipulation be convinced by the evidence:  she would be aware
that it is biased. Indeed, it seems that one cannot believe that p while being
aware that p has been produced by a biased procedure that does not properly
indicate truth. As we have argued, consciously believing on grounds that do
not seem to properly indicate truth does not seem to be possible (see section
3.1.3.). So, by the looks of it, biased belief-formation requires self-deception,
that  is,  concealment  of  its  tracks.  Foley  holds  that  “these  plottings  require
considerable effort”.406 As a result, there are some tentative considerations
which cast doubt on the easiness of belief-manipulation.
Jordan  has  replied  to  Foley’s  criticism  in  his  defence  of  pragmatic
argumentation. At first he grants that the most readily available belief-
inducing technologies, such as selective reading of evidence, involve self-
deception for the reason Foley has pointed out. However, he maintains that
there are belief-inducing technologies which do not require self-deception. But
if so, a person need not hide from herself that she has manipulated her
evidential situation in order to produce belief.407 If  this  is  true,  the  task  of
inducing a belief in oneself may be to some extent easier than Foley’s reasoning
suggests.
Jordan  invites  us  to  consider  a  belief-inducing  technique  which  has  two
constituents. First is the acceptance of a proposition, and second is to act on
that acceptance. According to Jordan’s definition, acceptance is to volitionally
assent  to  a  proposition,  which  apparently  amounts  to  employing  the
proposition as a premise in one’s deliberations, whether or not one believes
the  proposition  to  be  true.  As  for  acting  on  an  accepted  proposition,  in
Jordan’s view it means to behave as if the proposition were true (cf. Bishop’s
account of taking a proposition to be true in section 3.1.2.).408 Jordan claims,
in  reference  to  Daryl  Bem’s  psychological  studies,  on  the  one  hand,  and
Festinger’s  and  Carlsmith’s,  on  the  other,  that  accepting  a  proposition  and
acting  on  it  is  a  common  way  of  generating  belief  in  that  proposition.  He
argues, moreover, that this process does not involve self-deception.409
Jordan’s claim can be questioned. Short of additional explanation, it is not
obvious how a person could in full awareness come eventually to believe that
p by way of accepting and acting on p. For accepting and acting on p is not any
406 Foley 1994, 41.
407 Jordan 2006, 54-55.
408 On the distinction between belief and acceptance, Jordan refers to Alston 1996a and Cohen 1992.
See Jordan 2006, 55 n. 28. Jordan’s view is closer to that of Cohen than Alston, and Alston’s view on
acceptance diverges from Cohen’s in important respects. On Alston’s account, see section 4.2..
409 Jordan 2006, 57. See Bem 1972; Festinger and Carlsmith 1959.
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kind of truth-indicating evidential reason for p, and so it does not dispose one
to believe that p.410 Jordan’s claim that acceptance can generate belief becomes
more understandable once we realise that in his view one can believe that p
while acknowledging that evidence for p is inconclusive. He holds that even if
believing that p is “being disposed to feel that p is probably the case”, it does
not  follow  that  believing  that  p  involves  “being  disposed  to  feel  that p is
probably the case based on the evidence at hand”.411 But here Jordan seems
to make essentially the same claim as Bishop made: believing is not necessarily
tied to evidence. However, as we have argued, if belief’s aiming at truth is taken
seriously, conscious non-evidential believing is conceptually puzzling (see
section  3.1.3.).  So,  it  does  not  look  like  mere  acceptance  plus  action  could
eventually yield belief.
As things stand, it seems that Foley is right in insisting that intentional
manipulation  of  belief  requires  self-deception.  A  person  who  is  trying  to
induce in herself belief that p needs to somehow get from the state where she
is consciously deceiving herself to believe into a state where traces of the deceit
are  absent  and  she  believes  that  p  and  thinks  she  has  good  evidence  for  p.
However, self-deception has its own puzzles, as the extensive philosophical
literature  concerning  it  shows.  Taking  a  closer  look  into  this  topic  further
illuminates the problems attached to the deliberate manipulation of beliefs.
3.2.2 INTENTIONAL SELF-DECEPTION AS A MEANS TO ACQUIRE
BELIEF
According to the traditional model of self-deception, a person is deceiving
herself if she gets herself to believe that p while she truly believes that not-p (I
suppose that changing the disbelief into non-belief would not greatly alter the
issue). This model of self-deception has been thought to raise two paradoxes,
which Alfred Mele has labelled the static and the dynamic puzzles. The static
puzzle  refers  to  the  deceiver’s  state  of  mind:  how can  it  be  possible  to  hold
simultaneously contradictory beliefs?412 The  dynamic  puzzle  concerns  the
strategy of self-deception: how can anyone deceive herself without frustrating
her intention? For a person who is deceived must be unaware of the deceit so
that it can be successful, but then a self-deceiver has to be unaware of her own
deceitful scheme, and this seems rather puzzling.413 Finding a solution to these
410 There are perhaps some exceptions where it is not wholly inappropriate to say that acceptance
yields belief. For example, a cowardly person may accept and act as if she is courageous, and in the course
of time this can make her courageous. But in this case the former coward now has evidential grounds to
believe that she is courageous, and hence believe that she is, in fact, courageous. So, even here it is not
acceptance and acting as if per se which  stands  as  the  grounds  for  the  belief  in  question.  Instead,
acceptance and acting as if yield a change in the person, which forms the evidential ground for belief.
411 Jordan 2006, 55.
412 Whether consciously holding contradictory beliefs is a paradox in the sense of being impossible
may be contested, but I assume that it is problematic. For some relevant discussion, see e.g. Makinson
1965. See also Eklund 2014, 320 n. 30.
413 See Mele 1987, 121, 138; 2001, 6-8.
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two paradoxes is vital if one wants to defend the possibility of self-deception.
Accordingly, different accounts of self-deception have been developed.414
The way Foley elaborated deliberate belief-manipulation resembles what
Ian Deweese-Boyd calls the temporal partitioning model of self-deception.
According to this model, self-deception is a process extended over time where
the self-deceiver consciously attempts to get herself to believe that p and in the
process seeks to lose her original belief that not-p and to forget her deceptive
intention.415 We may suppose that this process involves mainly selective
reading of evidence, socialising with believers, and a Jordan-type of accepting
and acting on relevant propositions. On the face of it, this sort of intentional
self-deception readily dissolves the static puzzle of self-deception. According
to the model, a self-deceiver never holds contradictory beliefs but seeks over
time to change her mental state from disbelief (or non-belief) to belief that p.
But while it may be unaffected by the static puzzle, I am not sure how the
temporal  partitioning  model  as  depicted  so  far  could  solve  the  dynamic
paradox of self-deception. That is, how could the offered strategy to deceive
oneself be successful? According to the model, one can deceive oneself to
believe by somehow forgetting the deceptive intention in the course of time.
But one might ask how can the deceit succeed if the deception is forgotten? If
a person intends to deceive herself into believing that p but during the process
forgets her intention, it seems that the deceit is left unfinished.416 On the other
hand, it seems that intending to forget the deceit is a somewhat futile attempt.
To try to forget one’s deceptive intention would presumably just intensify the
memory of it, as the psychological ironic process theory holds.417 So, deceiving
oneself to believe in full awareness of what one is trying to do appears to be a
demanding task.
However,  Deweese-Boyd  points  out  that  on  the  temporal  partitioning
model a self-deceiver need not necessarily hide or forget her deceptive
intention in order to acquire the belief sought after. If this is true, the
mentioned difficulties would be avoided. Deweese-Boyd maintains that the
intention to deceive need not be forgotten in such cases where the self-deceiver
comes to think that what started as a deceit-process by coincidence led her to
truth.418 That is, the self-deceiver may as a result of the deception think that
the  deceiving  process  led  her  to  circumstances  in  which  she  came  to  have
evidence sufficient to yield belief. In the case at hand, the evidence would likely
be, say, a religious experience or an awareness which indicates God’s existence
or presence and thus prompts belief.
414 For an overview on different accounts, see Deweese-Boyd 2012.
415 Deweese-Boyd 2012, ch. 2.1..
416 Someone might suggest that one first deceives oneself to believe that p and then tries to forget
the deception while retaining the belief. But this does not seem to be a credible solution. As we have
argued, one cannot believe that p while being aware that the belief is acquired by deceptive means. So,
the deception needs to be somehow hidden before one can come to believe, and it is precisely this that is
problematic.
417 On the ironic process theory, see e.g. Wegner 1994.
418 Deweese-Boyd 2012, ch. 2.1..
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It is of crucial importance to note that in the above case it is still assumed—
whether  rightly  or  not  (cf.  Pascal’s  view  below)—that  the  self-deceiver  who
comes to think that she has acquired evidence sufficient to ground belief has
actually deceived herself into believing. The assumption is that the evidence
the  deceiver  has  acquired  is  actually  misrepresentative:  it  is  produced  by  a
biased mechanism, though from the believer’s viewpoint it does not look like
that (if it did look like that, she would not believe). This means that the self-
deception occurs on a sub-conscious level; the deceptive mechanism functions
sub-consciously. Unbeknownst to the deceiver, the mechanism conditions her
to  perceive  the  world  in  a  biased  way  which  stimulates  the  occurrence  of
relevant evidence and thus the formation of the relevant beliefs.419 Note,
however, that the belief thus acquired is not necessarily false: a person can by
self-deception come to believe a proposition which by serendipity is true.
3.2.3 CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION
So, a type of intentional self-deception that occurs ultimately sub-consciously
seems possible. However, such deception does not seem to secure success,
since that depends on whether the underlying deceptive mechanism starts to
work.  And whether  the  mechanism starts  to  work  is  something  one  cannot
guarantee but only to some extent contribute to by initially  engaging in the
process of self-deception. So, the modest conclusion to be drawn is that while
there  may  not  in  principle  be  obstacles  to  intentionally  inducing  a  belief  in
oneself, it is nonetheless a type of action which has difficulties attached to it.420
In  addition  to  these  difficulties,  intentional  self-deception  looks  like  a
blameworthy course of action. This is a topic I will discuss briefly in section
3.3., which is concerned with the ethics of belief.
In this connection I would like to make an excursion to Blaise Pascal’s view
of belief-formation by pragmatic motives. For against initial appearances, it
seems to diverge from the one analysed previously. So, for religious doubters
who  find  his  pragmatic  wager  argument  attractive  and  yet  cannot  believe,
Pascal recommends a course of action which in his view will likely bring about
belief:
419 Everitt has offered a depiction of how such a deception might go: “The course of action might
include,  for  example,  mixing  with  lots  of  intellectually  able  theists  whom  I  anyway  find  morally
admirable, avoiding atheists, attending church/synagogue/mosque, reading theistic tracts and avoiding
atheistic  tracts,  and  so  on.  I  could  go  through  the  outward  motions  of  the  believer,  for  example,  in
praying. At the start, I might well think to myself that my prayers were ridiculous. But it could well be
that as I persevered, and as I mixed constantly with other people who took praying seriously, I would
gradually find myself taking it seriously too. I would move from thinking that in prayer I was merely
communing with myself, to thinking that I really was communicating with another presence, a spiritual
force who heard me and who from time to time responded to me. I would come to think that a course of
action which I had embarked on in a somewhat cynical and self-interested fashion had, by very great
good fortune, brought me to accept important truths which I would otherwise have missed. I would be a
genuine believer.” Everitt 2004, 196-197.
420 This is not to say that persons do not deceive themselves into belief in less than full awareness,
and not deliberately.
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[…] follow the way by which they [who now believe] began. They behaved just as if
they did believe, taking holy water, having masses said, and so on. That will make
you believe quite naturally, and will make you more docile.421
At  first  glance,  Pascal  seems  to  be  suggesting  a  simplistic  model  of  belief-
manipulation:  act  as  if  you  believed  and  belief  will  eventually  come  (cf.
Jordan’s proposals in section 3.2.1.).422 However, while this is a fairly common
interpretation of Pascal’s view,423 it has been criticised by some commentators.
For example, Ward Jones claims, in short, that Pascal was not encouraging
self-deception when he recommended acting as if in order to believe. Instead,
Jones holds,  Pascal  thought that  such action can actually  make God’s  grace
more likely to occur and thus more likely to bring about belief.  Jones holds
that  grace  is,  if  experienced,  taken  by  the  believer  to  be  a  truth-conducive
evidential determinant of belief. Quite obviously, in this case the experience of
grace which grounds belief is not produced by a deceptive mechanism, since it
is supposedly initiated by God himself.424
Given Jones’s construal, one might say that the role of the wager argument
for Pascal was not to motivate a doubter to deceive herself into believing but
to persuade her to voluntarily seek grace by acting as if in the expectation that
God  will  in  some  way  grant  to  her  grace-based  evidence  sufficient  to  yield
belief.425 In line with this understanding, Thomas Morris similarly argues that
Pascal intended the wager argument to motivate a certain kind of religiously
relevant behaviour which would erode emotional and attitudinal obstacles to
belief and would “put us in a better epistemic position to access the evidence
that does exist”.426 According  to  this  understanding,  Pascal  was  clearly  not
encouraging self-deception or belief-manipulation. This makes his usage of
pragmatic  reasoning  vis-à-vis  religious  belief  more  attractive  than  that  of
Jordan.427
421 Pensées 418.
422 Cf. Jones 1998, 178.
423 See e.g. Bishop 2007, 118-119; Deweese-Boyd 2012, ch. 2.1.; Eklund 2012, 449; Flew 1976, 63;
Pojman 1986a, 50-54; Swinburne 2005, 128.
424 Jones 1998, 180-181, 187. See e.g Pensées 808. For the way in which grace yields belief, see Jones
1998, ch. 4. See also Jenkins’s preferred interpretation of Aquinas in section 2.1.2..
425 Incidentally, given Jones’s interpretation, Pascal’s recommendation can from the Plantingian
point of view be seen as seeking faith.
426 Morris 1994a, 57, 60. ”The unbeliever should begin an attempt to conform his life to a pattern set
by true believers. He should begin to think on the idea of God; he should meditate upon moving religious
stories; he should attempt to pray, as far as that is possible; he should associate with people who already
believe and hold religious values to be very important; and he should expose himself to religious rituals
and worship.” Morris 1994a, 56-57. Morris’s elaboration is reminiscent of William Wainwright’s view.
Wainwright has sought to argue that religious belief can, and perhaps should be, based on evidence, but
“the evidence can be accurately assessed only by men and women who possess the proper moral and
spiritual qualifications”. Wainwright 1995, 3.
427 Jones’s  and  Morris’s  interpretation  of  the  role  of  the  wager  argument  avoids  a  theological
peculiarity involved in the earlier surveyed view that pragmatic arguments commend belief-
manipulation. For it is awkward to suppose that God, if he exists, would value our trying to manipulate
ourselves to have beliefs about him because of some pragmatic motive (for a discussion, see Jordan
2006, 146-148; Swinburne 2005, 128). However, it does not seem to be that awkward to suppose that
God, if he exists, would value our honestly seeking him by relevant behaviour because of a pragmatic
motive, and this is consistent with Jones’s and Morris’s views on the function of the wager argument.
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3.3 REMARKS ON THE ETHICS OF BELIEF
Besides being an intrinsically problematic idea, believing or seeking by self-
deceptive  means  to  believe  a  proposition,  which  is  not  supported  by  one’s
evidence,  strikes  one  as  blameworthy  conduct.  This  claim presupposes  that
there are some norms governing the acquisition, sustenance, and renunciation
of beliefs, and so the claim is a take on the ethics of belief. In what follows, I
will make some remarks on this topic. My purpose is not to offer a full-blown
ethics of belief or an overview of this broad subject, but more moderately to
pay attention to some considerations that are relevant for our discussion.428
To begin with, to argue that there are norms to be followed when acquiring,
sustaining, and renouncing beliefs presupposes that beliefs are to some extent
voluntary. We must have the capacity to control our beliefs so that we can fulfil
our supposed doxastic responsibilities (ought implies can). The ongoing
discussion clearly supports this assumption. Though beliefs are not under our
direct voluntary control, we do have some indirect control over them. In other
words, from a synchronic viewpoint we cannot but have the beliefs we in fact
have, but from a diachronic viewpoint we can have some influence on which
beliefs we hold. According to John Bishop, we have considerable control over
the processes of inquiry that have an effect on our beliefs. For example, we can
control the extent to which we seek out and pay attention to relevant evidence.
Hence, we can be held responsible for having the beliefs we do, in fact, have. 429
What is more, Bishop argues in reference to his distinction between holding
and  taking  a  proposition  to  be  true  (see  section  3.1.2.)  that  besides  being
responsible  for  how  we  indirectly  control  our  beliefs  as  mental  states,  it  is
necessary to recognise that we may have responsibilities for how we directly
control what we take to be true in our practical reasoning.430 For example, a
person may be blameable for carelessly acting on an inattentively held belief,
whose propositional content the person would deem as lacking evidential
support, were she to reflect on it.
Accordingly,  in  Bishop’s  view,  at  least,  it  is  possible  to  have  doxastic
responsibilities at two different loci. This seems credible, although taking-to-
be-true (and its relative acceptance) may actually have its own ethics, as it can
be divorced from belief altogether. For one can take to be true what one does
not  believe  true.  However,  though  I  will  make  a  comment  on  the  “ethics  of
taking-to-be-true” in the end of this section, I shall here primarily focus on the
possible norms governing our belief-formation, that is, on the proper ethics of
belief.
What kind of responsibilities may we have with respect to belief-forming
practices?  The  most  reputed  ethics  of  belief  is  no  doubt  Evidentialism,  and
Clifford’s principle is most likely the best-known description of this view. The
principle  declares  that  “it  is  wrong  always,  everywhere,  and  for  anyone  to
428 For discussion on the ethics of belief, see e.g. Dole and Chignell (eds.) 2005; Chignell 2010.
429 Bishop 2007, 31. Cf. Pojman 1986a, 180.
430 Bishop 2007, 42.
Believing without Evidence
102
believe anything upon insufficient evidence”.431 Andrew Chignell remarks that
despite  the  synchronic  character  of  this  principle,  Clifford’s  view is  not  just
that  we  must  be  in  a  certain  state  at  a  certain  time  when we  form a  belief.
Instead,  he  meant  the  principle  to  be  understood  diachronically,  too,  as
governing our belief-related activities across time.432
For our needs, a diachronic description of Evidentialism is appropriate,
since it best captures the way we can be held responsible for our beliefs. So, we
may understand Evidentialism as follows:
(E)  Beliefs  ought  to  be  formed,  sustained,  and  renounced  on  the  basis  of
adequate evidence.
Evidentialism may be defended in different ways, say, on moral or intellectual
grounds,433 but even as such some version of it should look like an advisable
principle. For while it may be hard to defend unconditional Evidentialism, it
is, as Chignell says, even harder to defend the view that Evidentialism is
inappropriate in every domain.434
It  is  of  relevance  to  point  out  that  if  one  central  claim of  this  chapter  is
correct, that is, that non-evidential believing is not possible (see sections 3.1.3.
and 3.2.1.), a specific type of Evidentialism seems to be unavoidable. As it was
argued, given that belief aims at truth, a person can consciously believe that p
only if she thinks she has some kind of truth-indicating evidence to support p’s
truth. A claim similar to this one has been made by Jonathan Adler. He holds
that “Evidentialism is the intrinsic ethics of belief—it is the ethics of belief
imposed by the concept of belief itself.” Adler maintains that it a serious error
to maintain that adherence to Evidentialism could be an option one can take
rightly  or  wrongly,  wisely  or  foolishly.  For  example,  he  says,  from  a  first-
person point of view a person cannot believe that he is handsome just for the
reason  that  it  will  lessen  his  depression  (which  is  a  pragmatic  motive).  For
lessened depression does not bear on the truth of whether he is handsome.
Adler maintains that the “cannot” involved here is conceptual.435
While the above-mentioned “psychological Evidentialism”, as one might
call it, may be unavoidable, it does not follow that we automatically fulfil the
demands  of  (E).  For  example,  a  person  can  presumably  form  and  sustain
beliefs in less than full awareness by non-evidential factors (see section 3.1.3.),
and in such cases she is clearly going against (E). Additionally, what a person
from her viewpoint conceives as evidence relevant to her given belief may not,
in fact, be adequate evidence at all, and in this case (E) is violated, too. Still, if
431 Clifford 1879, 186.
432 Chignell 2010, ch. 1.1..
433 Jordan holds that Evidentialism can be understood in an ethical or in an epistemic/intellectual
sense. According to the ethical construal, persons should follow (E) because the consequences of no one
following it would be disastrous. Jordan holds that this was Clifford’s position. Clifford holds that not
following  (E)  would  be  a  danger  to  society,  and  persons  would  become  credulous,  lose  the  habit  of
inquiry, and “sink back into savagery”. Clifford 1879, 185-186. According to the epistemic/intellectual
construal of Evidentialism, (E) should be followed because not doing so makes one unreasonable, which
is as such a bad thing. Jordan maintains that Hume and Locke espoused this view. See Jordan 2006, 42-
44.
434 Chignell 2010, ch. 4.1..
435 Adler 2002, 2, 10.
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a person finds herself believing that p even after careful reflection on her
evidence for p, one might say that she is prima facie justified in believing that
p,  since she has reflected upon the issue and does have from her viewpoint
some evidence for p.
Something along the lines of (E) is assumed in the claim made at the outset
of this section, namely, that it is blameworthy to believe or try to believe by
self-deceptive means something not warranted by one’s overall evidence. But
is (E) an absolute norm, as Clifford apparently held? The answer is most likely
no. Sometimes it may be permissible to deviate from Evidentialism. Consider
the  following  imaginary  scenario,  for  example.  Suppose  a  person  is  given  a
forced choice: she must either believe some proposition p that is widely
considered  to  be  false  or  else  great  harm  will  be  done  to  the  whole  of
humankind. In this case it seems that on moral grounds it is advisable for the
person to try to believe that p by any possible means, even though this conduct
clearly deviates from (E).436
Is  it  permissible  to  try  to  believe  by  deceptive  means  faith-propositions
which  one’s  overall  evidence  does  not  support?  This,  at  any  rate,  is  what
pragmatic arguments for religious belief seek to show (see section 3.2.1.), and
I  will  accordingly  focus  on  them.  Like  moral  reasons  in  the  above  example,
pragmatic reasons for religious belief can presumably in some cases override
(E). For example, a reflective religious doubter may think that she cannot live
a meaningful and morally decent life without religious belief (say, belief that
such a life leads to salvation).437 So, in order to live a meaningful and morally
decent  life,  she  is  motivated  to  form  the  required  belief  even  though  the
relevant proposition from her viewpoint lacks adequate evidential support.
Because of the supposedly great benefit the belief would confer on the doubter
(and perhaps on persons close to her), she may be within her rights in going
against (E) and forming the relevant belief.
However, while pragmatic arguments for religious belief may in some cases
permit  deviation  from  (E),  I  would  point  to  an  alternative  way  to  conceive
pragmatic argumentation vis-à-vis religious matters, which does not typically
require  violating  (E)—and which  conveniently  anticipates  the  subject  of  the
next chapter. We have thus far supposed that pragmatic arguments commend
having faith-belief because of the benefits thus possibly attained. My first
complaint about this view is that it is too simplistic: pragmatic arguments are
not best understood as commending mere faith-belief, but it is more accurate
to  take  them  to  promote  faith,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  implies  more  than
belief.  Something  like  this  actually  seems  to  be  Jeff  Jordan’s  position.  He
maintains  that  pragmatic  arguments  recommend  not  just  belief  but
commitment  to  God,  which  in  his  view  amounts  to  reorienting  one’s  goals,
values, and behaviour by including belief that God exists among one’s central
beliefs and values.438
436 Cf. Jordan 2006, 46-47.
437 Cf. Swinburne 2005, 129.
438 Jordan 2006, 18-19.
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But  whereas  Jordan’s  reasoning  suggests  that  pragmatic  arguments
promote having faith with belief, that is, having doxastic faith, and thus
require violating (E), one might ask why faith without firm belief, that is, sub-
or  non-doxastic  faith,  would  not  suffice?  This,  in  fact,  is  my  suggestion:
pragmatic arguments can be reinterpreted as supporting sub- or non-doxastic
faith. As a simple example, consider the following revision of Nicholas Everitt’s
argument from solace (see section 3.2.1.): it is permissible to have some type
of sub- or non-doxastic  faith,  because it  can give meaning to one’s  life.439 A
religious doubter does not firmly believe that propositions of faith are true, but
she may nonetheless, say, believe that they are possibly true, and she may hold
that permitting this possibility to have an impact in her cognitive and practical
life would offer consolation and help overcome otherwise unavoidable
desperation. Because of the supposed pragmatic benefits, the doubter may be
justified  in  clinging  to  the  possibility  in  question,  which  then  amounts  to
having a kind of sub-doxastic faith.
There  is  at  least  one  good  aspect  in  conceiving  pragmatic  arguments  as
commending not doxastic faith or mere belief but sub- or non-doxastic faith.
As the above example illustrates, normally a religious doubter who makes use
of pragmatic arguments for sub- or non-doxastic faith need not seek to believe
by self-deceptive means against her better epistemic judgement. Instead, as I
am  inclined  to  think,  in  most  cases  religious  doubters  who  find  faith  an
attractive alternative are already in a suitable cognitive state to exemplify some
form of non-doxastic faith. Hence, pragmatic arguments for non-doxastic faith
do  not  generally  require  violating  (E),  and  so  they  are  compatible  with
Evidentialism as  understood  here.  One  might  also  point  out  that  pragmatic
arguments for sub- or non-doxastic faith are compatible with the Pascalian
understanding of the role of the arguments: exemplifying sub- or non-doxastic
faith can be seen as the sort of behaviour which, as Thomas Morris has said,
may put one “in a better epistemic position to access the evidence that does
exist”.440
I  am  not  here  seeking  to  offer  an  elaborated  defence  of  pragmatic
arguments for sub- or non-doxastic faith. However, if a religious doubter holds
that she is better off by having some kind of sub- or non-doxastic faith and by
having such faith she harms no one, I do not see any reason why it would not
be  permissible  for  her  to  have  the  faith  in  question.  While  it  may  not  be
advisable  for  the  doubter  to  devote  herself  too  much  to  her  sub-  or  non-
doxastic  faith,  to  say  that  she  is  not  entitled  to  it  at  all  seems  to  be  an
overstatement. In Bishop’s terminology my suggestion is actually an approach
to the ethics of taking-to-be-true. My claim is that a person may on pragmatic
grounds be entitled to tentatively take such propositions of faith to be true in
her  reasoning  which  she  considers  evidentially  wanting  and  does  not  thus
believe. This is the same as exemplifying a type of sub- or non-doxastic faith
439 Everitt 2004, 205-206.
440 Morris 1994a, 57, 60.
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(see section 3.1.1.).441 Different  allegedly  non-doxastic  views  of  faith  will  be
surveyed  in  the  next  chapter.  They  seek  to  illuminate  what  kind  of
propositional attitudes can take the place of firm belief in the cognitive aspect
of faith.
441 Concerning faith, Bishop appears to highlight the ethics of taking-to-be-true over the proper
ethics of belief: “reflective believers’ concern for the justifiability of their faith-beliefs should be regarded
primarily as a concern about whether it is morally justifiable to take faith-beliefs to be true in one’s
practical reasoning. If that is correct, then Philosophy of Religion should not focus ultimately on the
epistemic status of theistic faith-beliefs, but rather on the moral status of practical commitment to the
truth of those beliefs.” Bishop 2007, 48. For further discussion, see Bishop 2007, 41-52. Bishop notes
that, as regards rationality, Joshua Golding has argued for a similar shift from a focus on “having theistic
beliefs” to “being a religious theist”, which entails a practical commitment. Bishop 2007, 48, n. 24. See
Golding 2003. My claim is not this strong. My point is just that “having faith-belief” and “being a person
of sub- or non-doxastic faith” may have different rationality conditions. A person may not be justified in
having faith-belief but she may at the same time be justified in being a person of non-doxastic faith.
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4 FAITH WITHOUT BELIEF
In  the  beginning  of  the  previous  chapter  we  noted  a  difficulty  confronting
reflective religious doubters who find the religious form of life an attractive
alternative. Since it seems that in full awareness it is not possible to believe
that p without some evidence for p, the doubter who finds the evidence for the
propositions of faith wanting cannot believe these propositions. Although the
aim of chapter 3 was to offer different solutions to this problem, the dilemma
was in fact  just  further deepened.  John Bishop’s  proposal  that  belief  can be
sustained by non-evidential, passional causes seems to be conceptually
problematic,  and  the  suggestion  made  in  connection  with  pragmatic
arguments that one can by deceptive means get oneself to believe something
not warranted by one’s evidence looks like a difficult task to complete. What is
more, belief-manipulation (and non-evidential believing) go against the
dominant ethics of belief, namely, Evidentialism. For a reflective religious
doubter having faith with a strong belief, that is, having doxastic faith, does
not look like a feasible alternative.
According  to  Louis  Pojman,  religious  doubters  have  the  unwelcome
prospect  of  being  denied  the  benefits  of  religious  faith  altogether  or  being
labelled  “immature  theists”,  since  faith  with  belief  is,  according  to  his
conviction,  generally  regarded  by  the  orthodoxy  as  the  only  way  to  be  a
genuine  person  of  faith  with  the  benefits  of  salvation.  However,  Pojman
immediately asks, what is so important about belief anyway? May there not,
he queries, be other propositional attitudes that are equally as effective as
belief or at least adequate for the vital benefits of religion?442 Several theistic
philosophers, Pojman included, have answered affirmatively to this question.
That is, these philosophers have sought to develop accounts of faith which do
not allegedly entail belief of any kind. These non-doxastic accounts, as we have
labelled them (see section 1.1.2.), are the subject of this chapter.
We have already analysed one account of faith without firm belief, namely,
Swinburne’s Pragmatist view of faith (see section 2.1.3.; see also Bishop’s sub-
doxastic  model  of  faith  in  section  3.1.1.).  However,  in  his  view  of  faith
Swinburne does not try to dispense with belief altogether, as he holds that the
precondition  for  instantiating  faith  is  the  so-called  weak  belief  (that  is,  the
belief  that  the  Christian  creed  is  more  probably  true  than  any  of  its  rival
alternatives), and this is a sub-doxastic, “less-than-firm-belief” attitude. In
this  respect  the  views  we  shall  analyse  in  this  chapter  deviate  from  that  of
Swinburne. For they seek to show that the prevailing propositional attitude in
the cognitive aspect of faith need not be belief of any sort, since it can be a non-
doxastic, “other-than-belief” attitude. This idea has impact on the issue of the
voluntariness of the cognitive aspect of faith. If involuntary belief is not central
442 Pojman 1986a, 214.
Faith without Belief
108
to the cognitive aspect of faith, may it be comprised of an attitude that is more
readily subject to the will’s choices?
In what follows, in section 4.1. I shall survey Robert Audi’s suggestion that
propositional faith, “faith that so-and-so”, can be an adequate substitute for
propositional belief in an account of faith. After that, in section 4.2. William
Alston’s view of acceptance in religious faith is analysed. Alston’s definition of
this attitude bears prima facie resemblance to Jeff Jordan’s acceptance and
John Bishop’s taking-to-be-true (see sections 3.1.2. and 3.2.1.) but ultimately
diverges from them in significant respects. In section 4.3. I shall evaluate Louis
Pojman’s account of faith with hope, and in section 4.4. I shall consider J. L.
Schellenberg’s  view  of  what  could  be  termed  imagination-based  faith.
Schellenberg  also  speaks  about  propositional  faith  in  his  account,  but  his
elaboration of the notion diverges from that of Audi. Lastly, I shall summarise
some claims  I  have  made  in  this  study  and  offer  some further  reflections.  I
propose  a  view  of  faith  which  defends  the  propriety  of  hope  for  faith  but
diverges from Pojman’s account.
4.1 AUDI ON PROPOSITIONAL FAITH
In  many  of  his  articles  about  the  nature  and  rationality  of  religious  faith,
Robert Audi has argued for a view of faith which does not, he claims, entail
belief. His discussion of this subject is multifaceted, but one of the key notions
he  elaborates  is  propositional  faith,  which  he  takes  to  be  a  distinct  attitude
from belief and a viable candidate for the cognitive aspect of faith. I will here
focus  on  this  side  of  Audi’s  thought.  His  views  on  propositional  faith  have
remained relatively consistent throughout his career.443 I  shall  here  mostly
make  use  of  Audi’s  book Rationality and Religious Commitment (2011),
where he draws together and expands some of his previously published works.
So,  in  the  following  I  will  analyse,  firstly,  how Audi  conceives  the  nature  of
propositional faith and, secondly, this attitude’s impact on the issue of the
voluntariness of faith.
4.1.1 BETWEEN HOPE AND BELIEF: THE NATURE OF
PROPOSITIONAL FAITH
If I have faith that God loves human beings, Audi claims, I have, in addition to
a cognitive attitude, a certain positive disposition toward the truth of the
proposition in question.444 By this positive disposition Audi appears to mean
a favourable or positive evaluative attitude: “the point is (roughly) that faith
that something will occur entails taking that to be a good thing”.445 If a person
disapproves of something’s occurrence, Audi holds that she cannot have faith
443 See e.g. Audi 1991; 1992; 1993; 2003; 2011. See also Audi 2007; 2008.
444 Audi 2011, 54.
445 Audi 2011, 67.
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that  it  will  occur.446 This  line  of  thought  already  illustrates  one  difference
between  propositional  faith  and  belief:  belief  does  not  entail  a  positive
evaluative attitude. For example, a person can believe that her colleague will
be promoted without taking that to be a good thing. But if the person has faith
that the colleague will be promoted, she must take that to be a positive thing.
When applied to religious faith,  propositional  faith is,  in our terminology,  a
mixture of the cognitive and the evaluative-affectional aspects of faith (on
which, see section 1.1.2.), for it is both a cognitive and an evaluative attitude.
Audi maintains that  propositional  faith can include firm belief,  but he is
chiefly concerned with the sort of propositional faith that does not entail belief.
He calls such faith fiducial faith,447 and this is what we will accordingly mean
by propositional faith. Audi holds that this kind of propositional faith is easiest
to  see  in  everyday  cases.  His  example  is  parents’  having  faith  that  their
children will live up to their high ideals. If the ideals are truly high, living up
to them is difficult. In Audi’s view this can mean that the parents do not have
here  an  attitude  properly  considered  as  flat-out  (firm,  strong,  convinced)
belief.448 Moreover,  as  should  be  clear  by  now,  Audi  maintains  that
propositional faith does not include belief of any kind: it does not involve flat-
out  belief,  but  neither  does  it  comprise,  say,  weak  or  tentative  belief.  So,
propositional faith is in Audi’s view a non-doxastic attitude, though he
acknowledges that some philosophers have spoken of degrees of belief in such
a way that if one so much as takes a proposition to have any significant chance
of truth, then one thereby believes it to some degree.449
While propositional faith does not entail belief of any kind, it is in Audi’s
view  a  cognitive  attitude.  But  then  it  must  presumably  cohere  with  other
cognitive attitudes. Audi affirms this. In his view faith that p can coincide with
some  degree  of  doubt  about  p,  but  it  is  incompatible  with  pervasive  or
dominating doubt and a fortiori with disbelief that p. Audi maintains that faith
that p cannot coincide with any doubt sufficient to undermine a kind of
trusting that p is true. In his view propositional faith is connected, though not
identical, to what might be labelled propositional trust, “trusting that so-and-
so”. (The notion of propositional trust is interesting, but Audi does not analyse
it further.) Audi argues that propositional faith is conviction-wise stronger
than  hope,  which  in  his  view is  compatible  with  grave  doubt.450 “When the
strength of doubt that p is true reaches a certain level,” Audi claims, “hope, but
not faith, will probably be my attitude.”451 So,  besides belief,  Audi contrasts
propositional faith with hope. Vis-à-vis certitude or confidence about a
proposition’s truth, propositional faith is somewhere between hope and firm
belief: it is stronger than hope but weaker than belief.
446 Audi 2011, 74
447 Audi 2011, 71.
448 Audi 2011, 69.
449 Audi 2011, 54, 78-79.
450 Audi 2011, 54, 72-74.
451 Audi 2011, 73.
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Though propositional faith is confidence-wise weaker than belief, Audi
holds that in other respects it can be a steadfast attitude. By this he appears to
mean chiefly that unlike, say, tentative belief, propositional faith can survive
in the face of counter-evidence of a certain kind; it can resist being given up.
Audi also maintains that propositional faith can be a significant attitude to
one’s emotional life. He argues that faith has a tendency to remove or reduce
negative emotions concerning the same object, such as fear, anxiety,
depression, and anger. This, Audi maintains, is a manifestation of the sense in
which faith that p is a kind of trusting that p.452
Audi has offered numerous further indications of what propositional faith
is and how it contrasts with certain other attitudes. In his appraisal, William
Alston has picked out several of Audi’s characterisations of propositional faith.
Alston’s list is worth presenting here:
1. What propositional faith is not: (a) flat-out belief, (b) feeling of certitude,
(c) being subject to mistake, (d) belief + a positive evaluation of object, (e)
has  a  definitely  accepted  propositional  object,  (f)  implies  existence  of
object, (g) intellectual commitment to its propositional object, (h)
tentative belief that p, (i) weak belief that p, (j) belief that p is probably
true.
2. What  propositional  faith  is:  (a)  incompatible  with  disbelief  that  p,  (b)
cognitive in having a propositional object, (c) sufficient to qualify one as
religious  where  the  propositional  object  is  religious,  (d)  has  a  positive
attitudinal  aspect,  (e)  involves a disposition to believe that  p,  (f)  can be
strong and steadfast, (g) involves conviction, (h) requires belief other than
belief that p, (i) is a positive attitude to a proposition, (j) implies a cognitive
trust.
3. Weaker connections: (a) limits the degree of doubt that p, (b) is compatible
with  more  doubt  than  belief  of  p,  (c)  requires  less  for  justification  or
rationality than belief, (d) a weaker disposition than with belief to avow
the proposition, make inferences from it, and act on its basis, (e) if p turns
out to be false, there is more tendency to be surprised with belief than with
propositional faith, (f) the closer we are to belief, the less natural it is to
use “faith”.
4. Similarities between propositional faith and belief: (a) cognitive in having
a propositional object, (b) more or less rational, (c) influences behaviour,
(d) varies in strength and in centrality.453
Some  of  these  descriptions  are  already  familiar  to  us.  Some  of  the  new
characterisations,  on  the  other  hand,  might  seem problematic  or  at  least  in
need of further elucidation. I will not comment on them at this point, however.
The  purpose  of  explicating  them is  merely  to  provide  a  context  for  Alston’s
criticism of Audi’s view, to which we will turn next.
First of all, Alston claims that propositional faith is, in fact, close to belief,
even flat-out belief. There are, he says, the similarities set out in 4(a)-4(d), and
452 Audi 2011, 77-78.
453 Alston 2007, 124-125.
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in his view conditions 3(a)-3(d) hold of belief, too. However, this is not Alston’s
central critique of Audi’s view. His further criticism against Audi is that it
seems impossible for any propositional attitude to fit all the mentioned
specifications. Alston argues that the main tension concerns the relation of 2(i)
to 1(e) and 1(g): how could something be a positive cognitive attitude without
involving definite acceptance of a proposition and intellectual commitment to
it? What is more, Alston says that 2(a) also seems to be in conflict with 1(e)
and 1(g): why should propositional faith be incompatible with disbelief if it
does not involve intellectual commitment and acceptance? One might also ask,
for example, whether 1(b) and 2(g) are compatible: how could a propositional
attitude lack certitude but involve conviction?
The  adequacy  of  Alston’s  assessment  depends  on  how  acceptance  and
intellectual commitment is construed. Alston is aware of this, and this is why
his chief dissatisfaction with Audi’s view resides elsewhere.454 His main
critique is simply that Audi has not succeeded in telling us what propositional
faith  actually  is.  Alston  admits  that  Audi  has  said  quite  a  lot  about  the
similarities and dissimilarities propositional faith has to belief, what it is and
is not compatible with, the dispositions it does and does not involve, and so
on.  But,  Alston claims,  we are still  left  in the dark as to what all  this  is  true
of.455 In Alston’s view the only substantial hint we get is that propositional faith
is a positive cognitive attitude towards a proposition (2i). Another partial hint
is,  Alston concedes,  that  propositional  faith has a positive attitudinal  aspect
(2d),  which  Alston  takes  to  refer  to  what  we  termed the  positive  evaluative
attitude.456
I am not sure whether Alston’s critique is completely reasonable. To me it
seems that propositional faith is already quite well identified by the positive
cognitive and evaluative attitude (2i  and 2d),  though it  is  instructive to add
that as regards confidence about a proposition’s truth the cognitive attitude is
somewhere between hope and firm belief. In his reply to Alston, Audi just says
that if Alston demands an ordinary near equivalent of propositional faith, he
suggests that it is “trusting that” (cf. 2j).457 I  would ask,  however,  why Audi
hesitates to analyse propositional faith as a complex of partial belief, that is,
belief of less than maximal degree, and a positive evaluative attitude (cf. 1d,
1h-j). To me this looks like the most natural explication of Audi’s view, and this
454 Alston 2007, 126, 128-129. With respect to this critique of Alston, Audi answers as follows: “In
one place, Alston says that one of my requirements (being incompatible with disbelief) also seems to be
in conflict with the person’s not having ‘definitely accepted’ p and not being intellectually committed to
it. If (he wonders) […] [propositional faith] involves no intellectual commitment to p and no definite
acceptance of p, then why should it be incompatible with disbelief that p? The briefest way to answer this
is to note that I have stressed that faith that p is stronger, in at least the convictional dimension, than
hope. But even hoping that p is inconsistent with believing it false (disbelieving it) [Pojman disagrees;
see section 4.3.1.]. As to definite acceptance of a proposition—as contrasted with, for instance, accepting
it as a working hypothesis—I took that to imply belief.” Audi 2007, 242.
455 Cf. Radcliffe 1995, 75.
456 Alston 2007, 126.
457 Audi 2007, 242.
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description would likely dispel  Alston’s  puzzlement as regards the nature of
propositional faith.458
Analysing propositional faith as a degreed belief plus a positive evaluation
would  also  block  many  of  Dana  Radcliffe’s  objections  to  Audi’s  view.
Radcliffe’s claim is, in short, that having faith that p actually entails belief that
p:  “‘faith’  implies,  not  an absence of  belief,  but an acknowledgement by the
speaker that there are reasons for doubting the truth of the proposition, which
he nevertheless believes—perhaps confidently.”459 As such Radcliffe’s proposal
is  problematic:  it  is  questionable  how  one  could  confidently  believe  that  p
while simultaneously having doubts about p. But were one to say that faith that
p partly consists of a degreed belief that p, this would be compatible with some
amount of doubt about p and it would also be quite compatible with Radcliffe’s
view about the belief-entailing nature of propositional faith.
Audi, however, does not want to pursue this kind of reductionist strategy,
as  he  calls  it;  he  does  not  want  to  analyse  propositional  faith  in  terms  of
(partial)  belief.  According  to  him,  we  do  not  have  faith  that  p  by  merely
believing that p and having a positive evaluative attitude towards p (cf. 1d). He
claims  that  a  proponent  of  such  a  reductionist  view  would  have  to  find  an
appropriate belief aspect and to show that this belief implies an appropriate
evaluative  attitude.  Audi  doubts  whether  either  of  these  conditions  can  be
met.460 However, the reductionist might reply as follows. Degreed belief is an
appropriate  belief  aspect,  and  the  demand  that  this  belief  must  imply  an
evaluative attitude is too strong, for it is sufficient that the belief just happens
to coincide with a positive evaluative attitude—then one has propositional
faith.461
According  to  the  reductionist’s  construal,  which  I  find  appropriate,
propositional faith is a sub-doxastic attitude, as it is taken to include a degreed
belief. This is obviously at odds with Audi’s claim that propositional faith is a
non-doxastic attitude, that is, that it does not consist of belief of any kind.
However, otherwise analysing propositional faith in reductionist terms would
not  necessarily  challenge  Audi’s  account  in  any  substantial  way.  As  I  see  it,
propositional faith would still be a matter of having an attitude that is distinct
from firm belief.462
458 See Alston 1992, 158.
459 Radcliffe 1995, 76.
460 Audi 2011, 79.
461 Another reason why Audi claims that propositional faith does not reduce to propositional belief
plus positive evaluation is that, unlike belief, faith is not truth-valued. According to him, if one believes
that p, and then p turns out to be false, one’s belief that p has been shown to be false or mistaken. But,
he holds, if one has faith that p, and then p turns out to be false, one’s faith that p has been shown to be,
not false or mistaken, but misplaced and disappointed. Audi 2011, 75-76. I find Audi’s view confusing
and do not see any reason to deny that propositional faith is truth-valued. If I believe that p, and p turns
out to be false, what has been shown to be false is not, strictly speaking, my belief that p—I doubt whether
that is even a coherent idea—but the content of my belief, that is, p. The same goes for faith that p. And
in both cases it seems to me that I could, in suitable contexts, speak about my belief/faith that p being
mistaken, misplaced, or disappointed.
462 Cf. Audi 2011, 86-87.
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Returning to Alston’s assessment, his critique against Audi is not only
negative, but he seeks to fill the gap Audi’s account in his view leaves open.
That is, Alston seeks to offer a propositional attitude that is distinct from belief
and  can  be  the  positive  cognitive  attitude  (2i)  of  propositional  faith.  The
attitude Alston has in mind is his version of acceptance. Incidentally, Alston,
unlike Audi, opts for a kind of reductionist strategy in analysing the notion of
propositional  faith.  He  maintains  that  it  can  be,  in  essence,  reduced  to
acceptance  plus  the  positive  evaluative  attitude.  Though  Alston’s  view  of
acceptance will be analysed thoroughly in section 4.2., it is relevant to state it
briefly here. Audi has answered Alston in a critical tone, and in his answer he
offers insights into the voluntariness of propositional faith, which is our next
topic.
4.1.2 THE VOLUNTARINESS OF PROPOSITIONAL FAITH
Alston holds that acceptance can be the positive cognitive attitude involved in
propositional faith. He finds the voluntary character of the act of acceptance
to be the best way of giving a preliminary idea of it. In his view the mental act
of  acceptance is  the “adoption,  the taking on of  a  positive attitude toward a
proposition”.  Contrary  to  what  seems  to  be,  for  example,  Jeff  Jordan’s
definition of acceptance (see section 3.2.1.), Alston claims that the positive
cognitive attitude taken is more than just adopting a working assumption in
the sense of acting as if a proposition were true. In its place, Alston argues, the
attitude  taken  is  very  similar  to,  and  yet  distinct  from,  the  one  found  in
belief.463 For the moment it suffices to say about Alston’s view that according
to  him,  his  voluntary  acceptance  meets  many  of  Audi’s  characterisations  of
propositional  faith,  and  so  acceptance  is  in  his  view a  suitable  candidate  to
elucidate  the  nature  of  propositional  faith  (or,  to  be  precise,  the  cognitive
element of it).464
Audi is not convinced of Alston’s suggestion. We will take a closer look at
his key critique in section 4.2., where Alston’s view is analysed. Here we are
only  interested  in  the  voluntariness  issue,  and  Audi  is  not  satisfied  with
Alston’s proposal on this point either. He argues that the term “accept” often
implies a contrast with rejection and may then incorrectly suggest that forming
propositional faith requires some voluntary act. But, Audi maintains, a person
can have faith that p without having accepted p in the sense that requires an
act of considering and adopting p. In Audi’s view fiducial faith and trusting (in
its propositional sense) are more appropriate terms for propositional faith
than acceptance, because neither can be used to designate an act or an event
and neither must be formed as a result of a voluntary act, as generally seems
to hold in Alston’s scheme. In the end, Audi straightforwardly says that there
is surely no basic act by which we directly produce in ourselves propositional
463 Alston 2007, 132-133.
464 Alston 2007, 135.
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faith,  though  what  we  do  and  behold  in  our  mind  can  affect  our  fiducial
attitudes.465 So, in Audi’s view propositional faith is like belief in that it is not
a directly voluntary propositional attitude.
How  does  one  then  acquire  and  sustain  propositional  faith  in  a  given
proposition? Audi has not said much about this issue. As to the acquisition, he
seems to hold that though propositional faith, like belief, may typically arise
as a result of exposure to evidence, it need not be a response to evidence in this
way.  Audi  says  that  propositional  faith  “is  not  a  causal  notion  in  any  sense
precluding any particular kind of cause—or at any rate, not mere causation by
evidence”.466 As regards sustaining propositional  faith,  Audi’s  remark about
the “fluidity of faith” is significant. In his view, the strength of propositional
faith  “may  wax  or  wane  with  changes  in  such  variables  as  emotionality,
perceived evidence, and social support.”467 This suggests that propositional
faith is responsive to broadly evidential and emotional grounds and thus that
it  is,  if  not  acquired,  at  least  sustained  by  such  grounds.  This  fits  with  the
nature  of  propositional  faith,  as  it  is  not  just  a  cognitive  but  an  evaluative
attitude, too. Ultimately, however, Audi leaves questions concerning the
acquisition of propositional faith somewhat open.
While propositional faith is not voluntary, Audi nonetheless assigns
important tasks to the will in sustaining it. He argues that because faith that p
is compatible with more doubt than firm belief that p, faith provides a place
for, and sometimes calls for, the exercise of the will. To start with, Audi holds
that  one  needs  resolution  to  avoid  being  unsettled  by  apparent  counter-
evidences.468 By this  he seems to mean that  propositional  faith requires the
will’s sustenance in order to survive through adversities. However, one might
ask whether propositional faith is such an attitude that the will can have an
effect on its persistence. Audi even speaks about propositional faith being in a
sense self-sustaining: it can lead to its own strengthening by producing desires
to support it.469 But if this is so, is there really a place for the will in sustaining
propositional faith?
Audi holds that  propositional  faith requires the will  in another way,  too:
one should take pains to do the things appropriate to one’s faith, say, in central
religious  cases  to  do  as  God  would  have  us  do.470 This claim presumably
amounts to the view that acting on one’s propositional faith requires the will’s
exertion, since acting on an uncertain propositional attitude is harder than
acting on an attitude that is certain, like firm belief. However, this remark does
not so much concern the voluntariness of propositional faith per se (that is, as
a propositional attitude) as acting on it. In our terms the point relates to the
practical  aspect  of  faith  and  seems  to  fundamentally  amount  to  the  claim
465 Audi 2011, 83-84.
466 Audi 2011, 59, 59 n. 11. Audi himself appears to be especially interested in religious experiences.
In his view they may for some persons stand as grounds, that is, evidence, for theistic propositions. See
Audi 2011, ch. 5.
467 Audi 2011, 80. See also Audi 2011, 59.
468 Audi 2011, 76.
469 Audi 2011 93.
470 Audi 2011, 76.
115
already detectable in, for example, Swinburne’s and Bishop’s accounts that the
will is required in order to exemplify the practical aspect of faith (see sections
2.1.3. and 3.1.2.). In this case, too, Audi seems to argue that propositional faith
has a self-sustaining character. He holds that since there are often actions one
should perform to live up to one’s faith, faith itself may motivate the action,
and conversely doing the actions may confirm one’s faith or nurture it.471
Audi illustrates the self-sustaining nature of propositional faith with an
example.  Consider  a  person  who has  faith  that  her  friend  will  recover  from
surgery. Audi holds that sustaining this faith amounts to doing such things as
looking on the positive side of the illness; avoiding distraction and enticement
to pursue additional  commitments other than helping the friend and aiding
her  recovery  if  possible;  and  talking  positively  with  other  friends  about  the
friend’s predicament.472 Similar points presumably go for propositional faith
of a religious kind. For example, a person who has faith that there is a loving
God who has offered salvation to humans presumably can strive to maintain
her faith by simply trying to stay optimistic and doing things appropriate to
the faith in question, such as attending services and meeting with like-minded
persons.473
4.1.3 CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION
In  summary,  Audi  argues  that  besides  flat-out  belief  there  is  another
religiously significant attitude, namely, propositional faith. As regards
confidence about the truth of a proposition, propositional faith is weaker than
firm belief but stronger than hope. What is more, unlike mere belief (but like
hope,  as  we  shall  see),  propositional  faith  involves  a  positive  evaluative
attitude. Because of this, propositional faith covers besides the cognitive
aspect of faith at least partly the evaluative-affectional aspect of faith. This
kind of extensiveness is most likely a good thing in an attitude that is taken to
be religiously relevant. In Audi’s view propositional faith is not voluntary, and
apparently it is responsive to broadly evidential and emotional factors. Audi
holds that propositional faith can be fortified by engaging in activities it
commends.
After  all  Audi  has  said  about  the  attitude—and  given  Alston’s  and
Radcliffe’s critiques—propositional faith is in my view most naturally
construed as a complex sub-doxastic propositional attitude, which consists of
a  degreed  belief  and  a  positive  evaluative  attitude.  This  goes  against  Audi’s
view that propositional faith is non-doxastic, that is, that it does not consist of
a belief of any kind, but otherwise Audi’s view would not probably be much
challenged by this reductionist analysis. Furthermore, it may be interesting to
note that  especially  in reductionist  terms propositional  faith is  not far  from
471 Audi 2011, 93-94. Cf. Howard-Snyder 2013, 368.
472 Audi 2011, 94.
473 Cf. Audi 2011, 55-56.
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Alvin Plantinga’s view of the attitudes relevant for faith. This point calls for
some further elucidation.
According to Plantinga, faith ideally involves strong Christian belief as the
cognitive aspect of faith and the right affections as the evaluative-affectional
aspect  (see  section  2.2.).  As  I  see  it,  one  could  properly  think  of  Audi’s
propositional  faith  as  being  basically  similar  to  Plantinga’s  view,  except  the
cognitive aspect of propositional faith is comprised of a confidence-wise
weaker attitude than a strong belief. And, again, it would be tempting to say
that the attitude in question is a degreed belief. So, maybe Audi’s propositional
faith can be seen as a less than ideal instantiation of the sort of faith Plantinga
depicts—and perhaps it fits in Plantinga’s overall scheme of things, too.
With this comparison in mind, consider the following quotation from Audi:
Fiducial faith [that is, propositional faith] may be what remains when certain people
undergo a certain kind of intellectual change, especially where their confidence of
the relevant propositions diminishes. Faith has a kind of fluidity: its strength may
wax or wane with changes in such variables as emotionality, perceived evidence, or
social support. To object that if people lose confidence in certain propositions in a
way that precludes unqualified belief of the tenets of their religion, they cannot
remain  religious  is  to  exaggerate  the  importance  of  the  doxastic  side  of  religious
commitment. For people in this plight, fiducial faith may be thought to be a position
of retreat; but it is not a position of surrender. And if it does not represent an ideal
for faith, it is nonetheless a position from which ideal faith can develop.474
It  would be natural  to think that  the ideal  faith Audi refers to is  something
close to Plantinga’s view.
4.2 ALSTON ON ACCEPTANCE IN RELIGIOUS FAITH
In the previous section we saw a glimpse of how Alston conceives the notion
of acceptance, which in his view can be an appropriate propositional attitude
for religious faith. In this section I shall analyse Alston’s notion further and for
clarifying purposes compare it with certain other conceptions of acceptance.
Alston mentions that his view is mainly inspired by Jonathan Cohen’s An
Essay on Belief and Acceptance (1992), but, as he also notes, his way of putting
the issue is his own. Indeed, as I shall point out, Alston’s view diverges from
that of Cohen in important respects. Alston has stated his view in his article
“Belief, Acceptance, and Religious Faith” (1996) and reaffirmed it in “Audi on
Nondoxastic  Faith” (2007),  which is  chiefly  concerned with his  critique and
development of Audi’s view of propositional faith (see section 4.1.).
4.2.1 VOLUNTARY ACCEPTANCE AS TRUE: THE NATURE OF
ACCEPTANCE
Alston develops his notion of acceptance in reference to the notion of belief.
We have already discussed Alston’s view of belief in section 1.2.2.. Here it is
474 Audi 2011, 80. Audi’s italics.
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relevant to reiterate his list, which tells what sort of manifestations S’s
believing that p putatively entails:
(1) If  Bsp,  then  if  someone  asks  S  whether  p,  S  will  have  a  tendency  to
respond in the affirmative.
(2) If Bsp, then if S considers whether p, S will tend to feel it to be the case
that p with some degree of confidence.
(3) If Bsp, then S will tend to believe propositions that she/he takes to follow
from p.
(4) If Bsp, then S will tend to use p as a premise in theoretical and practical
reasoning where this is appropriate.
(5) If Bsp, then if S learns that not-p, S will tend to be surprised.
(6) If Bsp, then S will tend to act in certain ways that would be appropriate if
it were the case that p, given S’s goals, aversions and other beliefs.475
In Alston’s view (2) illustrates the involuntary character of belief (5 seems to
do it, too). By “feel” he seeks to convey the idea that occurrent belief possesses
“immediacy”, it is something one experiences rather than thinks out.476
As for acceptance, Alston holds that, unlike belief, it is a voluntary mental
act of adopting or having a policy towards a proposition: “to accept that p is to
‘take it on board,’ to include it in one’s repertoire of supposed facts on which
one will rely in one’s theoretical and practical reasoning and behaviour.”477 The
sort of policy adopted is in Alston’s view a dispositional state which is for the
most part similar to the one involved in believing. Alston holds that acceptance
includes mutatis mutandis each of the conditions (1)-(6) with the exception of
(2). Alston claims that lack of (2), that is, lack of feeling it to be the case, is the
central feature that distinguishes acceptance from belief.478
Since (2) is excluded from acceptance, accepting that p does not entail
believing  that  p.  What  is  more,  Alston  argues  that  one  cannot  accept  a
proposition one believes (and no doubt vice versa). He holds that there is no
point in accepting that p if one believes that p, for one who believes already
has  every  disposition  which  acceptance  would  give  her.  However,  Alston
concedes that this incompatibility may hold true only of strong, flat-out
beliefs. Beliefs of weaker strength may in his view require acceptance, since in
this case the dispositions, say, to use p in one’s reasoning and behaviour, are
weaker and may require bolstering up by acceptance.479
 In arguing that flat-out belief cannot go together with acceptance Alston is
knowingly going against Cohen’s account of acceptance. Cohen sees belief and
acceptance  as  being  compatible  with  each  other.  In  Alston’s  terms,  Cohen’s
view  is,  roughly,  that  believing  equals  nothing  more  than  (2),  whereas  his
475 Alston 1996a, 4.
476 Alston 1996a, 5.
477 Alston 1996a, 8, 11.
478 Alston 1996a, 9. I am inclined to think that if (2) goes, then (5) goes, too. But nothing of great
importance hinges on this correction, and hence we may dismiss it.
479 Alston 1996a, 10.
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version of acceptance is tantamount to (4), which I take to imply (6).480 So, for
example, if one is to use one’s belief that p in one’s practical reasoning, one
must in Cohen’s view accept that p. This means that, contrary to Alston’s view,
in  Cohen’s  account  there  is  a  considerable  overlap  between  beliefs  and
acceptances, given that persons often do use propositions they believe in their
reasoning and action. One might note that Bishop’s hold/take distinction (see
section  3.1.2.)  is  basically  the  same  as  that  of  Cohen  between  belief  and
acceptance. In Bishop’s account holding that p basically corresponds to (2) and
taking p to be true matches with (4) and (6).
To illuminate Alston’s view of acceptance further, let us consider one of his
examples  in  which  a  person  accepts  a  proposition  he  does  not  believe.  The
captain  of  the  defensive  team  is  trying  to  discover  what  play  the  opposing
quarterback  will  call.  From  previous  experience  of  playing  against  him,  it
seems to the captain most likely, but not certain, that the quarterback will call
a plunge into the middle of the line by the fullback. Accordingly, the captain
accepts that proposition and reasons from it in aligning the defence. In this
case the captain does not believe that this is the play the quarterback calls, but
he accepts it and thus proceeds on that basis.481
On  the  face  of  it,  Alston’s  example  suggests  that  acceptance  does  not
amount to much more than adopting an assumption for the sake of guiding
action. However, this is an analysis Alston disagrees with, and at this point we
come  to  the  key  difference  between  Alston’s  and  Cohen’s  accounts  of
acceptance. Unlike Cohen, Alston highlights that accepting that p involves “a
more positive attitude” toward a proposition than just making the assumption
or hypothesising that p. Alston holds that “to accept that p is to regard it as
true”, whereas “one can assume or hypothesize that p […] without taking any
stand on truth value”.482 Presumably because of this emphasis, Alston argues
that  not  any  given  proposition  can  be  accepted,  whatever  the  evidential
situation. For example, Alston holds that the defensive captain could not have
accepted  that  the  quarterback  will  take  the  ball  and  run  in  the  opposite
direction.483 The reason for this “could not” is most likely that the proposition
in question is in the captain’s view very implausible. Consequently, it seems to
me that in Alston’s view acceptance is, though voluntary, evidence-dependent:
in order to accept that p one must have some evidence for p.484 This proviso
does not apply to Cohen’s account. In his view reasons for acceptance can be
480 “First then, and very briefly, belief that p is a disposition, when one is attending to issues raised,
or items referred to, by the proposition that p, normally to feel it true that p and false that not-p, whether
or not one is willing to act, speak, or reason accordingly. But to accept the proposition or rule of
inference that p is to treat it as given that p.More precisely, to accept that p is to have or adopt a policy
of deeming, positing, or postulating that p-i.e. of including that proposition or rule among one's
premisses for deciding what to do or think in a particular context, whether or not one feels it to be true
that p.” Cohen 1992, 4. See also Cohen 1992, 8-11.
481 Alston 1996a, 10.
482 Alston 1996a, 11.
483 Alston 1996a, 11.
484 Alston leaves it unclear just how much evidence for p is needed so that one can accept that p.
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merely “ethical, professional, prudential, religious, aesthetic, or otherwise
pragmatic instead of evidential”.485
Alston argues that acceptance can take the place of belief in religious faith.
In his  view many Christians do not find themselves with such an assurance
that goes with flat-out belief that the Christian doctrines are true. While Alston
admits that these persons may less than fully believe the doctrines, he argues
that another alternative is that they accept them, which is “to perform a
voluntary act of committing oneself to them, to resolve to use them as a basis
for one’s thought, attitude, and behavior”.486 Alston also accentuates that
accepters  can  be  as  fully  involved  in  the  Christian  life  as  those  who  believe
firmly, for acceptance is not in his view a matter of make-believe, pretence, or
resolving to act as if the doctrines were true. Instead, he holds, “to accept the
doctrines is to accept them as true”.487 As we saw, Alston maintains that one
cannot  accept  a  proposition  one  takes  to  be  improbable.  This  means  that  a
person  must  presumably  have  some  evidence  for  the  truth  of  the  doctrinal
propositions  so  that  she  can  accept  them  as  true.  However,  otherwise  the
motivational grounds to accept the doctrines can probably be at least partly
pragmatic ones, as Alston appears to indicate.488
It  may  be  enlightening  to  note  that  in  our  terms  Alston’s  acceptance
actually seeks to cover two aspects of faith: the cognitive and the practical.489
On the practical side there is the detectable resolution to act on the doctrinal
propositions. On the cognitive side there is accepting the propositions as true,
which seems to be the main reason why in Alston’s view possible acceptances
are restricted by one’s evidential situation. In comparison, Cohen’s
acceptance,  if  applied  to  religious  faith,  is  best  seen  as  covering  merely  the
practical aspect of faith (cf. Bishop’s taking-to-be-true in section 3.1.2.). This
is because his acceptance does not include the Alston-type of “accept as true”
but  is  mainly  a  matter  of  adopting  a  proposition  among one’s  premises  for
deciding what to do in relevant situations.
Alston presumably departs from Cohen’s account of acceptance just
because  it  lacks  the  “accept  as  true”  condition,  making  it  thus  in  his  view
cognitively  too  weak  an  attitude  for  religious  faith.  This  is  Hamid  Vahid’s
interpretation of Alston’s motives. Vahid holds that on Cohen’s account it is
possible to accept that p while believing that not-p. So, Vahid continues, were
Alston to go with Cohen’s account, he should be prepared to allow such non-
realist  positions  as  Don  Cupitt’s  Christian  humanism  to  count  as  genuine
instances  of  faith  (on  theological  non-realism,  see  the  introduction).  But,
Vahid maintains, “this may not be congenial to Alston’s realist view of religious
faith”, and this, he holds, is perhaps the reason why Alston beefs up Cohen’s
notion of acceptance with the “accept as true” condition.490 Vahid’s
485 See e.g. Cohen 1992,  20.
486 Alston 1996a, 16-17.
487 Alston 1996a, 17-18.
488 See Alston 1996a, 17.
489 Cf. Schellenberg 2005, 144-145.
490 Vahid 2009, 28.
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interpretation is plausible given how Alston also strongly contrasts accepting
as true with make-believing, pretending, and acting as if (see above).
Alston holds that recognition of voluntary acceptance helps to resolve some
difficulties surrounding religious faith. To begin with, he maintains that
worries about “lack of faith”, when it means lack of involuntary belief, can be
alleviated by noticing that in this case volitional acceptance is an alternative.
Alston maintains that if one finds it impossible to believe that the Christian
doctrines are true, one can nonetheless accept them, provided that one takes
there to be sufficient reasons for doing so. Alston argues that acceptance can
also  explain  how religiously  relevant  merit  can  be  attached  to  the  cognitive
aspect of faith: since acceptance, unlike belief, is (directly) voluntary,
accepting  the  Christian  doctrines  can  be  meritorious.491 This,  however,  is  a
simplistic  view of  the voluntariness and meritoriousness of  Christian belief.
Swinburne, for example, argues that the will can indirectly have an influence
on our beliefs, and this is enough to make believing subject to merit or blame.
In addition, even if the cognitive aspect of faith is not voluntary, the practical
aspect can be that, and merit can be attached to exemplifying it, as Swinburne
argues (for a discussion see sections 2.1.2. and 2.1.3.; see also 3.3.).
Alston’s impression is that a significant proportion of contemporary
Christians are accepters rather than believers.492 In his view this has not been
noticed, because the term “belief” has been allowed to spread over any positive
propositional attitude. More precisely, he holds that “belief” has been used to
apply indifferently to both proper belief and acceptance.493 I  suppose  that
there is some truth in Alston’s general claim about the inflated use of “believe”,
but  it  is  not  clear  to  me  whether  his  notion  of  acceptance  picks  out  one
propositional attitude that is distinct from belief. There are some difficulties
attached to Alston’s account. These difficulties are the topic of the next section.
4.2.2 PRAGMATIC AND COGNITIVE ACCEPTANCE
In order to see the problems in Alston’s account of acceptance, we need to draw
distinctions between different types of acceptances. But before doing that, let
us  consider  another  critique  of  Alston’s  view  put  forth  by  Vahid.  His
contention is that the examples Alston offers to support belief/acceptance
distinction can be re-described in terms of degrees-of-belief without loss, and
thus acceptance is a superfluous propositional attitude. Consider the previous
case of the defensive captain. Alston argues that the captain, while not being
certain, accepts that the quarterback will call a plunge into the middle of the
line by the fullback. However, in Vahid’s view one could just as well say that
the captain believes this proposition to a certain degree and proceeds on that
491 Alston 1996a, 24-26.
492 “I have no direct statistical evidence to establish this”, says Alston and bases his conviction on
“faith stories of philosophers” in Clark 1993 and Morris 1994b. Alston holds that in these books some
philosophers’ descriptions point to the direction that they fall in the accepters’ rather than in the
believers’ group. See Alston 1996a, 18-19.
493 See Alston 1996a, 18, 20-21.
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basis.  And  the  same  point  goes  for  accepting  theological  doctrines.  Vahid’s
upshot is thus that “at least as far as Alston-type examples are concerned, no
convincing case has been made for the necessity of postulating the attitude of
acceptance”.494
Without going into details, suppose Vahid is right in claiming that Alston’s
acceptance is not necessarily required in order to explain certain behaviour
without a firm belief. To this Alston might simply reply that this was not even
his  claim.  Alston  appears  to  argue  that  people  may  in  relevant  cases  either
believe weakly or accept—both of these are real alternatives.495 So,  while
Alston’s acceptance may not be a necessary postulate, this point as such does
not count against the reality of the attitude. However, there are other reasons
to suspect the cogency of Alston’s view. Audi has claimed, contrary to Alston’s
central  assertions,  that  Alston’s  acceptance  is  not  voluntary  and  it  typically
implies belief. In order to understand Audi’s critique, we need further
distinctions between different kinds of acceptances.
Audi  holds  that  in  Alston’s  scheme  one  could  apparently  consider  a
theological  proposition,  then  accept  it,  and  thereby  enter  into  a  state  of
acceptance of the proposition that is an instance of non-doxastic faith. Audi
proposes calling the posited act behavioural acceptance and the resulting state
cognitive acceptance.496 But I suggest that we make yet a further distinction.
For  want  of  a  better  name,  the  posited  act  may  be  called  in  Audi’s  terms
behavioural acceptance (b-acceptance), which I take to be the mere
momentary voluntary act of taking a proposition aboard. However, contrary
to  Audi’s  suggestion,  the  resulting  state  is  twofold:  there  is  cognitive  and
pragmatic acceptance (c- and p-acceptance). C-acceptance stands for the
cognitive “accept as true” part of Alston’s acceptance; p-acceptance equals the
readiness to use the accepted proposition in reasoning and action.497 We can
thus  say  that  in  Alston’s  view  it  is  possible  to  enter  by  way  of  volitional  b-
acceptance into the states of c- and p-acceptance. For example, via a voluntary
act of acceptance (b-acceptance) a person may come to accept as true that a
co-worker of hers has made coffee (c-acceptance) and proceed on this basis to
the recreation room to get it (p-acceptance).
Given our definitions, Audi’s critique against Alston can be now described
as follows. To begin with, Audi seems to treat it as obvious that b-acceptance
can yield p-acceptance. He says that we can voluntarily accept a hypothesis by
forming an intention to act on it, and we can voluntarily call the hypothesis to
mind in contexts where it is pertinent to action. This outline is somewhere in
the neighbourhood of Cohen’s acceptance, and so we can say that Audi agrees
with  Cohen’s  view.  However,  though  Audi  maintains  that  b-acceptance  can
494 Vahid 2009, 23-26.
495 Alston 1996a, 17-18.
496 Audi 2011, 81.
497 Previously we noted that Alston’s acceptance, when applied to doctrinal propositions, covers both
the cognitive and the practical aspects of faith. Given the distinctions just made, one can say that c-
acceptance pertains to the cognitive aspect of faith, whereas p-acceptance has to do with the practical
aspect.
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yield  p-acceptance,  he  doubts  whether  one  can  enter  via  volitional  b-
acceptance into the state of  c-acceptance.  His ultimate claim in this  respect
seems to be that just as we cannot produce beliefs at will, we do not have direct
voluntary  power  to  produce  the  truth-valued  cognitive  attitude  of  c-
acceptance.498
Why does Audi maintain that b-acceptance cannot yield c-acceptance? The
reason for this appears to be that he sees c-acceptance as being very similar to
belief. Audi seems to argue that coming to c-accept that p either implies or is
equal  to  forming  the  belief  that  p,  and  so  c-acceptance  either  cannot  exist
without belief or reduces to belief. What is more, Audi seems to think that, like
forming a belief that p, c-accepting that p is an involuntary event. For example,
he  says,  if  you  tell  me  something  controversial  and  I  accept  what  you  say,
”accept”  here  seems  to  designate  something  like  my  not  resisting,  say,  by
asking  for  further  evidence,  and  my  cognitive  system’s  responding  in  my
forming the appropriate attitude, which in this case is normally belief.499 As a
result, in Audi’s view c-acceptance is, contrary to Alston’s claim, involuntary
and it either entails belief or reduces to belief. If c-acceptance reduces to belief,
it is not a non-doxastic but a doxastic attitude.
Vahid has argued against Alston in a way comparable to that of Audi. His
conclusion is that Alston’s acceptance or especially c-acceptance turns out to
be  a  species  of  belief:  it  is  a  truth-directed  state  very  much  like  belief  and
equally involuntary.500 In  Vahid’s  view  c-acceptance  is  clearly  a  doxastic
attitude.  In  this  respect  I  would  also  point  out  how  in  Alston’s  view  c-
acceptance is, like belief, evidence-dependent. To me Audi’s and Vahid’s
critiques  against  Alston  seem  quite  credible.  Even  if  there  is  such  a
propositional attitude as Alston’s c-acceptance that is distinct from belief, it in
any case appears to behave much like and coincide only with belief. So, it is
not  clear  whether  Alston’s  version  of  voluntary  acceptance  can  be  a  viable
substitute to belief in the cognitive aspect of faith. In the end, Alston’s notion
of  acceptance  may  be  simply  confused,  as  John  Bishop  suspects.  Bishop  is
inclined to think that Alston’s departure from Cohen’s understanding of
acceptance is a mistake.501 After Audi’s and Vahid’s critiques against Alston I
am ready to concur with Bishop’s suggestion.
4.2.3 CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION
According to Alston, as I construed his view, a person can by way of a volitional
act  of  accepting  a  proposition  (b-acceptance)  enter  into  a  twofold  state  of
accepting it as true (c-acceptance) and accepting it as a premise in one’s
reasoning  and  action  (p-acceptance).  But,  as  we  saw,  this  account  of
acceptance is problematic. The central difficulty lies in the idea of evidence-
498 Audi 2011, 81-82.
499 Audi 2011, 82.
500 Vahid 2009, 28-29.
501 Bishop 2007, 34 n. 12.
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dependent “accept as true”, that is, in the notion of c-acceptance. It does not
seem  to  be  a  voluntary  non-doxastic  attitude,  as  Alston  claims,  but  an
involuntary doxastic attitude. Or even if it is a non-doxastic attitude, it seems
to presume a doxastic attitude, namely, belief. As a result, Alston’s acceptance
does not seem to be a viable alternative to belief in religious faith.
There is, however, another rather trivial sense of “accept as true” according
to which one can voluntarily accept as true propositions, whether believed or
not. Such non-doxastic acceptance, let us name it c*-acceptance, might be
described as an embracement of a proposition merely for the sake of its truth
and  not,  say,  for  the  sake  of  its  practical  impact,  as  in  p-acceptance.  For
example, a person may c*-accept that extra-terrestrial intelligence exists even
though her evidence for this proposition is inconclusive and even though the
person does not have any inclination to use the proposition in her reasoning
and behaviour. That is, the person accepts the proposition merely for the sake
of its truth; she c*-accepts it. A notion of acceptance as true similar to this one
has been elaborated by Raimo Tuomela and Raul Hakli.502
The difference between c*-acceptance and Alston’s c-acceptance is that the
former, unlike the latter, is not evidence-dependent. One can c*-accept just
about any proposition one wants, for evidence is only a rationality requirement
for c*-acceptance.503 It follows that c*-accepting that p is compatible with
believing that not-p, and Alston wanted to exclude precisely this possibility by
his stronger notion of  acceptance (see Vahid’s  assessment in section 4.2.1.).
So, c*-acceptance is not what Alston has in mind by his c-acceptance. As such
c*-acceptance will not probably suffice for the cognitive aspect of faith. But,
for example,  for  a  person whose belief  in the doctrinal  propositions is  frail,
categorically c*-accepting the propositions can perhaps bring some stability to
her cognitive commitment.
4.3 POJMAN AND FAITH WITH HOPE
Louis Pojman has argued that for religious doubters hope may be a sufficient
substitute  for  belief  in  faith:  hope  is  enough  for  exemplifying  a  type  of
“experimental faith”. Pojman’s view has been influenced by James Muyskens’
thought, who has also defended the suitability of hope for religious faith.504 I
shall  here follow Pojman’s  account because he has explicitly  discussed hope
and faith with hope from the voluntariness viewpoint. In what follows, I will
first  survey  Pojman’s  view  on  the  phenomenology  of  hope  and  secondly
502 See Hakli 2006, 288-289; Tuomela 2000.
503 This point has been made by Hakli: ”For this kind of acceptance as true to be held rational, it
should respect the evidence available for the agent. In this sense acceptance as true is similar to belief,
but while for beliefs responsiveness to evidence is sometimes taken to be a necessary requirement, for
acceptance it is merely a rationality requirement. It is conceptually and factually possible for us to accept
a proposition not p even though we think that we have more evidence for p than against it.” Hakli 2006,
289.
504 See Pojman 1986a, 247 n. 5. See e.g. Muyskens 1974a; 1974b; 1979; 1980. See also Jordan 2006,
ch. 6.
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analyse his view of faith with hope or, as I shall eventually call it, faith with
motivational hope. At the same time I shall begin to elaborate the view of faith
with hope I prefer, namely, faith as propositional hope, which will be further
discussed in section 4.5.. Pojman’s view has not changed considerably over the
years.505 I will use as a main source his mature article “Faith, Doubt and Hope
or Does Faith Entail Belief?” (2003).
4.3.1 THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF HOPE
Pojman distinguishes several salient features of hoping, and he validates them
by means of examples. Our aim in this connection is not to give a full account
of all the possible nuances of hoping but to explicate such features of it that
are  relevant  to  the  discussion  on  faith  with  hope.506 So,  with  that  in  mind,
Pojman first of all argues that hope that p includes—as a minimum cognitive
requirement, I would add—the belief that p is possible. In Pojman’s view we
can only wish, not hope, for what we believe to be impossible. For example,
Steve may hope that the languishing Chicago Cubs won their game against the
awesome Atlanta Braves yesterday, if he does not know the score of the game
yet. But if Steve knows that the Cubs lost yesterday, he can merely wish that
they had won.
Secondly, Pojman argues that hope precludes certainty. He maintains that
it would be odd to say that “Steve knows that the Cubs won yesterday, but he
still hopes that they won”. Pojman also refers to Paul in Romans (8:24): “For
hope that is seen is not hope: for what a man sees, why does he yet hope for?”
In terms of subjective probabilities, Pojman holds that if S hopes that p, S must
deem that 0 < P(p) < 1.507 In Pojman’s view the probability one assigns to a
proposition is the degree to which that proposition is believed: 0.5 < P(p) < 1
equals some degree of positive belief that p; P(p) = 0.5 equals agnosticism; and
0 < P(p) < 0.5 equals some degree of disbelief that p, that is, belief that not-p
(see section 1.2.2.).508 Hence, Pojman’s view of the relationship between belief
and hope can be explicated as follows. Hoping that p is compatible but does
not necessarily require belief that p.509 Hoping that p is also compatible with
non-belief that p (that is, agnosticism about p). But even this is not a necessary
requirement, for hoping that p can occur with belief that not-p, too. According
to  Pojman’s  account,  Steve  may  after  probability  calculations  and  before
knowing the score believe that the Cubs lost yesterday and yet hope that they
won—on condition that he believes that the Cub’s victory is possible, of course.
505 See Pojman 1986a; 1986b; 2001; 2003.
506 For a historical and systematic analysis on hope, see Day 1991.
507 Pojman 2003, 543-544.
508 Pojman 2003, 536-537.
509 I suppose one might query the compatibility of hope and belief or certain belief, at the very least.
Something like this  might be Audi’s  suggestion.  His  view appears to be that  confidence-wise hope is
below propositional faith, which again is below firm belief (see section 4.1.1.). So, according to Audi’s
scheme, if a person has a firm belief that p, her confidence-level is such that it seems to exclude hope
that p. By  the  same  token,  Audi  would  presumably  argue  that  propositional  faith  and  hope  are  not
compatible.
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Thirdly, Pojman holds that hoping involves a desire or a pro-attitude for
the thing hoped to be true (we shall speak about a desire only).510 The object
of  the  desire  is  the  propositional  content  of  the  hope  in  question.  Fourthly,
Pojman argues that the desire involved in hoping must be motivational. If a
person hopes that p, Pojman says, in the right circumstances she will do what
she can to bring it about that p or, as I would rather say, she will do whatever
she can to make p’s occurrence more likely. For example, if Ryan hopes that
he will get an A in his difficult philosophy course, he will study hard to earn
this grade.511 Similarly, if a person hopes that she will win the lottery, she will
do  the  lotto.  This  course  of  action  will  improve  the  person’s  possibilities  of
winning (only marginally, of course), although there is nothing the person can
do to make it the case that she will, in fact, win. It should be pointed out that
not all hopes are motivational in the discussed sense, for some hopes do not
seem to arouse any significant action. There is not much Steve can do in order
to make it more likely that the Cubs actually won yesterday, but surely he can
still hope that the Cubs won their game.
Fifthly, Pojman argues that hoping, unlike believing, is typically under our
voluntary  control.  In  his  view I  may  decide  to  hope  that  the  Cubs  will  win,
whereas I cannot decide to believe this. On the other hand, Pojman says that a
person may or may not be able to give up a hope, but she is able to alter the
degree to which she hopes for something. By this Pojman appears to actually
mean that a person can decide whether and how much to invest in or pursue
her hopes.512 But this point about voluntariness of hope seems to apply only to
hopes that are motivational, that is, hopes which involve seeking to make the
thing hoped for more likely to occur. For example, Ryan may find that his hope
that he will get an A is preoccupying him to the point of distraction, and so he
may decide to study less and thus in a sense hope less. Presumably, Ryan can
also stop studying entirely, in which case it seems that he has stopped hoping
altogether (likewise,  if  a  person does not do the lotto,  she cannot be said to
hope that she will win). Then again, if Ryan decides to start studying again, it
seems that he has begun to hope again.
As  Ryan’s  example  illustrates,  hope  that  p  which  is  motivational  in  the
discussed sense seems to be constituted by seeking to make p’s occurrence
more likely by a certain action. Since the decision to act and the consequent
conduct  are  in  most  cases  voluntary,  we  can  say  that  hopes  which  are
motivational  are  largely  voluntary.  Such  hopes  can  be  labelled  simply
motivational hopes. The constitutive aspect in motivational hopes is that an
attempt  is  made  to  make  the  object  of  the  hope  more  likely  to  occur.  The
motivational hope that p thus amounts to seeking to make p’s occurrence more
probable.  A  person  cannot  be  said  to  motivationally  hope  that  p  lest  she
somehow seeks to make it more probable that p, for example, as in the above
510 This does not mean that it is not possible to hope that something is false, in which case one has a
desire that something is false.
511 Pojman 2003, 544. Cf. Day 1991, 56
512 Pojman 2003, 544-545.
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examples,  by  studying  or  by  doing  the  lotto.  Since  motivational  hope  is
constituted by action, it is by all appearances a non-doxastic attitude.
However, while motivational hopes may be voluntary, there appears to be
another kind of hope that is largely involuntary. J. L. Schellenberg apparently
has this type of hope in mind. He argues that the propositional hope that p is
a complex state consisting in belief that p is “in some respect good or at any
rate possible” and desire which is defined as being “disposed to experience a
felt attraction to it [that is, p] in suitable circumstances” (cf. Pojman’s first and
third condition). And Schellenberg maintains that both belief and desire are
involuntary.513 I  am inclined to think that  some hopes are like Schellenberg
describes,  and  I  would  give  Steve’s  hope  that  the  Cubs  won  their  game
yesterday as an example. Following Schellenberg, this kind of hope could be
labelled  propositional  hope,  since  constitutive  to  such  hope  is  a  certain
complex propositional attitude and not a certain action, as in motivational
hoping.514 Since  propositional  hope  is  typically  constituted  partly  by  a  less-
than-firm-belief, it is a sub-doxastic attitude.
There is another reason why the term “propositional hope” is appropriate
here, for this sort of hope is functionally akin to Audi’s propositional faith. The
attitudes in question are comparable: both of them involve a cognitive aspect
and a positive evaluative aspect.515 The main difference between propositional
hope and propositional faith is that the cognitive aspect of hoping is weaker
than that of propositional faith. The minimal cognitive constituent of
propositional hope that p is belief that p is possibly true, which in Audi’s view
is probably insufficient for having faith that  p.  It  is  presumably this  kind of
propositional hope Audi has in mind when he says that as a person’s strength
of doubt that p reaches a certain level, the hope that p instead of faith that p
will be her attitude (see section 4.1.1.).
Propositional hopes presumably arise, persist, and vanish in response to
broadly evidential and emotional considerations or circumstances (cf. Audi’s
view on the acquisition and sustenance of propositional faith in section 4.1.2.).
If  I  hear  that  a  dear  friend  of  mine  has  been  in  what  sounds  like  a  terrible
accident, this would quite automatically trigger in me the propositional hope
that she is alright. If I later learn that she feels well, my hope will fade, as I now
believe  happily  that  she  is  alright.  Propositional  hopes  may  promote  some
action (for example, I may want to take care of my supposedly injured friend),
but  they  are  not,  like  motivational  hopes,  constituted  by  an  action.  Unlike
motivational hopes, a propositional hope can persist even if one does not act
in accordance with it. At times there may not even be any relevant action to
do.
513 Schellenberg 2005, 142.
514 Motivational hoping is propositional, too, but the point is that the sine qua non for motivational
hoping is a certain action and not some complex propositional attitude, as in proper propositional hope.
One might point out that whereas motivational hopes are not far from volitions, propositional hopes
resemble emotions.
515 For some contrasts Audi draws between faith and hope, as he sees it, see Audi 2011, 73-74.
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Pojman has not apparently acknowledged the distinction between
motivational and propositional hopes, which, it is to be granted, may not be
clearcut.  Still,  not  recognising  the  distinction  is  probably  the  reason  why
Pojman  incorrectly  conceives  hoping  to  be  mostly  voluntary.  For  the  same
reason Schellenberg presumably mistakenly conceives hoping mostly
involuntary. But, as I argued, it is more plausible to think that motivational
hopes, which amount to seeking to make something more likely, are mainly
voluntary, whereas propositional hopes, which amount to a complex
propositional attitude, are involuntary. This rather lengthy digression into
motivational  and  propositional  hopes  is  relevant  to  the  discussion  on  faith
with hope.
Returning to Pojman’s analysis of the phenomenology of hope, he argues,
sixthly, that hoping, like wanting, is evaluative in a way that believing is not,
and  in  his  view  we  may  have  morally  unacceptable  hopes  but  not  beliefs.
Pojman’s point seems to be that since hope, unlike belief, involves a desire for
the thing hoped to be true, only hopes can be morally appraised (on the other
hand, see the discussion on the ethics of belief in section 3.3.).516 Perhaps this
is  correct  in  this  specific  sense.  For  example,  there  does  not  seem  to  be
anything morally wrong in believing that a friend will not survive her illness,
if it really looks like that on the evidence at hand. But things may be otherwise
if one propositionally and especially motivationally hopes for this outcome. If
I  motivationally  hope that  my friend will  not  survive,  I  am seeking to bring
about this state of affairs, and this is no doubt questionable conduct. On the
other hand, if I propositionally hope that my friend will not survive, this may
also be blameworthy, even though I may not be able to cease to hope this and
might even be ashamed of my hope. One might blame me for having formed
my  character  poorly  if  I  find  myself  propositionally  hoping  bad  things  to
happen to my friends.517 Incidentally, this example illustrates that in some
cases the same proposition can be both propositionally and motivationally
hoped for.
Lastly, Pojman makes a distinction between ordinary and deep hope. He
argues  that  when  a  person  is  disposed  to  risk  something  significant  on  the
possibility of the proposition hoped to be true, she has deep or profound hope.
When the risk involves something of enormous value, Pojman says, it may be
called desperate hope. Pojman’s example of deep hope is a person betting her
last  few  dollars  on  an  unlikely  winning  horse  in  order  to  get  the  required
money  for  important  later  use.  Such  a  person,  Pojman holds,  trusts  in  and
commits herself to the horse in question; in Pojman’s view the person has a
deep hope that the horse will win.518 However, given the distinction between
motivational and propositional hopes, I would analyse this example more
explicitly  as  follows.  Firstly,  by  betting  on  the  horse  the  person  has  the
motivational  hope  that  she  will  get  the  required  money.  This  is  the  desired
516 Pojman 2003, 545. Cf. Day 1991, 76-77.
517 Cf. Day 1991, 77.
518 Pojman 2003, 545.
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state  of  affairs  the  person  is  seeking  to  make  more  probable  by  the  bet.
Secondly, the person most likely has a propositional deep hope that the horse
will  win,  which  is  aroused  by  the  monetary  investment  and  the  overall
situation.
In sum, Pojman argues that hoping that p includes at least the belief that p
is possible and precludes certainty about p’s truth. In addition, in Pojman’s
view hoping involves a desire for the thing hoped to be true,  and the desire
must be motivational—when it can be that, one must add. While Pojman also
holds that hoping is largely voluntary, I argued that only motivational hopes,
which are largely constituted by doing a certain action, are best seen as such.
Propositional hopes, which are complex propositional attitudes, are not
usually voluntary. Still further, Pojman maintains that hoping can be morally
evaluated in a way that believing cannot, and it can be ordinary, deep, or even
desperate.
4.3.2 FAITH WITH MOTIVATIONAL HOPE
How does hope function as regards religious faith? The way Pojman sees faith
with hope taking place can be described succinctly in the following way. First
of all, in Pojman’s view a religious doubter must conceive of God’s existence
and life after death from a desiderative viewpoint as something delightful and
their alternative, that is, no God and no life after death, as not very welcoming.
Secondly,  according  to  Pojman,  the  doubter  must  hold  that  “there  is  just
enough evidence to whet his or her appetite, to inspire hope, a decision to live
according to theism or Christianity as an experimental hypothesis,  but not
enough evidence to cause belief”.519 Pojman maintains that having faith is, in
essence, a commitment to something, say, a person, hypothesis, or religion. 520
Consequently, if the religious doubter decides to commit herself to Christianity
by means of living according to it, she has in Pojman’s view decided to have
faith with hope.
Pojman  has  compared  the  decision  to  have  faith  with  hope  to  that  of
choosing  a  live  hypothesis  in  William James’s  sense  (see  the  introduction).
Pojman holds that  James is  right when he says that  the relevant hypothesis
must  be  a  psychologically  live  hypothesis.  But  where  Pojman  differs  from
James—or his construal of James—is that in his view it is not “necessary to get
oneself to believe that the hypothesis is true in order to choose it in a profound
way”.521 For  in  Pojman’s  view  choosing  and  adequately  living  by  a  live
hypothesis is realisable with hope. I find Pojman’s reconstruction of James in
outline  appropriate  (cf.  the  appraisal  of  Bishop’s  model  of  faith  in  section
3.1.3.). But his account of faith with hope requires further elucidation. I have
two remarks.
519 Pojman 2003, 547. My emphasis.
520 Pojman 2003, 537.
521 Pojman 1986a, 228-229.
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Firstly, Pojman clearly implies that hoping begins when a doubter decides
to commit herself to Christianity and live according to it (see the quotation
above). This indicates that for Pojman of chief importance as regards having
faith is motivational hope, since such hoping is constituted by action. But what
is the doubter motivationally hoping for here? Pojman is not explicit in this
respect,  but I  assume that the content of  the doubter’s  hope is  that  she will
achieve  the  goals  possibly  attained  by  the  commitment  to  Christianity  (say,
salvation).  The doubter holds that  by the commitment she will  improve her
chances of attaining the goals, although there is clearly nothing she can do in
order to make it the case that she, in fact, achieves them, for that will depend
on whether the goals are real and there to be had.
My second comment on Pojman’s view has to do with the precondition for
being in a situation to decide to have Pojmanian faith with motivational hope.
As the comparison with James reveals, Pojman maintains that a prerequisite
for  choosing  faith  with  motivational  hope  is  that  one  must  conceive  of
Christianity as a live hypothesis. For Pojman this appears to mean something
like  that  Christianity’s  truth  must  be  believed  to  be  a  real  possibility  and
something  that  is  desirable.  But  this,  I  would  say,  is  simply  identical  to  the
propositional hope that Christianity is true. So, it seems that in order to have
Pojmanian faith with motivational hope one must already propositionally
hope that Christianity is true. It is actually this hope that appears to take the
place of firm belief in Pojman’s account of faith.522  Pojman seems to hold that
the motivational hope can be deep or even desperate, when conjoined with the
relevant propositional hope.523
In our terminology, Pojmanian faith with motivational hope seems to entail
three aspects of faith: the cognitive, the evaluative-affective, and the practical.
I would explicate this as follows. The cognitive and evaluative-affective aspects
of  Pojman’s  view comprises the propositional  hope that  Christianity is  true,
since  propositional  hope  is  both  a  cognitive  and  an  evaluative-affective
attitude. The practical aspect of Pojman’s view consists of the motivational
hope that one will attain the goals Christianity offers, since this hope equals a
practical  commitment to Christianity by which a person seeks the goals  she
desires to achieve.  The practical  aspect  is  central  in Pojman’s  view: without
exemplifying  it  one  does  not  have  faith.  So,  in  Pojman’s  scheme  faith
predominantly  calls  for  the  action-oriented  motivational  hope;  mere
propositional hope does not suffice for having faith. This is why I call Pojman’s
view faith with motivational hope.
522 It may be instructive to note that the case at hand is structurally quite similar to the one where a
person bets on a horse in order to improve her possibilities of getting the needed money (see the previous
section). In an analogous way, the religious doubter bets on Christianity via the commitment in order to
improve her possibilities of gaining, say, life after death.
523 Cf. Pojman 2003, 547. It is perhaps interesting to remark that while the motivational hope that
one will attain, say, salvation does not seem to require the firm belief that Christianity is true (since
propositional hope suffices), it is compatible with such belief. For example, a person may firmly believe
that Christianity is true but that her attaining the goals it offers is very unlikely. If such a person seeks,
say, salvation, she would merely motivationally hope that she will attain it.
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I  argued  previously  that  motivational  hope  is  voluntary  whereas
propositional hope is not. It follows that in Pojman’s account only the practical
aspect  of  faith  is  voluntary.  In  Jamesian  terms,  one  does  not  choose  to  see
Christianity as a live hypothesis worthy of commitment, but it appears to one
as such presumably on broadly evidential and emotional/passional grounds.
Still, whether one makes the commitment is a voluntary choice, and as long as
a person volitionally commits herself to Christianity, she is exemplifying
Pojmanian faith with motivational hope.524 If  the  person  ends  the
commitment, she does not hope in the required way, and so she does not have
faith anymore.
Pojman’s  view of  faith  is  readily  compared  with  Swinburne’s  Pragmatist
view  of  faith  (see  section  2.1.3.).  Like  Pojman,  Swinburne  highlights  the
importance of the practical aspect of faith, as in his view having faith basically
amounts to seeking certain goals  by committing oneself  to Christianity.  But
whereas  Swinburne  claims  that  the  minimal  cognitive  requirement  for  this
commitment is  a  weak belief,  that  is,  the belief  that  Christian creed is  more
probably true than any relevant rival creed, in Pojman’s account propositional
hope suffices. Consequently, as compared to Swinburne, Pojman demands less
in  the  way  of  belief-that  and  allows  more  room  for  a  person’s  evaluative-
affective preferences in choosing to have faith.
According to Pojman, not just agnosticism but even an “interested type of
atheism” is a possible religious position.525 In  Pojman’s  view  a  person  can
believe that Christianity is not true and yet have faith with hope (cf. Pojman’s
view on the relationship between hope and belief in section 4.3.1.). But in this
case one might ask how this sort of faith with disbelief differs from such in the
theists’  view inadequate  non-realist  accounts  of  faith  in  which  the  object  of
faith is conceived blatantly as non-existent (see e.g. Le Poidevin’s account in
section 1.1.3.). Pojman does not seem to have really thought about this issue,526
but I suppose that some differences can be detected.
An  important  dissimilarity  is  that,  unlike  the  non-realist  in  question,  a
disbelieving hoper is not indifferent to the truth of the subject matter in the
sense that for her much clearly hinges on whether the things hoped for are true
or  there  to  be  had,  whereas  the  non-realist  has  no  such  concerns  (cf.  the
linguistic interpretation of theological realism in the introduction). I would
also say that the non-realist’s and the hoper’s religious behaviour diverge from
each other. Consider worshipping, for example. A straightforward non-realist
(again, see Le Poidevin’s account in section 1.1.3.) presumably make-believes
that there is a God and then addresses this postulated fictional being and acts
524 Cf. Pojman 2003, 546.
525 Pojman 1986a, 230.
526 Consider  the  following,  for  example:  “Genuinely  living  as  if  must  be  distinguished  from
pretending. You can pretend and act as though you love your neigbors, for you may believe that it is good
policy to give this impression; but in genuinely profound hope the intentional state is different from that
of pretending.” Pojman 1986a, 225. But this just invites the question how are the intentional states
different, and Pojman seems to leave this unanswered.
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as if such a being existed.527 The hoper, on the other hand, is seeking for a real
being. Her prayer is, as one might say, world-directed. The hoper cries or calls
out for what she thinks of not as a posited fiction but as a real being whose
existence she disbelieves but nonetheless conceives as a possibility.
Analogically, a person may find himself lost in the woods, think it is only a slim
possibility that she is mistaken in her belief that she is alone, and yet cry out
for a helper and instructions.
Though faith with hope may be compatible with disbelief, Richard Gale and
Alexander Pruss have argued that having such faith is morally wrong from the
viewpoint of the hoper. Their central argument can be put as follows. Gale and
Pruss hold that it cannot be denied that at times there is a conflict between
Christian and non-Christian ethics—the latter presumably means some
general secular ethics. Their example of such a conflict is whether abortion is
permissible. On the supposition that for the hoper the principles of non-
Christian ethics are more credible than Christian ones, it seems plausible to
argue that  in a case of  conflict  the hoper ought to follow secular principles;
following Christian principles in this case amounts to acting immorally from
the hoper’s point of view. But, Gale and Pruss argue, if a person has faith with
hope,  she  is  categorically  committed  to  acting  in  accordance  with  Christian
principles, and so she is from her viewpoint occasionally committed to acting
immorally.528
Gale and Pruss also remark that as an evidentialist Pojman argues that
acting on evidentially unjustified beliefs is normally a bad thing, since it can
do damage to oneself and others. To take Pojman’s example, he holds that “if
I want to live a long life and believe that living on alcohol and poison ivy will
enable me to do that, I will not attain my desire”.529 But this claim, Gale and
Pruss point out, seems to just as much condemn having faith with hope, since
it entails acting on propositions that lack evidential justification.530 Evidently,
it  does not matter whether a person believes or merely hopes that  living on
alcohol  and  poison  ivy  will  enable  her  to  live  a  long  life,  for  the  negative
consequences are the same in both cases if the person acts on the proposition
in question.
Some general critique along the lines of Gale and Pruss may be adequate.
For  Pojman  having  faith  appears  to  amount  to  a  robust  commitment  to
Christianity,531 and  one  might  ask  whether  such  practical  commitment  is
reasonable or justified with mere hope.  Then again,  one might query Gale’s
and Pruss’s supposition that Christian ethics can at times demand something
that is incompatible with secular ethics. It is also debatable whether acting on
propositions that lack evidential justification is always a bad thing, since some
such actions may be harmless and prudentially worthwhile. So, one could try
527 I am not implying that all non-realists argue in this way, which may even look like a caricature
characterisation of theological non-realism.
528 Gale and Pruss 2003, lii. For further discussion, see Pruss 2002; Himma 2006.
529 Pojman 2003, 541.
530 Gale and Pruss 2003, liii.
531 See e.g. Pojman 2003, 537.
Faith without Belief
132
to argue against Gale and Pruss that having Pojmanian faith with motivational
hope is not harmful to anyone and that it can yield some benefits which are
otherwise unattainable (cf. the re-evaluation of the role of pragmatic
arguments in section 3.3.).
4.3.3 FAITH AS PROPOSITIONAL HOPE—AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW
Whether or not Pojman’s account can meet the challenges put forward by Gale
and Pruss,  I  would  suggest  that  there  is  another  way  to  conceive  faith  with
hope, which may more easily accommodate the critique. In brief, whereas
Pojman in his account of faith highlights motivational hope over propositional
hope,  I  would  reverse  the  emphasis:  there  can  be  a  sort  of  faith  with  hope
where the propositional hope that Christianity is true is the central aspect and
the  motivational  goal-seeking  hope  recedes  into  the  background.  I  shall
describe  this  view  of  faith  as  propositional  hope  in  section  4.5.,  but  it  is
relevant to say something about it at present, too.
Faith as propositional hope is, I think, suitably compared with Plantinga’s
A/C model of faith. In Plantinga’s view having faith ideally involves a strong
belief as the cognitive aspect of faith and the right affections, say, finding the
believed propositions attractive, as the evaluative-affective aspect of faith (see
section  2.2.).  But  could  not  the  sub-doxastic  propositional  hope  that
Christianity is true be seen as the weakest possible instantiation of this kind of
faith? For there is at least the “belief that possibly” in the cognitive aspect of
faith, and there is a suitable evaluative-affective aspect, namely, the desire that
the  things  hoped  for  are  true.  And  no  doubt  the  hoper  also  has  other
appropriate evaluative-affective tendencies, like longing for God.
What is more, in Plantinga’s A/C model the practical aspect of faith is de-
emphasised: it does not count as the focal aspect of faith but as acting out one’s
faith. I would argue similarly with regard to faith as propositional hope. The
actions a person’s religious propositional hope prompts are not, as in Pojman’s
account,  constitutive  to  the  faith  in  question  but  count  as  acting  it  out.  In
addition, I would argue that the actions should be tentative and overridable so
that  Gale’s  and  Pruss’s  critique  (if  successful)  is  avoided:  the  propositional
hoper should never act in a way that is from her viewpoint immoral. In short,
faith  as  propositional  hope  amounts  to  volitionally  allowing  what  one
involuntarily propositionally hopes to have a moderate impact in both one’s
cognitive and practical life. The strength of the impact should correspond to
the conceived evidential strength of the propositional content of the hope.
Faith as propositional hope is no doubt qualified, but I cannot see why it could
not be one type of faith nonetheless.
According to Plantinga’s theological views, a person’s faith is produced by
the promptings of the Holy Spirit. Plantinga admits that for whatever reason
the deliverances of the Holy Spirit come in different degrees and so faith has
less than ideal instantiations. Given this proviso and the similarities between
Plantinga’s A/C model and the view of faith as propositional hope, one might
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wonder whether Plantinga would be willing to grant that those who have faith
as propositional hope have been to some extent instigated by the Holy Spirit.
This would anyway fit with the traditional Christian view according to which
hope is one of the theological virtues that results from the supernatural grace
of God.
Then again, it must be conceded that the traditional Christian view about
the virtue of hope is narrower in propositional content than the one presented
here.  For example,  for  Aquinas,  as  J.  P.  Day describes it,  the content of  the
virtue  of  hope  is  just  that  one  will  attain  eternal  happiness  in  the  form  of
communion  with  God.  According  to  Day,  Aquinas  held  that  this  hope  for
salvation is rational, since it is backed up by a firm belief that there is a God
who grants salvation.532 However,  according  to  the  view  of  faith  as
propositional hope I have been sketching out, the propositions Aquinas take
to be firmly believed are also hoped to be true. But perhaps this can mean that
the effect of the virtue of hope in a person expands to a wider propositional
content.533
4.4 SCHELLENBERG’S IMAGINATION-BASED VIEW OF
FAITH
J. L. Schellenberg has argued that scepticism is in our times the right stance
towards  religious  propositions.  However,  he  does  not  take  this  to  mean the
end  of  rational  religion,  but  a  condition  for  a  new  understanding  of  it.
Schellenberg’s claim is that a positive justification can be rendered to a kind of
non-doxastic imagination-based but still realist view of faith. The
propositional content of the faith should in his view be conceived as ultimism,
which he defines as the claim that there is a metaphysically and axiologically
ultimate reality, in relation to which ultimate good can be attained.534
Schellenberg has written a trilogy on his view of religion. Here I shall mainly
make use of the first book of the trilogy, the Prolegomena to a Philosophy of
532 Day 1991, 23-25.
533 Jordan’s remark on Christian hope may still be worth considering. His view appears to be in line
with Aquinas’ understanding. After reviewing Emil Brunner’s account of the theological virtues of faith,
hope, and love, Jordan goes on to claim that Christian hope might be best characterised as a confident
“eschatological expectation of eternal life and providence”. In his view the expectation is confident, since
one acts on one’s hope. The expectation is also assured, Jordan claims. In his view this assurance need
not be based on one’s assessment of probabilities, but rather on one’s Christian commitment. Jordan
holds that it is important to note that Christian hope entails belief in certain theological propositions.
He  argues  as  follows:  “One  hopes  in  the  Christian  sense  only  if  one  believes  in  God.  And,  as  many
philosophers and theologians have pointed out, ‘belief in’ presupposes ‘belief that’. One can trust
someone only if one believes certain things about the person trusted. While hope as such does not entail
belief,  Christian hope does seem to entail  belief.”  Jordan 2006,  197-198.  See Brunner 1956.  Jordan’s
reasoning may not be wholly clear, but his conclusion is: Christian hope is confident and (thus) entails
belief.  In response one might say that  Christian hope can function in the way Jordan described,  but
otherwise he seems to just beg the question against those who seek to argue that Christian hope can also
be a certainty-wise faltering attitude and occur without belief.
534 See e.g. Schellenberg 2009, 1.
Faith without Belief
134
Religion (2005). It is in this book where Schellenberg introduces his account
of faith which we are mainly interested in.535
Schellenberg does not conceive the propositional content of faith in theistic
terms, and so in this sense he is not a theistic philosopher. However, he clearly
argues within the analytic theistic tradition and converses with theistic
philosophers. His view of faith is also interesting as such and diverges from
the views surveyed thus far especially as regards the cognitive aspect of faith.
In addition, Schellenberg explicitly discusses the voluntariness of faith in his
account and emphasises this issue. These points together make his account of
faith worth considering in this study. And, as our discussion on the nature of
faith is  fairly  formal,  it  is  not impossible to apply Schellenberg’s  insights to
Christianity  or  theism,  if  that  is  seen  as  appropriate.  I  shall  in  any  case
illustrate  Schellenberg’s  view  of  faith  in  theistic  terms—he  does  that
frequently, too.
As  pointed  out,  Schellenberg  highlights  voluntariness  of  faith.  More
precisely, he claims that faith must be understood as something that is directly
voluntary.  In  his  view  it  is  not  that  we  can  over  time  have  an  influence  on
whether we have faith, but that we can have faith right now by an act of will
and that without will’s exertion faith will be lost.536 According to Schellenberg,
this view of the voluntariness of faith is well supported by institutional
deliberations, theoretical discussions in the philosophy of religion, and in
ordinary religious parlance. For example, he says, Christian theologians and
church councils have declared that faith is voluntary; theologians have often
spoken of faith as meritorious, which seems to entail that it must be voluntary;
and religious people warn the faithful against the loss of faith, thus implying
that faith is voluntary.537 Schellenberg’s  view of  the voluntariness of  faith is
very straightforward (for more subtle views see section 2.1.2.). But whatever
one thinks about his emphasis, it anyway has a visible impact on his account
of faith.
The basis  of  Schellenberg’s  view of  faith is  the distinction between “faith
that” and “faith in”. He has labelled these attitudes propositional and
operational faith respectively. Schellenberg holds that propositional faith
involves a kind of voluntary, positive, and assenting attitude toward religious
propositions (his elaboration of propositional faith clearly diverges from that
of Audi). On the other hand, operational faith in Schellenberg’s view is more
than a positive propositional attitude in being a sort of positive response to the
relevant propositions. Schellenberg holds that operational faith is a matter of
trust  in  its  Swinburnean  action-focused  sense  (see  section  2.1.2.).538 In  our
terms, operational faith pertains to the practical aspect of faith, whereas
535 The other books are Schellenberg 2007; 2009. See also Schellenberg 2013b.
536 More precisely, Schellenberg takes three clauses to capture the voluntariness of faith. First is the
accessibility clause: anyone who seeks to have faith can have it. Second is the terminability clause: faith
can be terminated by those who no longer wish to have it. Third is the vulnerability clause: faith will be
lost in the absence of sustaining activity. Schellenberg 2005, 147.
537 Schellenberg 2005, 148-149.
538 Schellenberg 2005, 108-109.
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propositional  faith  concerns  the  cognitive  aspect  of  it.  I  will  analyse
operational faith first, where Schellenberg, though following Swinburne, has
some  novel  remarks  to  make.  His  original  ideas,  however,  concern  the
cognitive aspect of faith, which will be discussed secondly.
4.4.1 OPERATIONAL FAITH AND THE NATURE OF TRUST
Since Schellenberg advances Swinburne’s notion of trust, it is appropriate to
reiterate it here. So, according to Swinburne, trusting a person is to act on the
assumption that she will do for you what she knows that you want, when the
evidence gives some reason for supposing otherwise and bad consequences
follow if the assumption is false. For example, Swinburne holds, I may trust a
friend by lending her a valuable item when she has previously proved to be
careless with valuables (one might ask, though, why I should trust her). In this
case, Swinburne holds, I act on the assumption that she will do what she knows
I want (treat the valuable with care), when evidence (previous experience)
indicates that she will not, and bad consequences follow if she does not (the
valuable gets damaged).539
Schellenberg concurs with Swinburne’s action-emphasising definition of
trust.  According  to  him,  ordinary  language  links  trust  to  vulnerability,  and
there would be no vulnerability or bad consequences if the person who trusts
were not disposed to act on her attitude relevant to trust. To illuminate with
the  previous  example,  in  Schellenberg’s  view  I  do  not  trust  my  friend  (as
regards  lending  the  valuable)  if  I  do  not  lend  her  the  valuable  when  the
situation calls for it. Schellenberg argues that for me to merely assume that the
friend will treat the valuable with care is not enough. That is only to assume
that the friend is trustworthy; it is not yet to trust her.540
Schellenberg argues that the same points go for religious trust, which he
illustrates with trust in God. According to him, a person may assume that God
will be and do for her what she wants or needs, but if she is never disposed to
act  on  this  assumption,  she  is  not  trusting  God.  Consequently,  trust  in
Schellenberg’s view involves an action disposition, which emerges in response
to the content of the relevant proposition or propositions. He argues that in
the  religious  case  the  proposition  concerns  God’s  good  will  toward  the
individual in question, and in response the individual “puts her life into God’s
hands, deliberately conducting herself in the manner she sees as appropriate
to the truth of that proposition”.541
Schellenberg notes that Terence Penelhum has criticised Swinburne’s
account  of  trust  for  overemphasising  action.  As  Schellenberg  interprets  it,
Penelhum suggests that Swinburnean trust is to be called explicit trust, and it
should be contrasted with implicit  trust,  which is  a  matter of  feeling serene
and free from anxiety rather than a matter of action disposition. In Penelhum’s
539 Swinburne 2005, 143.
540 Schellenberg 2005, 110.
541 Schellenberg 2005, 111.
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view it is this latter sort of trust that is ideal for faith.542 Schellenberg is critical
towards Penelhum’s view. He argues that accentuating a sort of trust that is
constituted by emotion alone is hard to maintain consistently. In his view it is
clearly correct to assimilate trust to an action disposition—he notes that even
Penelhum has a tendency to link implicit trust to action. To utilise the previous
example, Schellenberg maintains that I may feel serene about how my friend
will handle the valuable, but if I do not actually lend the valuable to her when
she asks for it, the friend has a good reason to doubt that I trust her in this
respect. So, according to Schellenberg, Penelhum’s distinction between
explicit and implicit trust is inadequate, and so the latter cannot be ideal for
faith.543
Despite his critique, Schellenberg takes advantage of the notions of explicit
and implicit trust to illuminate another point about trust which is not entirely
distinct from that of Penelhum. In brief, Schellenberg maintains that the
distinction can refer to how easy or hard it is to do the actions relevant to one’s
trust. To begin with, Schellenberg stresses that to trust someone is, strictly
speaking, not to act in the relevant manner but being disposed to do so. It is
not necessary for A now to act toward B in the relevant way in order for A to
trust B, for the requirement is only that A is disposed to perform the relevant
actions in the appropriate circumstances. Given this, Schellenberg argues that
it  is  possible  for  A  to  be  naturally  disposed  to  perform the  actions,  without
hesitation  or  distress,  and  without  even  conscious  reflection  on  the
propositions involved. In this case, Schellenberg holds, it is appropriate to say
that  A  trusts  B  implicitly,  and,  in  addition,  the  disposition  in  question  is  a
strong one.544 For example,  if  I  always lend my valuables to my friend with
ease and quite automatically when she asks for them, I trust her implicitly as
regards lending the valuables, at least.
Then again, Schellenberg maintains that occasionally one’s intention to act,
if realised, activates the disposition which constitutes trust. Schellenberg
argues that here one is consciously reflecting on what one is doing, most likely
because trusting is  difficult  in this  case.  This,  Schellenberg holds,  should be
labelled explicit trust. This sort of trust can in his view be, though difficult,
strong and unwavering, but it can also be weak, which is the case if, say, the
trusting disposition occasionally fails to instantiate.545 For example, I may find
lending my valuables to my friend a difficult task, because she has proved to
be careless with them. But if I nonetheless lend the valuables to her each time
when she asks for them, my trust in her is explicit and strong. However, if I
only rarely lend her the valuables, my trust is explicit and weak. And if I never
542 Penelhum 1995, 72-74; Schellenberg 2005, 111. See also Penelhum 1995, 68.
543 Schellenberg 2005, 112-113. For some further discussion, see Penelhum 2013, 251; Schellenberg
2013a, 281-282.
544 Schellenberg 2005, 115.
545 Schellenberg 2005, 115.
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lend  the  valuables  to  her,  I  do  not  trust  her  at  all  as  regards  lending  the
valuables.546
Schellenberg holds that similar distinctions can be drawn with respect to
trust  in  God:  “This  trust  may  be  reflective  or  unreflective,  conscious  or
unconscious,  troubled  or  relatively  untroubled,  difficult  or  easy,  implicit  or
explicit.”547 But given Schellenberg’s definitions, one might restore the critique
Penelhum made at the outset: instead of explicit trust in God, trust of the
implicit sort in conjunction with serenity is ideal for faith.548 Schellenberg
disagrees,  however.  Though  he  maintains  that  having  faith  involves  trust,
serenity is not in his view ideal for faith. He holds that serenity is, instead, the
goal of religious faith: “one who attains serenity (or at least complete serenity)
seems to have arrived at its [that is, faith’s] destination.”549
What is more, according to Schellenberg, the claim that serenity is not ideal
for faith is in line with the view that faith is voluntary. For if faith is voluntary,
Schellenberg reasons, it is something pretty much anyone can exemplify. But
in  his  view  serenity  is  not  like  that:  it  is  not  something  almost  anyone  can
achieve just by trying to. In addition, Schellenberg holds that if an emotional
aspect consisting of serenity or freedom of anxiety were essential to having
faith, then whether one has faith depends partly on the type of personality one
possesses, as some personality types are more given to anxiety than others.
But,  Schellenberg  argues,  “the  idea  that  faith  is  in  any  way  dependent  on
involuntarily acquired tendencies of the sort we use the label ‘personality’ to
cover […] is highly counterintuitive”.550 Still, Schellenberg does not deny that
various positive emotions are often possessed by persons who have faith, but
in his  view such emotions are not entailed by having faith.  For example,  he
says, a person may decide to have faith in order to generate eventually, say,
546 A person’s implicit trust can presumably turn into explicit trust (or even mistrust) due to setbacks
just as one’s explicit trust can eventually develop into implicit trust, if the object of trust is found out to
be trustworthy in the course of time. To take an example of the former situation, Schellenberg holds that
a mother may lose her implicit trust in her daughter because of her unexpected bad behaviour. If the
mother says of the daughter that “she betrayed my trust, I cannot trust her anymore”, this in
Schellenberg’s view means that the mother cannot trust the daughter in the way she did before, but it
does  not  mean  that  she  cannot  trust  her  at  all  anymore.  For  the  mother  still  can,  if  she  so  chooses,
explicitly trust the daughter. Schellenberg 2005, 118. Cf. Penelhum 1995, 73-74.
547 Schellenberg 2005, 115.
548 Penelhum might agree with this re-evaluation. In his later comments on implicit trust, he argues
as follows in reference to Mark 10, where Jesus says that the kingdom of God belongs to little children:
“I inferred that children manifest what I called implicit trust, a state of mind in which, I think the text
implies, they have innocently never raised any question about what Jesus is teaching them [the children
are “serene”], and I supposed Mark’s Jesus commended this as a model of how the ideally faithful adult
should be in these matters. I am not interested in rearguing this. I am, however, concerned to note that
the childlike acceptance (a clear form of innocence) that Jesus blesses is commonly thought of by his
followers as an ideal against which other kinds of faith are to be measured. It is clearly not to be thought
of as a choice taken by the children in the face of alternatives [as it would likely be in the case of explicit
trust].” Penelhum 2013, 250.
549 Schellenberg 2005, 119.
550 Schellenberg 2005, 120. Plantinga might retort that there is nothing counterintuitive in saying
that an emotional aspect is essential to having faith, for whether you have such faith depends not on your
personality quirks, as Schellenberg supposes, but on whether you have been affected by the Holy Spirit.
For Schellenberg the cause of the supposed emotional aspect of faith is natural, namely, the person’s
personality, whereas for Plantinga the cause of that aspect is supernatural, namely, the Holy Spirit. See
section 2.2..
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emotional  love  of  God.  This  example  apparently  illuminates  that  this
emotional aspect is not necessarily linked to having faith.
In  sum,  for  Schellenberg  the  practical  aspect  of  faith,  which  he  labels
operational faith, consists of voluntary trust in the relevant object. At heart,
trusting in his  view simply amounts to “a disposition to act religiously: [it]
may  be  said  to  be  defined  by  the  extent  of  one’s  religious  actions  and
dispositions to perform them”.551 Schellenberg maintains that trusting can be
easy or hard and more or less reflected, but as long as one decisively does the
actions one’s trust calls for, one’s trust is strong. Trusting may be accompanied
by different emotions, but in Schellenberg’s view they are not constitutive to
trust. Nor does he see any emotion as a necessary aspect of faith, since in his
view faith must be voluntary, and emotions are not that generally.
4.4.2 PROPOSITIONAL FAITH AS A VOLUNTARY IMAGINATION-
BASED ATTITUDE
When  one  trusts  or  simply  acts  religiously,  one  does  that  via  having  some
propositional  attitude  towards  the  proposition  on  which  one  acts.  In  other
words, exemplifying the practical aspect of faith presupposes that one has
some  suitable  propositional  attitude  in  the  cognitive  aspect  of  faith.  One
possible attitude here is, as Schellenberg says, “unquestioned belief”, which
presumably often yields strong implicit trust.552 On the other hand,
Swinburne, for example, holds that the minimal requirement for trusting God
is weak belief (see section 2.1.3.), whereas Pojman would no doubt argue that
propositional hope suffices (see section 4.3.2.). These propositional attitudes
presumably yield trust of the explicit sort. Schellenberg’s view is in line with
these suggestions. He holds that trust can be exemplified with what he calls
propositional faith, which he takes to be, among other things, distinct from
hope, incompatible with firm belief, and voluntary.553
Schellenberg illuminates the nature of propositional faith with examples
where a person moves from a faithless state of mind to having faith that p. So,
suppose  B  has  assured  to  A  that  she  will  remember  to  complete  a  certain
important task. A is aware that B has forgotten this sort of thing before. So,
given her evidence, A does not really believe that B will do the task, though she
does  not  quite  disbelieve  it  either.  After  hours  of  worries,  A  notes  that  this
unease wastes her mental energy and that she should go with the idea that B
will  complete  the  task.  Hence,  A  imagines  that  B  is  preparing  the  task
successfully,  just  as  B  promised.  Focusing  on  this  picture  and  affirming  to
herself  as  often as is  needed that  B will  complete the task,  A,  while still  not
believing, has moved to a new mental state where her worries dissipate and
551 Schellenberg 2005, 124-125.
552 Schellenberg 2005, 126.
553 Schellenberg 2005, 126-127, 142.
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she is able to get on with other tasks. Schellenberg argues that A has in this
case chosen to have faith that B will complete the task.554
In the above example propositional faith represents a rather short-term
response to an exigency, but Schellenberg notes that the attitude can be a more
ongoing  disposition,  too.  His  example  is  a  cynical  person  who has  low self-
esteem and believes that the world is overall a bad place but then decides to
use her imagination to see the world in more optimistic  terms.  In this  case,
Schellenberg holds, the pessimistic person has chosen to have faith that she is
really okay and that human nature is basically good.555 Schellenberg points out
that in certain similar examples one might not find faith but, say, acting-as-if
or hope, but his conviction is that one might equally find the sort of faith he
seeks  to  illustrate.  So,  according  to  him,  there  is  a  need  to  “expand  our
conceptual repertoire”.556
In more precise terms, Schellenberg maintains that propositional faith
involves four elements which are discernible in the above examples, too. So,
first of all, Schellenberg holds that faith that p is adopted when the evidence is
insufficient to cause belief that p—in his view faith that p is even incompatible
with belief that p. Secondly, in reference to Alston, Schellenberg argues that a
person who has faith that p must think that p is in some way a good thing (cf.
Audi’s positive evaluative attitude in section 4.1.1.).557 This  aspect  of
propositional faith Schellenberg labels a favourable evaluation.558
Thirdly, Schellenberg argues that having faith that p is to purposely picture
the world according to p. In his view, having propositional faith is to represent
the  world,  through  the  power  of  will  and  imagination,  as  having  a  certain
specific character. Schellenberg maintains that this illustrates one difference
between propositional faith and belief. The point is, in brief, that with faith
one  is  consciously  and  deliberately  representing  the  world  in  a  certain  way
(which, one should note, can turn out to be the accurate way to represent it),
whereas in the experience of belief, as Schellenberg puts it, “the world is
showing or presenting itself to  me.”  Schellenberg  also  holds  that  in
propositional faith it may be hard to sustain the representation, but in belief
such a difficulty does not arise, since the representation is not voluntarily
produced.559
Fourthly, Schellenberg holds that faith that p involves a volitional policy of
assenting to p: it is deliberately to go along with p as opposed to questioning,
criticising, or ignoring it. The assent is to actively prefer p over its denial; it is
a  resolution  to  think  of  p  as  true.  In  Schellenberg’s  view  the  proposition
assented to exert a certain intellectual influence, and propositions
554 Schellenberg 2005, 130.
555 Schellenberg 2005, 131.
556 Schellenberg 2005, 132 n. 2.
557 See Alston 1996a, 12.
558 Schellenberg distinguishes this favourable evaluation from desire, as in his view the former does
not entail the latter. His example of such a case is a person who may not desire that her rival will win the
elections but who may nonetheless from party loyalty or obligation campaign for the rival, and so, as one
might say, intellectually evaluate favourably that the rival will win. Schellenberg 2005, 133.
559 Schellenberg 2005, 134.
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incompatible  with  it  will  recede  into  the  background  of  one’s  attention.
Schellenberg distinguishes this volitional assent from assuming the truth of a
proposition, because the latter expression in his view leaves out what he wants
to emphasise by propositional faith: that it is something one can do for its own
sake and for its intrinsic value and not for the sake of something else, such as
action in the case of assuming.560 Schellenberg’s assent bears a resemblance to
the notion of c*-acceptance, which we discussed in section 4.2.3., as both of
these attitudes highlight that propositions can be embraced merely for the
sake of their truth.
As a result, Schellenberg holds that S has faith that p equals the conjunction
of  the  following  conditions:  (1)  S  lacks  evidence  causally  sufficient  for  S  to
believe that p, (2) S considers the state of affairs reported by p to be good, (3)
S persistently represents the world to herself as including that state of affairs,
and (4) S voluntarily and committedly adopts a policy of assent towards that
representation or, more broadly, towards p.561 Schellenberg’s next claim is that
propositional faith can be directed towards religious propositions, too.
According to him, propositional religious faith is a long-term cognitive
commitment to actively see the world in a certain way. So, just as exemplifying
the practical aspect of faith is often taken to involve a steadfast practical
commitment, in Schellenberg’s view exemplifying the cognitive aspect of faith
involves an ongoing cognitive commitment in the form of propositional
faith.562
Though Schellenberg emphasises that adopting propositional faith can
have an intrinsic  value,  he says that  the attitude is  generally  adopted partly
because of action-guidance. But, Schellenberg claims, if a person acts on her
propositional  faith,  she  is  actually  manifesting  operational  faith,  that  is,
trust.563 So,  in Schellenberg’s  view a person may trust  God even if  all  she is
doing  “is  acting  on  a  beliefless  attitude  of  voluntary  assent  to  the  relevant
religious  propositions  in  pursuing  a  religious  way”.564 To  illustrate,  in
Swinburne’s  view trusting in God amounts to worshipping God and seeking
salvation for oneself and others (see section 2.1.3.). Schellenberg’s claim is that
these actions can be based on propositional faith of the relevant sort, which in
this case basically amounts to volitionally and constantly imagining and going
along with the representation that a Christian God exists.565 The sort of trust
that goes with propositional faith is most likely explicit, since trusting is quite
clearly done without epistemic or emotional assurance. Schellenberg holds
that this, rather than Penelhum’s serenity, might be a better candidate for the
sort of trust that is ideal for faith.566
560 Schellenberg 2005, 134-137.
561 Schellenberg 2005, 138-139.
562 Schellenberg 2005, 137-138.
563 Schellenberg 2005, 139.
564 Schellenberg 2005, 140.
565 Cf. Schellenberg 2013a, 263-264.
566 Schellenberg 2005, 140.
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At first glance, Schellenberg’s account of faith looks like a non-realist one,
since having propositional faith is ultimately just to imagine that the world has
a certain character. But non-realism does not seem to be Schellenberg’s
interpretation. Penelhum has aptly contrasted Schellenberg’s account with
Richard  Braithwaite’s  non-realist  view  of  faith.  According  to  Penelhum,
Braithwaite  holds  that  propositions  of  faith  can  be  treated  as  pictures  of
desirable states of affairs that can inspire persons to pretend that the world is
like  the  propositions  say  they  are  and  to  live  an  “agapeistic”  life.567
Braithwaite’s view is clearly similar to that of Schellenberg, but Penelhum
argues that the distinguishing feature is that in Braithwaite’s view the
propositions of faith may not be literally true and may even be thought to be
false, whereas Schellenberg’s account is not compatible with such a conviction.
On the contrary, Penelhum holds, one needs to have at least weak evidential
support for p in order to have a Schellenbergian faith that p.568
Schellenberg in general agrees with Penelhum’s analysis. He holds that
having faith that p presupposes that one lacks flat-out belief that not-p.569 One
might say that there is no point in having a Schellenbergian faith that p if one
thinks  that  there  are  no  chances  for  p  being  true,  whereas  in  Braithwaite’s
account of faith the truth value of p is not at all relevant.570 In my view this
shows that Schellenberg’s propositional faith is not on its own sufficient for
the cognitive aspect of faith, but it must go together with some minimal belief,
like belief about possibility. Otherwise Schellenberg’s view reduces to non-
realist faith. In other words, if not complemented with some minimal belief,
Schellenbergian propositional faith is nearly indistinguishable from
Braithwaite’s non-realism.
Schellenberg has compared his account of faith with some of the views we
have  considered  previously.  To  begin  with,  Schellenberg  holds  that  one
propositional attitude distinct from propositional faith is hope, which he
analyses as a complex attitude including, roughly, a belief about possibility and
a desire. (see propositional hope in section 4.3.1.). According to Schellenberg,
one difference between these attitudes is that propositional faith, unlike hope,
is  voluntary.  Schellenberg also holds that  propositional  faith has something
more to give to one’s  cognitive life  than hope:  “there is  an extra element of
definiteness  and  constancy—assent  to  a  certain  picture  of  the  world,
voluntarily assumed—that makes all the difference.”571 Moreover, contrary to
Pojman’s assessment (see section 4.3.2.), Schellenberg seems to think that
hope, unlike propositional faith, is not a sufficiently strong attitude for the sort
567 See Braithwaite 1955. See also Stiver 1996, 72.
568 Penelhum 2013, 251.
569 Schellenberg 2013a, 282.
570 One might nonetheless ask whether having a Schellenbergian faith that p is compatible with a
flat-out belief that not-p. Penelhum appears to think that this is not possible, but Schellenberg seems to
suggest otherwise, although he says that “completely confident disbelief might make such faith
psychologically impossible”. Schellenberg 2005, 132. See Penelhum 2013, 251.
 Penelhum 2013, 251.
571 Schellenberg 2009, 198. Cf. Schellenberg 2005, 142.
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of full-fledged practical commitment faith in his view entails (see
Schellenberg’s operational faith in section 4.4.1.).572
Schellenberg appears to see hope as a rather weak and feeble attitude, but
one might argue that at times it can also be lively and vibrant. In such cases
the contrast between hope and propositional faith need not be substantial.
Even Schellenberg points out that it is possible to beef up the notion of hope
so as to include “more positive thoughts and commitment”, in which case it
turns  out  to  be  in  his  view  turns  equivalent  to  his  notion  of  propositional
faith.573 Schellenberg holds that it is natural for a person to both hope that p
and have faith that p, but in his view these attitudes do not entail each other. 574
Schellenberg also compares his view to Alston’s acceptance (see section
4.2.). As he interprets it, Alston’s acceptance is a matter of taking a proposition
“on board” (cognitive acceptance) and using it in one’s thinking and behaviour
(pragmatic  acceptance).  In Schellenberg’s  view his  notion of  assent (see the
fourth element of propositional faith) is very similar to Alston’s acceptance,
especially  to its  “taking on board” part.575 However, Schellenberg’s problem
with Alston’s view is, in our terms, Alston’s way of taking acceptance to cover
both the cognitive and the practical aspects of faith. This is in Schellenberg’s
view a defect, for the aspects require being conceptually distinguished.576 This
is a reasonable demand, which I have, in fact, tried to follow in this study.
Moreover, Schellenberg appears to make the important point that when the
distinction  between  the  cognitive  and  the  practical  aspects  of  faith  is  made
clearly, one can realise that exemplifying, in our terms, a non- or sub-doxastic
account of  faith can be more than just  a  practical  matter,  such as acting on
assumptions.577 For  exemplifying  such  accounts  can  have  a  cognitive
significance, too. In general, just like certain beliefs, certain other attitudes like
hope  and  propositional  faith  (whether  Schellenberg’s  or  Audi’s)  with
appropriate contents can have intrinsic value for the persons having them.
They need not derive their significance from something else, like from their
practical usefulness (cf. the revaluation of the role of the pragmatic arguments
in section 3.3.). In my view this is an important consideration which has not
been sufficiently emphasised.
Lastly, it should come as no surprise that when Schellenberg comments on
James’s  “The  Will  to  Believe”,  he  holds  that  it  should  not  be  read  as
commending the will to believe, but the will to have faith or the will to imagine
and act correspondingly. Consequently, choosing a hypothesis in a situation of
a genuine option can in Schellenberg’s outline be seen as a volitional choice to
persistently imagine the world as the hypothesis describes it (propositional
572 Schellenberg 2009, 198.
573 Schellenberg 2009, 133.
574 Schellenberg 2005, 143.
575 Schellenberg  2005,  143-144.  Actually,  Schellenberg’s  assent  does  not  look  like  Alston’s
problematic c-acceptance. Instead, as noted, it seems to be closer to the notion of c*-acceptance. This is
for the reason that Schellenberg’s assent, like c*-acceptance, does not really seem to be evidence-
dependent in the way Alston’s c-acceptance is. For a discussion, see sections 4.2.2. and 4.2.3..
576 Schellenberg 2005, 145.
577 See Schellenberg 2005, 146.
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faith) and to act correspondingly (operational faith).578 This illustrates the
point just made: choosing to exemplify faith without having a firm belief can
be more than a practical matter—it can have cognitive import, too.
4.4.3 CONCLUSION AND REFLECTION
In sum, according to Schellenberg’s account, faith includes propositional faith
as the cognitive aspect of faith and operational faith as the practical aspect of
faith. Propositional faith basically amounts to volitionally and persistently
imagining the world in accordance with relevant faith-propositions, and it can
have  intrinsic  value  for  the  person  having  it.  Operational  faith  amounts  to
trust, which fundamentally means acting on the propositions of faith. Of the
views analysed in this chapter, Schellenberg’s propositional faith seems to be
the only one that truly is a non-doxastic and voluntary attitude. Neither Audi’s
propositional faith, Alston’s acceptance, nor Pojman’s propositional hope look
like a non-doxastic or voluntary attitude. They seem to include or reduce to a
belief of some kind, and so they are naturally conceived of as involuntary.
However, as argued, Schellenberg’s non-doxastic propositional faith does
not alone seem to suffice for the cognitive aspect of faith. Instead, it must be
accompanied by some minimal belief, that is, by some sub-doxastic attitude,
so that it does not amount to a non-realist position. In rather harsh terms I
would say that this means that Schellenberg’s propositional faith can only be
an ancillary propositional attitude in the cognitive aspect of faith. The essential
attitude must be some sub-doxastic attitude that, so to speak, entails realism.
This consideration indicates one general conclusion as regards the question of
what kind of propositional attitude is required for the cognitive aspect of faith.
As things stand, I find it hard to see how any non-doxastic attitude could
play the role that doxastic or sub-doxastic attitudes have in the cognitive
aspect  of  faith.  By this  I  do not imply that  besides belief  there could not be
room—or even need—for some non-doxastic attitude (say, Schellenberg’s
propositional faith), but just that some kind of belief is required, whether it is
a belief about possibility or probability or a degreed belief. So, though I do not
straightforwardly exclude non-doxastic attitudes from the cognitive aspect of
faith, I wish to highlight that the aspect necessarily requires some sub-doxastic
attitude, at the very least. Otherwise non-realism seems hard to avoid.
4.5 FAITH AS PROPOSITIONAL HOPE AND THE
VOLUNTARINESS OF FAITH
In this study I have analysed different accounts of faith and pointed out what
I take to be their strengths and weaknesses. While doing this I have indicated,
especially in connection with Pojman’s view of faith (see section 4.3.3.), how
578 Schellenberg 2009, 209-210.
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faith in my view could be instantiated in the midst of doubt. Though my view
in certain important respects differs from that of Pojman, I also find
propositional hope to be the appropriate minimal requirement for
exemplifying a kind of sub-doxastic faith. In this section I shall elaborate this
view, which I have labelled faith as propositional hope, and compare it with
other  accounts.  Subsequently  I  shall  draw  this  study  to  a  conclusion  by
considering analytic theists’ understanding of the voluntariness of faith on a
general level.
4.5.1 FAITH AS PROPOSITIONAL HOPE
In my view the best way to approach faith as propositional hope is by way of
considering once again a Jamesian scenario. I am not seeking to explicate what
James actually means, though I do think that a promising reconstruction of
his  view  is  the  one  offered  here.  So,  suppose  that  the  Christian  hypothesis
presents itself to a religious doubter in a Jamesian genuine option, that is, in
a  case  of  q  genuine  choice  between  two  hypotheses.  Suppose  also  that  the
doubter decides to adopt the Christian hypothesis instead of its rival, the rival
being some non-religious, secular hypothesis. In my view this adoption should
be understood as follows.
When  Christianity  presents  itself  in  a  genuine  option  to  the  doubter,  it
means that  the doubter’s  “intellectual”  as well  as  “passional  nature” already
disposes her towards adopting the option. This means, first, that the doubter
sees that her evidence for the truth of the propositions of Christian faith has
some strength, though not enough to yield strong (convinced, flat-out) belief.
In other words, the doubter already believes that the propositions of Christian
faith have some probability of being true or, as I shall (for convenience’s sake)
say, are possibly true. Secondly, Christianity’s presenting itself to the doubter
in  a  genuine  option  means  that  the  propositions  of  Christian  faith  are
attractive to the doubter. That is, she has an emotional pro-attitude towards
the propositions or, as I shall say it, she desires that the propositions are true.
But believing that Christianity is possibly true and desiring that it is true in
my view implies that the doubter already hopes that Christianity is true. The
hope in question is a propositional hope (see sections 4.3.1.-4.3.3.), which is a
complex sub-doxastic propositional attitude consisting of belief about
possibility  (or  probability)  and  a  desire  (or  perhaps  some  equivalent
favourable evaluation or orientation). Propositional hope is not voluntary, as
neither  of  its  constituents  are  generally  voluntary.  In  Jamesian  terms,  the
doubter does not choose to see Christianity as a live hypothesis, but it appears
to her as such. (It does not follow that a person who does not at present see
Christianity as a live hypothesis could not later see it as such and vice versa.)
As to the doubter’s adoption of the Christian hypothesis when it presents
itself in a genuine option, this in my view amounts to approving, as opposed
to rejecting or disregarding, the hope in question and allowing it to play a part
in one’s mental life. The hope itself may motivate this endorsement, and the
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doubter  then  seeks  to  bring  the  hope  to  mind  every  now  and  then  and
contemplates it, among other things. For reasons to be pointed out, this in my
view, strictly speaking, equals adopting faith as propositional hope. As this is
a choice the doubter can also withdraw, the choice and going along with it is
the  voluntary  aspect  of  faith  as  propositional  hope.  So,  while  propositional
hope  as  such  is  involuntary,  it  is  another  thing  to  voluntarily  allow  one’s
propositional hope to live and have influence in one’s life. (The same point
likely goes for other propositional attitudes, too.) In Jamesian terms, adopting
the  Christian  hypothesis  when  it  presents  itself  in  a  genuine  option  is  the
doubter’s voluntary decision.
The  voluntary  aspect  of  faith  as  propositional  hope  can  be  further
illustrated by way of Schellenberg’s notion of assent. He holds that assent that
p  is  a  deliberate  volitional  policy  of  going  along  with  p  as  opposed  to
questioning, criticising, or ignoring it (see section 4.4.2.). Faith as
propositional hope involves a similar assent or, rather, approval: it includes
going  along  with  one’s  hope  instead  of  ignoring  it.  What  is  more,  as  my
wordings  suggest,  I  find  it  most  accurate  to  conceive  of  the  approval
functioning as a second order propositional attitude and what is approved is
the first order propositional attitude of hope with the relevant propositional
content. The doubter who has faith as propositional hope voluntarily approves
that she hopes and she deliberately permits her hope to live instead of denying
and disregarding it. This approval need not be incompatible with being critical
and responsive to further evidence that may affect one’s hope.
The closest relative in its form to the view of faith as propositional hope is
Plantinga’s  A/C  model.  Like  the  A/C  model,  faith  as  propositional  hope
consists of a cognitive and an evaluative-affective aspect of faith. In the A/C
model there is firm belief and suitable emotions and evaluations; in faith as
propositional hope there is belief about possibility and desire (and doubtless
other suitable evaluative-affective tendencies). What is more, one could say
that, like the A/C model, faith as propositional hope does not, strictly
speaking, include any practical aspect. Instead, appropriate actions can be
seen as acting out one’s faith (for a discussion, see sections 1.2.2. and 2.2.). In
the case of faith as propositional hope the relevant actions amount to
experimenting  with  one’s  faith  by  agnostic  prayer  or  worship,  for  example.
Seeking to do what from one’s viewpoint is good can also be seen as acting out
one’s  faith  or  at  least  such  conduct  can  be  partly  motivated  by  the  faith  in
question.
In consequence, choosing to have faith as propositional hope is not, again,
strictly speaking, a matter of making a practical commitment to propositions
one hopes to be true. That is, to utilise the terminology of Bishop’s doxastic
venture model of faith (see section 3.1.2.), faith as propositional hope is not a
matter of taking such propositions to be true in one’s practical reasoning which
are hoped to be true. This description is unfitting, since, as argued, the view of
faith as propositional hope does not include a practical aspect. Still, it is not
inappropriate to say that if the doubter acts out her faith as propositional hope,
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she is tentatively taking to be true what she hopes to be true. But I would here
rather speak of acceptance in Cohen’s sense (see section 4.2.), as it is a better-
known term in the literature.
Besides the similarities to Plantinga’s view, propositional hope as such is
functionally analogous to Audi’s propositional faith. Both of these attitudes
involve a cognitive and an evaluative-affective aspect—in propositional faith
the  cognitive  conviction  is  simply  stronger  than  in  propositional  hope.  It  is
natural to think that the doubter’s hope that p can develop into Audian faith p
(just as it is natural to think that a person’s faith that p can turn into the sort
of firm belief plus the positive affections Plantinga emphasises) if the doubter’s
confidence towards the truth of p arises due to the accumulation of evidence
of some sort. Likewise, a person’s faith that p can change into the hope that p,
if the person’s confidence towards p weakens for some reason. In this respect
the evidence-responsive attitudes a person of faith has may have the sort
fluidity  Audi  speaks  of:  their  strength  may  change  with  variations  in  such
variables as emotionality and perceived evidence (see section 4.1.).
The difference between Pojman’s view of faith and mine parallels that
between Swinburne and Plantinga—and perhaps that between Catholic and
Protestant  emphases  in  general.  Both  Pojman and  Swinburne  highlight  the
practical aspect of faith: having faith is basically a voluntary commitment to
seek the goals which following the Christian way allegedly offers (see section
2.1.3. and 4.3.2.). I also suppose that Pojman would be ready to argue along
with  Swinburne  that  having  faith  is  meritorious.  Conversely,  in  accordance
with  Plantinga’s  theological  view  I  am  inclined  to  think  of  faith  in  less
meritorious  and  voluntary  terms  (although  faith  has  a  voluntary  element).
That is, having faith is not so much a matter of meritorious action as having a
proper cognitive and evaluative-affective stance towards the subject of
Christian  faith.  According  to  this  view,  a  practical  commitment  is  a
consequence of a person’s faith, not a part of it. In addition, in my view the
commitment  should  be  tentative,  as  it  is  debatable  whether  a  robust
commitment  is  permissible  with  mere  hope  (for  a  discussion,  see  section
4.3.2.). This point leads us to the next consideration.
Faith as propositional hope is in Paul Helm’s terminology an evidential
proportion  view  of  faith  according  to  which  the  strength  of  faith  must  be
proportioned with the strength of belief. Since the cognitive aspect of hoping
is evidentially very weak, I take it to grant only weak and cautious faith. This
elucidates another way to differentiate my view from that of Pojman. For
Pojman’s  account,  like  Swinburne’s,  appears  to  be  in  Helm’s  terminology
closer to an evidential deficiency view of faith, which sees faith as in some way
compensating or making up for lack of evidence. In Pojman’s view having faith
is to make a commitment of such strength that is not warranted by the overall
evidence. But, as argued, it is debatable whether such commitments are often
permissible (for a discussion of Helm’s somewhat messy distinction, see
sections 2.1.3. and 3.1.1.).
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From the doubter’s “philosophical viewpoint” it is no doubt most credible
to  consider  the  cause  of  her  hope  as  a  natural  one;  hoping  is  responsive  to
broadly  evidential  and  emotional  or  passional  grounds  (see  section  4.3.1.).
However, as traditional Christianity claims that having faith is a gift from God,
maybe  from  the  “theological  viewpoint”  the  doubter  can  think  of  her
propositional hope as a sign of having to some extent received supernatural
grace  and  being  affected  by  the  Holy  Spirit.  Perhaps  faith  as  propositional
hope can be seen as the weakest possible instantiation of a broadly Plantingian
faith. This also illuminates one difference between Swinburne’s and Pojman’s
views on the one hand, and mine and Plantinga’s on the other. The former do
not really accentuate that faith is a gift from God.
In his Three Essays on Religion,  John Stuart  Mill  (1806-1873) defended
religious hope on prudential grounds. According to him:
Truth is the province of reason, and it is by the cultivation of the rational faculty that
provision is made for its being known always, and thought of as often as is required
by  duty  and  the  circumstances  of  human  life.  But  when  the  reason  is  strongly
cultivated, the imagination may safely follow its own end, and do its best to make
life pleasant and lovely inside the castle, in reliance on the fortifications raised and
maintained by Reason round the outward bounds.
On these principles it appears to me that the indulgence of hope with regard to the
government of the universe and the destiny of man after death, while we recognize
as  a  clear  truth  that  we  have  no  ground  for  more  than  a  hope,  is  legitimate  and
philosophically defensible. The beneficial effect of such hope is far from trifling. It
makes life and human nature a far greater thing to the feelings, and gives greater
strength as well as greater solemnity to all the sentiments which are awakened in us
by our fellow-creatures and by mankind at large. It allays the sense of that irony of
Nature which is so painfully felt  when we see the exertions and sacrifices of a life
culminating in the formation of a wise and noble mind, only to disappear from the
world  when  the  time  has  just  arrived  at  which  the  world  seems  about  to  begin
reaping the benefit of it. The truth that life is short and art is long is from of old one
of the most discouraging parts of our condition; this hope admits the possibility that
the art employed in improving and beautifying the soul itself may avail for good in
some other life, even when seemingly useless for this.579
I am here largely siding with Mill. Although hoping is bitter-sweet, it can
offer, for example, meaning and consolation and give us strength to continue
in  the  face  of  difficulties.  In  other  words,  hoping  as  such  has  pragmatic
benefits.  It  may  be  that  some  of  our  hopes  should  be  muted  by  paying  no
attention to them. But if a religious doubter finds herself hoping that
Christianity—or, for that matter, some other suitable worldview—is true and
holds that she is better off by having the hope and inflicts no harm by it, is she
necessarily acting imprudently if she deliberately allows her hope to live? I am
inclined to say no (cf. section 3.3.). It may not be advisable for the doubter to
invest too much in her hope. But to say that she is not entitled to hope at all
seems to be an exaggeration. Hope may even resist being dispensed with. So
why fight against it if it offers solace and other possible benefits?
579 Mill, Three Essays on Religion (1874), 249-250. See also Jordan 2006, 187-190.
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4.5.2 DOXASTIC NON-VOLUNTARISM BUT RELIGIOUS
VOLUNTARISM?
In analytic theistic philosophy there appears to be quite a general consensus
on the following two ideas. Firstly, it is claimed that faith-belief, like any other
belief, is not directly voluntary, which is the same as embracing doxastic non-
voluntarism. Secondly, though it is held that faith-belief is involuntary, it is
widely argued that having faith is, in some way or another, a voluntary matter.
For  example,  Swinburne  and  Bishop  accentuated  that  the  belief  which
constitutes the cognitive aspect of faith is largely involuntary. But, they held,
the commitment which forms the practical aspect of faith is voluntary. Since
in Swinburne’s and Bishop’s view practical commitment is the central aspect
of faith, they in the end maintain that exemplifying faith is in an important
sense a voluntary choice.
To take another example, Alston argued—though not convincingly—that
while the cognitive aspect of faith is involuntary if constituted by belief, it can
be  voluntary  if  constituted  by  his  version  of  acceptance.  In  this  case,  too,
having faith is a voluntary choice. Similar considerations were put forward by
Pojman  as  regards  hope  and  Schellenberg  as  regards  his  construal  of
propositional faith. Even Plantinga has a tendency to hold that although faith
is largely an involuntary matter, having it requires a willingness to receive it.
Consequently,  on  the  whole,  analytic  theistic  philosophers  seem  to  have  a
tendency  to  argue  against  doxastic  voluntarism  but,  as  one  might  say,  for
religious voluntarism. This was the view I defended, too. I argued that religious
hope is involuntary (it is a sub-doxastic attitude), and yet I maintained that
having faith as propositional hope is voluntary, since it amounts to volitionally
approving one’s hope, that is, permitting one’s hope to live.
However, while the idea of religious voluntarism seems from one viewpoint
quite reasonable, from another viewpoint it may be questioned. The viewpoint
that is reasonable might be labelled philosophical. From the perspective of the
phenomenology of belief, propositional attitudes, and action theory it seems
plausible  to  argue,  as  we  have  seen,  that  faith  includes  both  voluntary  and
involuntary elements. What is more, from this perspective one may also argue
that the central aspect of faith is voluntary, and this is just to embrace religious
voluntarism from a philosophical point of view.
Then  again,  the  viewpoint  from  which  religious  voluntarism  might  be
questioned could be labelled theological.  From this  viewpoint it  is  not clear
whether religious voluntarism is an acceptable position. For that will depend
on  which  theological  standpoint  one  advocates.  Perhaps  Catholic  and
especially Orthodox theology may affirm some version of religious
voluntarism, as they highlight that faith comes from God but also requires
humans’ volitional activity. On the other hand, traditional Protestantism has
not been very eager to affirm religious voluntarism. According to its emphases,
faith is due to God and the importance of human efforts is to some extent
diminished.
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What  these  considerations  indicate  is  that  there  is  a  need  to  draw  a
distinction between philosophical and theological considerations as regards
questions relating to the voluntariness of faith. From one viewpoint religious
voluntarism may be granted while from the other it  may not.  This need not
yield  an  inconsistent  view.  For  example,  one  may  argue  that  some  kind  of
practical commitment is the focal aspect of faith and that from a philosophical
viewpoint it is voluntary, because it amounts to practical conduct which clearly
requires the will. But at the same time one may from the theological viewpoint
argue  that  the  commitment  is  not  actually  voluntary,  because  deep  down it
occurs due to supernatural grace and the promptings of the Holy Spirit. In fact,
love in the sense of being disposed to do good towards others is traditionally
conceived of as a God-given theological virtue. Given this, one might argue that
even the execution of this virtue is attributable to God, though superficially it
may look like a human’s commendable volitional behaviour.
Faith without Belief
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SUMMARY
This study was a critical examination of the views about the voluntary aspect
of religious faith in contemporary analytic theistic philosophy of religion. In
addition, I elaborated the view of faith as propositional hope as a promising
alternative for some religious doubters.
In the introduction I pointed out that certain presuppositions of analytic
theists are of significance for their discussion on the nature and voluntariness
of  faith.  The  central  assumptions  are  theological  realism  about  religious
language,  that  is,  linguistic  theological  realism,  and  the  view  that  faith  is
connected with epistemic attitudes. Without these assumptions the problems
discussed lose much of their relevance.
In the first proper chapter I analysed analytic theists’ general views on the
nature  of  faith  and  propositional  belief.  As  regards  faith,  we  were  chiefly
interested in listing different aspects of faith that a view (a model, an account)
of faith may entail. I suggested that four aspects can be distinguished: (i) the
cognitive, (ii) the evaluative-affective, (iii) the practical, and (iv) the
interpersonal aspects. In analytic theistic philosophy the emphasis has been
put on (i) and (iii). Some philosophers have also reflected on ideas pertaining
to (ii). (iv) has not really received attention in the views we analysed. So, the
interpersonal aspect of faith is a topic which may deserve further analysis. The
same goes for the possible social or communal aspects of faith.
As regards the nature of propositional belief, in analytic theistic philosophy
it is typically taken to aim at truth, to come in degrees, and involve a feeling of
conviction. The feeling aspect of belief is in all probability not best seen as a
kind of emotional state. Alston, for example, only seeks to illustrate the
involuntary nature of belief by the term “feel”. Direct doxastic voluntarism,
that is, the view that belief is directly voluntary, is widely rejected in analytic
theistic philosophy, and this rejection is a central premise in the discussion on
the voluntariness of faith.
In the second chapter the key topic was how the beliefs of faith are acquired
and the  implications  this  issue  has  for  questions  about  the  voluntariness  of
faith.  The  views  of  Richard  Swinburne  and  Alvin  Plantinga  were  the  main
focus of this chapter. Swinburne highlights the practical aspect of faith in his
Pragmatist view of faith. He maintains that having faith amounts to seeking
certain goals, namely, worship of God and salvation to oneself and others. This
conduct he equates with trust in God and doing the actions that love of God
would lead one to do. Swinburne argues that this aspect of faith is voluntary
and exemplifying it deserves merit.
Swinburne holds that the minimum requirement for instantiating the
practical aspect of faith is the so-called weak belief, that is, the belief that the
Christian  creed  is  more  probable  than  any  relevant  rival  creed,  though  not
necessarily  more  probable  than  its  negation.  This  sub-doxastic,  less-than-
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firm-belief attitude is the cognitive aspect of Swinburne’s view of faith. Like
many theistic philosophers, Swinburne argues that belief, whether religious or
not, is acquired in response to evidence, which can come in many forms. As an
evidentialist and a proponent of natural theology Swinburne holds that ideally
the evidence for Christian truths consists of substantial arguments. Swinburne
maintains  that  holding  Christian  belief  can  be  meritorious,  though  it  is  not
directly  voluntary.  This  is  the  case  if  the  belief  is  acquired  as  a  result  of
voluntarily started impartial investigation.
Plantinga’s Aquinas/Calvin model of faith is in many respects dissimilar
and  even  contrary  to  Swinburne’s  view.  Plantinga  does  not  emphasise  the
practical but the cognitive and the evaluative-affective aspects of faith: faith is
ideally  a  matter  of  having  a  convinced  Christian  belief  and  the  appropriate
affections,  such  as  finding  what  is  believed  attractive.  In  Plantinga’s  view,
Christian belief is held in a basic way, that is, it is held on the grounds of its
content  just  seeming  to  be  true,  which  I  proposed  to  be  a  kind  of  non-
propositional evidence. Following traditional Christianity, Plantinga holds
that due to sin’s effects persons cannot acquire faith by their own efforts, but
it must come to them supernaturally through the instigation of the Holy Spirit.
In this process, Plantinga maintains, the Holy Spirit also cures persons’
damaged sensus divinitatis,  the  sense  of  divinity,  which  enables  persons  to
form general theistic beliefs about God in suitable circumstances.
In comparison to Swinburne’s view, Plantinga’s model does not have much
room  for  volitional  elements.  Nor  does  Plantinga  imply  that  faith  is
meritorious action which God rewards. Instead, faith is in his view a gift from
God and it basically amounts to finding oneself with the appropriate cognitive-
affective stance towards Christian truths. Still, Plantinga cautiously suggests
that coming to have faith may be subsequent to the willingness to have it. This
seems to mean some kind of readiness to receive faith instead of being
reluctant  to  have  it.  Perhaps  one  could  also  speak  of  seeking  faith  in  this
respect. This is the voluntary aspect in Plantinga’s view of faith. What is more,
sustaining and acting out Plantingian faith likely requires the will. Then again,
from  the  theological  viewpoint  Plantinga  might  say  that  due  to  sin  these
cannot occur without the constant promptings of the Holy Spirit. In this case
it is unclear whether the actions are ultimately up to the persons’ own efforts.
The  third  chapter  was  chiefly  concerned  with  the  possibility  of  believing
without  sufficient  evidence.  The  permissibility  of  such  believing  was  also
discussed as part of the topic of the ethics of belief. Views elaborated by John
Bishop  and  Jeff  Jordan  were  central  in  this  chapter.  According  to  Bishop’s
doxastic venture model of faith, a person of faith makes a full-weight practical
commitment to firmly believed faith-propositions—the person “takes to be
true”  what  she  “holds  true”,  in  Bishop’s  terms—while  she  recognises  that
evidence  does  not  adequately  support  the  truth  of  the  propositions.  Bishop
hence emphasises the cognitive and practical aspects of faith in his model. Like
Swinburne, he holds that the latter is voluntary and meritorious whereas the
former is involuntary, as it entails belief.
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The central problem in Bishop’s model had to do with the idea of believing
without evidence. In Bishop’s view such believing is possible, because besides
evidence  belief  can  be  caused  by  non-evidential,  passional  factors,  such  as
emotions and desires. However, in reference to Andrei Buckareff’s critique, I
argued  that  only  evidential  believing  is  possible  in  full  consciousness.  Non-
evidential believing is conceptually problematic, since believing on grounds
that do not indicate truth is inconsistent with belief’s truth-aiming nature. So,
Bishop’s model of faith does not look like a feasible alternative to those who
find the evidence for the propositions of faith wanting.
But while it  may not be possible to believe without evidence,  it  is  widely
argued that one can acquire a belief in an evidentially uncertain proposition
by  means  that  involve  manipulating  one’s  doxastic  states.  This  claim  was
defended by Jeff Jordan, who argues for religious belief on pragmatic grounds.
His discussion is motivated by the insight that pragmatic reasons to believe do
not yield belief: they are not truth- but utility-indicating reasons, which are a
sub-class of  non-evidential  reasons for belief.  Thus,  as Jordan argues,  some
sort of belief-inducing technique is necessary in order to acquire pragmatically
vindicated belief.
Jordan’s claim was basically that a pragmatically vindicated belief that p
can  be  acquired  via  volitionally  supposing  and  acting  as  if  p  were  true.
However, I argued that merely supposing and acting as if p were true are not
truth-indicating evidential reasons for p, and so they do not yield belief that p.
In  its  place,  following  Richard  Foley’s  initial  considerations,  I  argued  that
belief-manipulation requires intentional self-deception by which a person
deceives herself into a misguided state where she thinks she has sufficient
evidence to ground belief. My conclusion was that while such self-deception
may  not  be  impossible,  it  is  a  course  of  action  which  does  not  guarantee
success.
Besides being a difficult task to fulfil, believing or seeking by self-deception
to believe against one’s better epistemic judgment goes against the dominant
ethics  of  belief,  namely,  Evidentialism,  which  was  defined  as  the  view  that
beliefs ought to be formed, sustained, and renounced on the basis of adequate
evidence. In this connection we also discussed whether pragmatic arguments
for religious belief can override the demands of Evidentialism. While we noted
that this  may sometimes be the case,  I  suggested that  pragmatic  arguments
can be reinterpreted as vindicating not just belief or faith which entails belief
but faith without firm belief, such as faith with hope. This understanding of
the arguments does not usually necessitate forming beliefs by self-deceptive
means. So, the arguments do not require going against Evidentialism, which
is no doubt a good feature.
In the fourth chapter I analysed allegedly non-doxastic views of faith which
claim  that  faith  need  not  entail  any  kind  of  belief,  as  there  are  viable
alternatives  to  it.  This  chapter  was  preoccupied  with  views  put  forward  by
Robert Audi, William Alston, Louis Pojman, and J. L. Schellenberg. Lastly, I
elaborated my view of faith as propositional hope. According to Audi, another
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religiously significant attitude besides belief is propositional faith. He holds
that as regards confidence about the truth of a proposition, propositional faith
is weaker than firm belief but stronger than hope. Unlike belief and like hope,
propositional faith in Audi’s view involves a positive evaluative attitude.
Hence, in addition to the cognitive aspect of faith, propositional faith covers at
least partly the evaluative-affective aspect.
Audi argues that propositional faith is a non-doxastic attitude, that is, it
does  not  involve  belief  of  any  kind.  However,  taking  Alston’s  and  Dana
Radcliffe’s critiques against Audi into account I argued that propositional faith
is most plausibly explicated as a complex propositional attitude which consists
of a degreed belief and a positive evaluative attitude, and so it seems in fact to
be a sub-doxastic attitude. Audi claims that propositional faith is not voluntary
but  responsive  to  broadly  evidential  and  emotional  grounds.  I  noted  that
Audi’s view is basically similar to that of Plantinga: propositional faith can be
seen as a confidence-wise weaker instantiation of the sort of faith Plantinga
highlights.
Alston  argued  that  his  notion  of  voluntary  acceptance  can  be  a  viable
substitute to belief in faith. According to him, to accept that p is to accept p as
true  (cognitive  acceptance)  and  to  use  p  in  one’s  practical  reasoning
(pragmatic acceptance). Alston’s acceptance thus covers both the cognitive
and  the  practical  aspects  of  faith.  In  Alston’s  view  acceptance  is  evidence-
dependent: one must have some evidence for p in order to accept p. Audi and
Vahid argued that the cognitive aspect of Alston’s acceptance (“accept as true”)
actually equals to or entails belief. In addition, Audi claimed that the cognitive
acceptance is involuntary. Hence, Alston’s acceptance does not seem to be a
viable  alternative  to  belief.  In  the  end  it  may  be,  as  Bishop  suspected,  that
Alston’s  notion of  acceptance is  simply confused.  But this  is  not to say that
there  are  no  other  cogent  notions  of  acceptance,  such  as  that  of  Cohen  (cf.
pragmatic acceptance).
Pojman held that faith is feasible with hope. In our terms, Pojmanian faith
is  to  motivationally  hope  that  one  will  attain  the  goals  of  Christianity  while
propositionally  hoping  that  Christianity  is  true.  The  motivational  hope  is  a
practical  commitment  to  seek  the  goals  in  question,  and  thus  it  forms  the
practical aspect of Pojman’s view of faith. The propositional hope is roughly a
belief about possibility plus a positive evaluation, and so it covers the cognitive
and the evaluative-affective aspects of faith. For Pojman the practical aspect,
that is, the motivational hope, is the focal aspect of faith. In this respect his
account of faith bears a resemblance to Swinburne’s view. Pojman maintains
that  hoping  is  mostly  voluntary,  but  when  the  distinction  between
motivational and propositional hopes is taken into account, I argued that only
the former are voluntary. So, in Pojmanian faith with hope the practical aspect
is voluntary whereas the other aspects are not.
Schellenberg  argued  that  faith  is  feasible  as  a  kind  of  voluntary
imagination-based behaviour. His view consists of propositional and
operational faith. The former has to do with the cognitive aspect of faith while
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the latter concerns the practical aspect. Schellenberg equals operational faith
with trust in the Swinburnean action-emphasising sense of the term: religious
trust is basically a disposition to act religiously. Schellenberg argues that trust
can  be  exemplified  with  his  version  of  propositional  faith,  which  is  roughly
equivalent to a voluntary resolution to imagine the world in a religious way. In
his  view  such  imagining  can  have  intrinsic  value  for  the  person  who
exemplifies it.
Schellenberg seems to be the only one who has with some credibility argued
that  there  is  room  for  a  directly  voluntary  propositional  attitude  in  the
cognitive  aspect  of  faith;  Alston  and  Pojman  failed  to  establish  their  cases.
However, one may query whether Schellenberg’s non-doxastic propositional
faith is alone adequate for the cognitive aspect of faith. As we argued, if faith
that p is not accompanied by some minimal belief, say, belief that p is possible,
it  seems  to  amount  to  a  non-realist  position.  So,  to  put  it  crudely,
Schellenberg’s  propositional  faith  can  be  only  an  ancillary  attitude  in  the
cognitive aspect of faith. The primary attitude must be some sub-doxastic
attitude, some minimal belief, which, so to speak, entails realism.
I proposed a view of faith as propositional hope. According to this account,
to have faith is to voluntarily allow one’s involuntary propositional hope that
Christianity is true to have an impact on one’s mental life. Propositional hope
is a sub-doxastic propositional attitude. It consists of belief about possibility
or probability and a desire or some positive evaluation. Because of this, faith
as propositional hope involves the cognitive and the evaluative-affective
aspects of faith. The practical aspect is not included, but suitable actions count
as acting out one’s faith. Moreover, the actions should be tentative, since it is
not clear whether or how often strong practical commitments are permissible
with  such  epistemically  weak  attitudes  as  hope.  I  suggested  that  faith  as
propositional  hope  may  fit  in  a  broadly  Plantingian  scheme  as  the  weakest
possible instantiation of the A/C model of faith. In its form Plantinga’s model
is in any case the closest relative to the view of faith as propositional hope.
In light of what has been said some comments can be made about what it
may mean in Jamesian terms to adopt the Christian hypothesis, when it is seen
as  a  live  hypothesis  or  a  hypothesis  involved  in  a  genuine  option.  Firstly,  it
seems that a person who sees Christianity as a live hypothesis must already
have some uncertain but nonetheless apposite cognitive and evaluative-
affective attitudes towards Christianity. As regards the evaluative-affective
attitudes, they consist of various positive evaluations and emotions.
Concerning the cognitive attitude alone, it seems that it is best conceived in
sub-doxastic terms as a belief of some kind or degree, since it is hard to see
what else it could be. This is because such propositional attitudes as hope and
Audi’s faith, which are prima facie non-doxastic attitudes, ultimately appear
to reduce to complex attitudes whose cognitive components consist of a belief
of some kind. The cognitive and evaluative-affective attitudes in question are
not  directly  voluntary,  but  arise  due  to  broadly  evidential  and  emotional  or
passional factors. Maybe from the Christian or theological viewpoint having
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these attitudes could be seen as signs of having been to some extent instigated
by the Holy Spirit.
As to adopting the Christian hypothesis, this is likely best conceived as a
person deciding to let the stated pre-existing cognitive and evaluative-affective
attitudes have an impact on her mental and practical life. Such adoption can
be  explicated  in  terms  of  some  suitable  notions  of  acceptance,  such  as
pragmatic acceptance and a specific kind of cognitive acceptance. The
adoption is then a matter of putting the hypothesis into practice (pragmatic
acceptance) and it has intrinsic mental significance, too (cognitive
acceptance). While seeing Christianity as a live hypothesis is not something
one can directly produce at will, adopting or accepting it is at least from the
philosophical viewpoint a voluntary decision. So, instead of James’s slogan
“The  Will  to  Believe”  I  would  prefer  “The  Will  to  Accept”.  But  whether
adopting the Christian hypothesis is a voluntary decision from the theological
viewpoint  is  not  obvious.  That  will  depend,  for  example,  on  the  presumed
theological views about the nature and scope of God’s grace.
157
REFERENCES
Abraham, William
1990 “The  Epistemological  Significance  of  the  Inner  Witness  of  the
Holy Spirit”. Faith and Philosophy Vol. 7 No. 4, 434-450.
Adler, Jonathan
2002 Belief’s Own Ethics. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Ala-Prinkkilä, Jouko
2014 Todennäköisin vaihtoehto. Richard Swinburnen käsitys
kristillisen teismin rationaalisuudesta. Vantaa: STKSJ 278.
Alston, William
1988 “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification”.
Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 2, 257-299.
1989 Divine Nature and Human Language. Essays in Philosophical
Theology. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
1991 Perceiving God. The Epistemology of Religious Experience.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
1992 “Concluding Reactions”. Faith, Reason, and Skepticism. Eds.
William  Alston  and  Marcus  Hester.  Philadelphia:  Temple
University Press, 155-159.
1994 “Swinburne  on  Faith  and  Belief”. Reason and the Christian
Religion. Essays in Honour of Richard Swinburne. Ed. Alan
Padgett. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 21-37.
1995 “Realism and the Christian Faith”. International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion Vol. 38 No. 1, 37-60.
1996a ”Belief, Acceptance, and Religious Faith”. Faith, Freedom, and
Rationality. Eds. Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder. Boston:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 3–27.
1996b A Realist Conception of Truth. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
2007 “Audi on Non-Doxastic Faith”. Rationality and the Good. Critical
Essays on the Ethics and Epistemology of Robert Audi. Eds. Mark
Timmons et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 123–139.
Amesbury, Richard,
2012 "Fideism". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter
2012  Edition).  Ed.  Edward  Zalta.  URL  =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/fideism/>
Aquinas, Thomas
1952 Summa Theologiae. Ed. Petri Caramello. Torino: Marietti.
Audi, Robert
1972 “The Concept of Believing”. The Personalist Vol. 53 No. 1, 43–62.
1991 “Faith, Belief, and Rationality”. Philosophical Perspectives Vol. 5,
213-239.
1992 “Rationality and Religious Commitment”. Faith, Reason, and
Skepticism.  Eds.  William  Alston  and  Marcus  Hester.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 50-79.
1993 “The Dimensions of Faith and the Demands of Reason”. Reasoned
Faith. Ed. Eleonore Stump. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Summary
158
1994 “Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe”. Noûs Vol. 28
No. 4, 419-434.
2003 “The  Theology  of  Faith  and  the  Ethics  of  Love:  A  Philosophical
Perspective”. Religion in der Moderne. Ed. Rainer Berndt.
Wurzburg: Echter, 321-346.
2007 “Justifying Ground, Justified Beliefs, and Rational Acceptance”.
Rationality and the Good. Critical Essays on the Ethics and
Epistemology of Robert Audi. Eds. Mark Timmons et al. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 222-247.
2008 “Belief, Faith, and Acceptance”. International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion Vol. 63 No. 1, 87–102.
2011 Rationality and Religious Commitment. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Beilby, James
2005 Epistemology as Theology. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing
Company.
2007 “Plantinga’s Model of Warranted Christian Belief”. Alvin
Plantinga. Ed. Deane-Peter Baker. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 125–165.
Bem, Daryl
1972 “Self-perception Theory”. Advances in Experimental and Social
Psychology. Ed. Leonard Berkowitz. New York: Academy Press,
1-62.
Beversluis, John
1995 “Reforming the ‘Reformed’ Objection to Natural Theology”. Faith
and Philosophy Vol. 12 No. 2, 189-206.
Bishop, John
2002 “Faith as Doxastic Venture”. Religious Studies Vol. 38 No. 4, 471–
487.
2003 “Believing by Faith and the Concept of God”. Thinking Outside the
Square. Church in Middle Earth.  Eds.  Ree  Boddé  and  Hugh
Kempster. Auckland: St Columba’s Press and Journeyings, 1-11.
2004 “How to  Answer  the  De  Jure  Question  about  Christian  Belief?”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Vol. 56 No. 2,
109-129.
2005 “On the Possibility of a Doxastic Venture: a Reply to Buckareff”.
Religious Studies Vol. 41 No. 4, 447–451.
2007 Believing by Faith. An Essay in the Epistemology and Ethics of
Religious Belief. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
2010 “Faith”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010
Edition).  Ed.  Edward  Zalta.  URL  =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/faith/>.
Braithwaite, Richard
1955 An Empiricist’s View of the Nature of Religious Belief.
Cambridge: University Press.
Broackes, Justin
1986 “Belief De Re and De Dicto”. The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 36
No. 144, 374-383.
Brunner, Emil
159
1956 Faith, Hope, and Love. Transl. by Olive Wyon. Philadelphia:
Westminster Press.
Buber, Martin
1923 Ich und Du. Leipzig: Insel Verlag.
Buckareff, Andrei
2004 “Acceptance and Deciding to Believe”. Journal of Philosophical
Research Vol. 29, 173-191.
2005 “Can Faith Be a Doxastic Venture?” Religious Studies Vol. 41 No.
4, 435-445.
2009 “Permissible Faith Ventures”. Sophia Vol. 48 No. 1, 85-90.
2011 “Action-individuation and Doxastic Agency”. Theoria Vol. 77 No.
4, 312-332.
Byrne, Peter
1998 The Moral Interpretation of Religion. Grand Rapids: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company.
Calvin, John
1986 Institutes of Christian Religion.  Trans.  by  Ford  Lewis  Battles.
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co.
Chignell, Andrew
2010 “The Ethics of Belief”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Spring  2013  Edition).  Ed  Edward  Zalta.  URL  =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/ethics-
belief/>.
2013 “Prolegomena to Any Future Non-doxastic Religion”. Religious
Studies Vol. 49 No. 2, 195-207.
Clark, Kelly James (ed.)
1993 Philosophers Who Believe. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press.
Classen, H. G.
1979 “Will, Belief and Knowledge”. Dialogue Vol. 18 No. 1, 64-72.
Clifford, W. K.
1879 “The Ethics of Belief”. Lectures and Essays of the Late William
Kingdon Clifford Vol. 2. Eds. Leslie Stephen and Frederick
Pollock. London: Macmillan, 177-211.
Cohen, L. Jonathan
1992 An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Creel, Richard
1993 “Faith, Hope, and Faithfulness”. Faith and Philosophy Vol. 10 No.
3, 330-344.
Cupitt, Don
1980 Taking Leave of God. London: SCM Press.
Day, J. P.
1991 Hope. A Philosophical Inquiry. Helsinki: Hakapaino Oy.
Deweese-Boyd, Ian
2012 “Self-Deception”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Spring  2012  Edition).  Ed.  Edward  Zalta.  URL  =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/self-
deception/>.
Dole, Andrew and Chignell, Andrew (eds.)
Summary
160
2005 God  and  the  Ethics  of  Belief. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Duns Scotus, John
1950- Opera Omnia. Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis.
Edgely, Roy
1969 Reason in Theory and Practice. London: Hutchinson.
Engel, Pascal
2004 “Truth and the Aim of Belief”. Laws and Models in Science. Ed.
Donald Gillies. London: King’s College Publications, 77-97.
Eklund, Dan-Johan
2012 “Uskonnollisen uskon tahdonvaraisuus modernissa teistisessä
uskonnonfilosofiassa”. Teologinen Aikakauskirja 5, 446-458.
2014 “Is Non-evidential Believing Possible? John Bishop on
Passionally Caused Beliefs”. Religious Studies Vol. 50 No. 3, 309-
320.
Everitt, Nicholas
2004 The Non-existence of God. Abingdon: Routledge.
Fales, Evan
2004 “Proper Basicality”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Vol. LXVIII No. 2, 373-383.
Farmer, Herbert
1942 The Servant of the Word. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Festinger, Leon and Carlsmith, J. M.
1959 “Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance”. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology Vol. 58 No. 2, 203-210.
Flew, Antony
1976 The Presumption of Atheism. London: Elek/Pemberton.
Flint, Thomas
1998 Divine Providence. The Molinist Account. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Foley, Richard
1994 “Pragmatic Reasons for Belief”. Gambling  on  God.  Essays  on
Pascal’s Wager. Ed. Jeff Jordan. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman
and Littlefield Publishers, 31-46.
Forster, Michael
2002 "Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher", The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). Ed. Edward
Zalta. URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2008/entries/schleiermacher/>
Frege, Gottlob
1892 “Ûber Sinn und Bedeutung” Zeitschrift für Philosophie und
philosophische Kritik Vol. 100 No. 1, 25–50.
1956 “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry”. Mind Vol. 65 No. 259, 289-311.
Gale, Richard
1999 The  Divided  Self  of  William  James. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Ginet, Carl
161
2001 “Deciding to Believe”. Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. Essays on
Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 63-76.
Golding, Joshua
1990 “Toward a Pragmatic Conception of Religious Faith”. Faith and
Philosophy Vol. 7 No. 4, 486–503.
2003 Rationality and Religious Theism. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Govier, Trudy
1976 “Belief, Values, and the Will”. Dialogue Vol. 15 No. 4, 642-663.
Greenspan, Patricia
1988 Emotions and Reasons. An Inquiry into Emotional Justification.
New York: Routledge.
Griffioen, Amber
2014 “(Ad-)ventures in Faith. A Critique of Bishop’s Doxastic Venture
Model”. Religious Studies, available on CJO2014.
doi:10.1017/S003441251400047X.
Hakli, Raul
2006 “Group Beliefs and the Distinction between Belief and
Acceptance”. Cognitive Systems Research Vol.  7  No.  2-3,  286-
297.
Heil, John
1984 “Doxastic Incontinence”. Mind Vol. 93 No. 369, 56-70.
Helm, Paul
1992 “Faith, Evidence, and the Scriptures”. Scripture and Truth. Eds.
D. A. Carson and John D. Woodbridge. Grand Rapids: Baker Book
House, 303-320.
1998 “John  Calvin,  the  Sensus  Divinitatis,  and  the  Noetic  Effects  of
Sin”. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Vol.  43
No. 2, 87-107.
2000 Faith with Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Herrmann, Eberhard
2004 Religion, Reality, and a Good Life. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.
Himma, Kenneth
2006 “Christian Belief without Belief that God Exists: Defense of
Pojman’s Conception of Faith”. Faith and Philosophy Vol. 23 No.
1, 65-79.
Hintikka, Jaakko
1962 Knowledge and Belief. An Introduction to the Logic of the Two
Notions. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Holyer, Robert
1983 “Belief and Will Revisited”. Dialogue Vol. 22 No. 2, 273-290.
Howard-Snyder, Daniel
2013 “Propositional  Faith:  What It  Is  and What It  Is  Not”. American
Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 50 No. 4, 357-372.
Hume, David
1896 A  Treatise  of  Human  Nature. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
James, William
Summary
162
1897 The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New
York: Longmans Green and Co.
Järveläinen, Petri
2000 A Study on Religious Emotions. Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-
Society.
Jeffreys, Derek
1997 “How Reformed is Reformed Epistemology? Alvin Plantinga and
Calvin’s ‘Sensus Divinitatis’”. Religious Studies Vol. 33 No. 4, 419-
431.
Jenkins, John
1997 Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Jones, Ward
1998 “Religious Conversion, Self-Deception, and Pascal’s Wager”.
Journal of History of Philosophy Vol. 36 No. 2, 167-188.
Jordan, Jeff
1994 “The Many Gods Objection”. Gambling on God. Essays on
Pascal’s Wager. Ed. Jeff Jordan. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman
and Littlefield Publishers, 101-114.
1996 “Pragmatic Arguments and Belief”. American Philosophical
Quarterly Vol. 33 No. 4, 409-420.
1997 “Pragmatic Arguments”. A Companion to Philosophy of Religion.
Eds. Charles Taliaferro and Philip Quinn. Oxford: Basil Blackwell
Publishers, 352-359.
2005 “Pascal’s Wagers and James’s Will to Believe”. The Oxford
Handbook for Philosophy of Religion. Ed. William Wainwright.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 168-187.
2006 Pascal’s  Wager.  Pragmatic  Arguments  and  Belief  in  God.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2013 “Pragmatic  Arguments  and  Belief  in  God”. The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition). Ed. Edward
Zalta. URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
win2014/entries/pragmatic-belief-god/>
Kant, Immanuel
2009 Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Transl. by Werner S.
Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co.
Kenny, Anthony
1979 The God of the Philosophers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1983 Faith and Reason. New York: Columbia University Press.
1992 What Is Faith? Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Kierkegaard, Søren
1968 Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Transl. by Walter Lowrie and
David F. Swenson. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1992 Concluding Unscientific Postscript.  Transl.  by Howard V.  Hong
and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kinghorn, Kevin
2005 The Decision of Faith: Can Christian Beliefs Be Freely Chosen?
New York: T & T Clark International.
163
Knuuttila, Simo
1986 “Usko, järki ja tulevaisuus”. Tulevaisuus: Juhlakirja akateemikko
Georg Henrik von Wrightin 70-vuotispäivän kunniaksi.
Helsinki: Otava, 294–315.
Koistinen, Timo
2000 Philosophy of Religion or Religious Philosophy? A Critical Study
of Contemporary Anglo-American Approaches. Helsinki: Luthe-
Agricola-Society.
Kvanvig, Jonathan (ed.)
1996 Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Essays in Honor of
Plantinga’s Theory of Knowledge. London: Rowman & Littlefield
Publishers.
Lad Sessions, William
1993 “The Certainty of Faith”. Faith in Theory and Practice. Essays on
Justifying Religious Belief. Eds. Elizabeth Radcliffe and Carol J.
White. Chicago: Open Court, 75-89.
1994 The Concept of Faith. A Philosophical Investigation. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Lagerspetz, Olli
1998 Trust: The Tacit Demand. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Lehrer, Keith
1996 “Proper Function versus Systematic Coherence”. Warrant in
Contemporary Epistemology. Essays in Honor of Plantinga’s
Theory of Knowledge. Ed. Jonathan Kvanvig. London: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishers.
Mackie, John
1982 The Miracle of Theism. Arguments for and against the Existence
of God. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Maitzen, Stephen
1991 “Swinburne on Creedal Belief”. Philosophy of Religion Vol. 29 No.
3, 143-157.
Makinson, David
1965 “The Paradox of the Preface”. Analysis Vol. 25 No. 6, 205-207.
Mascord, Keith
2006 Alvin Plantinga and Christian Apologetics. Milton Keynes:
Paternoster.
Mavrodes, George
1988 Revelation in Religious Belief. Philadelphia: Temple University
Press.
McGrath, Alister
1994 Christian Theology. An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell.
McGrath, Matthew
2012 “Propositions”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2014 Edition) Ed. Edward Zalta. URL = <http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/propositions/>.
McKay, Thomas and Nelson, Michael
2010 “Propositional Attitude Reports”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Spring  2014  Edition).  Ed.  Edward  Zalta.  URL  =
Summary
164
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/prop-
attitude-reports/>
McLeod, Carolyn
2011 “Trust”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014
Edition).  Ed.  Edward  Zalta.  URL  =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/trust/>
Meadors, Edward
2006 Idolatry and the Hardening of the Heart. London: T&T Clark.
Meek, E. L.
1997 “A Polanyian Interpretation of Calvin’s Sensus Divinitatis”.
Presbyterion Vol. 23 No. 1, 8-24.
Mele, Alfred
1986 “Incontinent Believing”. Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 36 No. 143,
212-222.
1987 Irrationality.  An  Essay  on  Akrasia,  Self-Deception,  and  Self-
Control. New York: Oxford University Press.
2001 Self-Deception Unmasked. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mill, John Stuart
1874 Three Essays on Religion. New York: Henry Holt & Co.
Miller, Dickinson
1942 “James’s Doctrine of ‘The Right to Believe’”. The Philosophical
Review Vol. 51 No. 6, 541-558.
Montmarquet, James
1986 “The Voluntariness of Belief”. Analysis Vol. 46 No. 1, 49-53.
Morris, Thomas
1994a “Wagering and the Evidence”. Gambling on God. Essays on
Pascal’s Wager. Ed. Jeff Jordan. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman
and Littlefield Publishers, 47-60.
Morris, Thomas (ed.)
1994b God and the Philosophers. New York: Oxford University Press.
Moser, Paul
2008 The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
2010 The Evidence for God. Religious Knowledge Reexamined. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Mourad, Ronney
2008 “Choosing to Believe”. International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion Vol. 63 No. 1, 55-69.
Muyskens, James
1974a “Kant’s Moral Argument”. Southern Journal of Philosophy Vol.
12 No. 4, 425-434.
1974b “Religious-Belief as Hope”. International Journal for Philosophy
of Religion Vol. 5 No. 4, 246-253.
1979 The Sufficiency of Hope. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
1980 “The Apologetic Force of a Theology of Hope”. Scottish Journal of
Theology Vol. 33 No. 2, 101-120.
Pappas, George
165
2014 “Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic
Justification”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
2014 Edition). Ed. Edward Zalta. URL = <http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/justep-intext/>.
Pascal, Blaise
1966 Pensées. Transl. by A. J. Krailsheimer. London: Penguin.
Penelhum, Terence
1995 Reason and Religious Faith. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
2013 “Religion after Atheism”. Religious Studies Vol.  49  No.  2,  249-
255.
Peterson, Michael et al.
1991 Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy
of Religion. New York: Oxford University Press.
Phillips, D. Z.
1993 “On Really Believing”. Is God Real? Ed. Joseph Runzo. New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 85-108.
Plantinga, Alvin
1983 “Reason and Belief in God”. Faith and Rationality. Reason and
Belief in God.  Eds.  Alvin  Plantinga  and  Nicholas  Wolterstorff.
Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 16-93.
1991 “The Prospects for Natural Theology”. Philosophical Perspectives
Vol. 5, 287-316.
1993a Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1993b Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2000 Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2001 “Internalism, Externalism, Defeaters, and Arguments for
Christian Belief”. Philosophica Christi Vol. 3 No. 2, 379-400.
2007 “Appendix: Two Dozen (or So) Theistic Arguments”. Alvin
Plantinga. Ed. Deane-Peter Baker. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 203-227.
Plantinga, Alvin and Wolterstorff, Nicholas (eds.)
1983 Faith and Rationality. Reason and Belief in God. Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.
Le Poidevin, Robin
1996 Arguing for Atheism. An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Religion. New York: Routledge.
Pojman, Louis
1985 “Believing and Willing”. Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 15
No. 1, 37-55.
1986a Religious Belief and the Will. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
1986b “Faith without Belief”. Faith and Philosophy Vol. 3 No. 2, 157-176.
2001 Philosophy of Religion. California: Mayfield Publishing
Company.
2003 “Faith,  Doubt  and  Hope  or  Does  Faith  Entail  Belief?” The
Existence of God.  Eds.  Richard  Gale  and  Alexander  Pruss.
Trowbridge, Wiltshire: The Cromwell Press, 535-549.
Price, H. H.
1969 Belief. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd.
Pruss, Alexander
Summary
166
2002 “Christian Faith and Belief”. Faith and Philosophy Vol. 19 No. 3,
291-303.
Pruss, Alexander and Gale, Richard
2003 “Introduction”. The Existence of God.  Eds.  Richard  Gale  and
Alexander Pruss. Trowbridge, Wiltshire: The Cromwell Press, xi-
lviii.
Quine, W. V. O.
1956 “Quantifiers and Propositional Atittudes”. The  Journal  of
Philosophy Vol. 53 No. 5, 177-187.
Quinn, Philip
1994 “Moral Objections to Pascalian Wagering”. Gambling on God.
Essays on Pascal’s Wager. Ed. Jeff Jordan. Lanham, Maryland:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 61-82.
Radcliffe, Dana
1995 “Nondoxastic Faith: Audi on Religious Commitment”.
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion Vol. 37 No. 2,
73-86.
Ramsey, Frank
1926 “Truth and Probability”. Foundations of Mathematics and Other
Logical Essays.  Ed.  Richard  Braithwaite.  London:  Kegan  Paul,
1931.
Richard, Mark
1990 Propositional  Attitudes:  An  Essay  on  Thoughts  and  How  We
Ascribe Them. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ross, James
1985 “Aquinas on Belief and Knowledge”. Essays Honoring Allan B.
Wolter. Eds. W. A. Frank and G. J. Etzkorn. Franciscan Institute,
243-269.
1986 “Believing for Profit”. The Ethics of Belief Debate.  Ed.  Gerald
McCarthy. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 221-235.
Ryan, Sharon
2003 “Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief”. Philosophical
Studies Vol. 114 No. 1-2, 47-79.
Schellenberg, J. L.
2005 Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
2007 The Wisdom to Doubt. A Justification of Religious Skepticism.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
2009 The Will to Imagine. A Justification of Skeptical Religion. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
2013a “Replies to My Colleagues”. Religious Studies Vol. 49 No. 2, 257-
285.
2013b Evolutionary Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shah, Nishi
2002 “Clearing Space for Doxastic Voluntarism”. The Monist Vol. 85
No. 3, 436-445.
Stiver, Dan
1996 The Philosophy of Religious Language. Sign, Symbol, and Story.
Gateshead: Athenaeum Press Ltd.
167
Stump, Eleonore
1991 “Aquinas on Faith and Goodness”. Being  and  Goodness.  The
Concept of the Good in Metaphysics and Philosophical Theology.
Ed. Scott MacDonald. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 179-207.
Swinburne, Richard
1977 The Coherence of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
1979 The Existence of God. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
1981 Faith and Reason. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
1989 Responsibility and Atonement. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
1991 Revelation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
1993 The Coherence of Theism. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
1994 The Christian God. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
1998 Providence and the Problem of Evil. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
2001a “Plantinga on Warrant”. Religious Studies Vol. 37 No. 2, 203-214.
2001b Epistemic Justification. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
2004 The Existence of God. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
2005 Faith and Reason. 2nd Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Tennant, F. R.
1943 The Nature of Belief. London: Centenary Press.
Thomas, Nigel
2014 “Mental Imagery”. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
2014 Edition). Ed. Edward Zalta. URL = http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/mental-imagery/
Tillich, Paul
1957 Dynamics of Faith. New York: HarperCollins.
Tuomela, Raimo
2000 ”Belief versus Acceptance”. Philosophical Explorations Vol. 3 No.
2, 122-137.
Vahid, Hamid
2009 ”Alston on Belief and Acceptance in Religious Faith”. The
Heythrop Journal Vol. 50 No. 1, 23-30.
Van Inwagen, Peter
1983 An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2006 The Problem of Evil. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wainwright, William
1995 Reason and the Heart. A Prolegomenon to a Critique of Passional
Reason. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Wegner, Daniel
1994 “Ironic Processes of Mental Control”. Psychological Review Vol.
101 No. 1, 34-52.
Williams, Bernard
1973 Problems of the Self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Winters, Barbara
1979 “Believing at Will”. Journal of Philosophy Vol. 76 No. 5, 243-256.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig
1958 Philosophical Investigations. 2nd Edition. Transl. by Elizabeth
Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Summary
168
1969 “On Certainty”.  Transl.  by Elizabeth Anscombe and Denis Paul.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Yandell, Keith
1990 “The Nature of Faith: Religious, Monotheistic, and Christian”.
Faith and Philosophy Vol. 7 No. 4, 451-469.
Zagzebski, Linda
1993 “Religious  Knowledge  and  the  Virtues  of  the  Mind”. Rational
Faith. Catholic Responses to Reformed Epistemology. Ed. Linda
Zagzebski. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,
199-225.
1991 The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Zeis, John
2013 “Holding the Faith True”. Res Philosophica Vol. 90 No. 2, 161-170.
